Chapter 5: General Objects and Intentions of the Act SO 327(2)(a)

I Introduction

The Committee has approached this ground in two ways. First, it may ask itself whether the regulation is consistent with the intentions of the statute as a whole. Secondly, it may consider whether the regulation-making power in the Act authorises the making of such a regulation. In a sense, this second enquiry is simply one component of the first enquiry. If a regulation is outside the terms of the regulation-making power, then arguably it will not be consistent with the intentions of the Act. For the purposes of this analysis, however, it is helpful if the two approaches of the Committee are separated out in this way.

This Standing Order ground is one of the three most often discussed in the reports of the Regulations Review Committee.¹⁶³ The Statutes Revision Committee made two important points regarding it. First, its inclusion as a ground of review “is not intended to open the Regulations Review Committee to discussion on matters of policy. It is intended that the Committee deal only with the policy as written in general terms”.¹⁶⁴ The distinction is an important one. This ground requires the Committee to consider the objects and intentions of the Act under which the regulation was made. As a consequence, the Committee will consider the policy implicit in the Act to ascertain whether the regulations are consistent with that policy. Yet, in doing so, the Committee will not examine the merit of the policy itself, since this is outside the Committee’s jurisdiction.

The second point made by the Statutes Revision Committee is that this ground does not allow the Regulations Review Committee to invalidate a regulation on the basis that it is ultra vires the empowering Act. Rather, this is a matter for the courts. The Regulations Review Committee concurs with this view. It has stated that a finding of ultra vires and a breach of Standing Order 327(2)(a) are separate and distinct grounds of review.¹⁶⁵ The Committee did acknowledge, however, that of all the grounds listed in Standing Orders 327(2), this ground is “closest to raising the question of ultra vires”.¹⁶⁶ This is because a finding that the regulation was made outside the terms of the regulation-making power is tantamount to a finding that the regulation was made without proper authority. Yet, from a jurisdictional point of view, the distinction is important, since only a court can invalidate delegated legislation.

II Purpose of the Act

The Committee has taken a broad approach to deciding on the objects and intentions of any given Act. It is not uncommon for a complainant to argue that because a regulation is inconsistent with one part of the empowering Act, the regulation is not in accordance with the objects and intentions of the Act as a whole. The Committee has tended not to be drawn into such a narrow approach, preferring instead to look for the wider purpose of an Act.

For example, in its investigation into the Legal Services Board (Civil and Criminal Legal Aid Remuneration) Instructions 1998, the complainants argued that new guideline fees issued by the Legal Services Board for remuneration of practitioners providing legal aid were too low.¹⁶⁷ The complainants cited the long title of the Act: “An Act to make legal assistance more readily available to persons of insufficient means”. The complainants argued that practitioners would be unwilling to take on domestic violence work at such a low rate, and that this would have implications for the safety of victims of domestic violence. Yet the long title did not provide a complete picture of the objects and intentions of the Act. Section 95(1)(c) obliged the Board to ensure that the civil and legal aid schemes were as “inexpensive, expeditious, and efficient as is consistent with the spirit of the Act”. Thus, the Board was required to balance competing objectives and for this reason the regulations were not considered to be in breach of Standing Order 327(2)(a).

A similar approach was taken by the Committee in its investigation into the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance (Employment Premiums) Regulations 1995 and 1996.¹⁶⁸ Section 167 of the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 provided for regulations prescribing rates of premiums and risk-based classifications. The complainant company supported risk-based premiums, but argued that the phased introduction of the scheme was unreasonable because it prolonged cross-subsidisation of high-risk employers by low-risk employers. The complainant pointed to the long title of the Act that stated that the scheme was to be “insurance-based” and argued that to set premiums that were disproportionate to the actual risk an employer presented was inconsistent with the objects of the Act. The Committee responded by stating that the long title of an Act is only a précis of the purpose of the Act and should be read along with various provisions of the statute. The Committee found that the Act gave the Accident Compensation Corporation a broad discretion as to how it set premium rates. The regulations were not, therefore, considered to be in breach of this ground.¹⁶⁹

In 2005, the Committee reviewed a notice that prescribed the rental payments and costs that societies paid to gaming machine operators who ‘hosted’ their gaming machines.¹⁷⁰ The complainant (the Charity Gaming Association) argued that the level of payments had been set too low, and that this would discourage gaming machine operators from hosting machines. This would mean less money spent on gaming machines generally, which in turn would mean less money distributed to the community. In advancing its case, the complainant argued that this outcome would be contrary to the Gambling Act 2003 (the empowering Act). Section 3(g) provided that one of the purposes of the Act was to “ensure that money from gambling benefits the community”. The Committee was not persuaded. It stated that the requirement that gambling benefit the community did not in itself require that a certain level of gambling be maintained. It pointed out that section 3 identified a number of other purposes that also had to be taken into account. It further noted that any reduction in gambling that flowed from the notice was not inconsistent with an Act that sought to control the growth of gambling.

The Committee did find fault with the Accident Insurance (Review Costs and Appeals) Regulations 1999.¹⁷¹ The regulations were made pursuant to the Accident Insurance Act 1998 that introduced the market-model for the provision of accident compensation insurance. Section 405(d) of the Act provided for regulations to remunerate claimants for the costs of appealing a decision on an insurance claim. The Department of Labour openly acknowledged that remuneration levels were set at relatively low levels to discourage claimants from having legal representation in the review process. This, the Department argued, was because the review was intended to be an informal and non-litigious process. The Committee, however, concluded that the regulations breached Standing Order 327(2)(a). In the opinion of the Committee, a general object of the Act was to ensure equitable compensation for certain classes of personal injury. In addition, the Act reflected a clear legislative intention that all parties should have access to a fair and effective dispute resolution procedure. It was concluded that the regulations unjustifiably impeded the ability of an applicant to choose to be legally represented in this process by setting an inadequate rate of remuneration. If a claimant could not be legally represented in the review process, then the objects and intentions of the Act were being defeated.¹⁷²

If an Act sets a process for the vetting of regulations, such as a review panel, then it could be contrary to the purposes of the Act if that process is not followed in all material respects. Section 72 of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 required the Review Panel convened under that Act to have, inter alia, a member with legal expertise present to consider the regulations remitted to it. Due to a conflict of interest, the legal member recused themselves while considering the Canterbury Earthquake District Plan Order 2014.¹⁷³ A number of Committee members considered this to mean that the Act's purpose in having legal oversight had not been complied with, while other members did not believe the Act strictly set a quorum of legal expertise. As the Committee could not come to a decision in its investigation and the order was subsequently validated by Parliament, the issue is somewhat unresolved.

When regulations are used to set fees for a service, any significant increase in those fees may mean that the regulation is deemed to be inconsistent with the objects and intentions of the Act.¹⁷⁴ In 1998, the Committee undertook an investigation into the Disputes Tribunal Amendment Rules 1997 and 1998.¹⁷⁵ The Rules were made pursuant to the Disputes Tribunal Act 1988 which consolidated and amended the Small Claims Tribunal Act 1976. The long title of the Small Claims Tribunal Act 1976 provided that the Act was to make provision for the establishment of tribunals to hear and determine small claims. Fees for lodging a claim with the tribunal were doubled under the 1997 Rules and then further increased under the 1998 Rules. A majority of the Committee found that the Rules breached Standing Order 327(2)(a) on the basis that the fees were set at such a level that they created potential barriers to justice for low income earners. In addition, in some cases the fees represented too high a proportion of the total amount being claimed. The purpose of the Act was to provide relatively low cost access to a small claims court. In the opinion of the Committee, the fees had been set at such a level that this object was being unjustifiably frustrated.

Similar issues were dealt with by the Regulations Review Committee in its investigation into fee increases for civil proceedings in the Disputes Tribunal, District Court, High Court, and Court of Appeal.¹⁷⁶ The fees were increased significantly in 2002, and then increased further in 2004. The complainants argued that the fee increases defeated the purposes of the empowering legislation (the Judicature Act 1908 and the District Courts Act 1947) by creating barriers to accessing the courts. In response, the Department for Courts suggested that the emphasis in both Acts was on administrative matters relating to how courts operated. In other words, how court services are to be provided rather than why they exist at all. Both Committees concluded that the empowering Acts went beyond merely providing for the administration of courts, and further, that access to justice was among the general objects of each Act. In the 2002 report, the Committee felt unable to draw conclusions as to whether Standing Order 327(2)(a) had been breached given that the impact of the fee increases could not be established conclusively. However, in the 2005 report, the Committee identified certain types of fees that it considered excessive and which it declared not to be in accordance with the objects and intentions of the empowering legislation.

More recently, the Committee, in its investigation into the Resource Management (Forms, Fees, and Procedure) Amendment Regulations 2009, expressed concern that an increase in the filing fee for commencing proceedings in the Environment Court from $55 to $500 could unduly affect access to the Court in breach of SO 327(2)(a).¹⁷⁷ On the evidence available, however, it was unable to establish whether the increase was having such an effect. Accordingly, it issued an interim report giving the complainants an opportunity to re-open the complaint within a year’s time should new evidence about the increased fee’s operation arise. It recommended that the government take note of the interim report and monitor the effect of the fee increase on deterring persons from commencing proceedings in the Court; and the way in which the Registrar exercises his or her power to waive the fee. The government response accepted the Committee’s recommendations and set out how the government proposed to monitor the operation of the fee increase and the exercise of the Registrar’s waiver power.¹⁷⁸ In its final report on the complaint - issued approximately two years after the initial report - the Committee noted that, on the available evidence, it was not able to determine whether or not the new filing fee was having a deterrent effect on access to the Environment Court.¹⁷⁹ It encouraged the government to continue monitoring the effect of filing fee, and invited the complainants to re-submit their complaint, should new evidence of a deterrent effect arise.

In contrast, the Committee was not convinced that the extent of an increase in the annual practising fees for midwives from $50 in 2003 to $600 in 2006 was in itself objectionable in terms of Standing Order 327(2)(a).¹⁸⁰ However, it did find the Standing Order ground was made out in relation to the charging of fees in excess of cost in order to maintain a financial reserve. The Committee took the view that the empowering Act gave the Midwifery Council a broad power to levy the fees necessary to carry out its functions; and it accepted that the fees set were comparable to those set by other health regulatory agencies and reflected the cost of setting up the body. It noted, though, that there are general principles to be followed when public sector agencies set fees by regulation, which are contained in the Office of the Auditor General’s Guidelines on Costing and Charging for Public Sector Goods and Services and the Treasury’s Guidelines Setting Charges in the Public Sector.¹⁸¹ A breach of these principles might amount to a breach of one or more of the Standing Order grounds. One of the principles in the guidelines is that charging more than the expected costs in order to maintain a financial reserve is not permitted (except where permitted by the empowering legislation). The rationale being that public sector agencies should not overcharge for services, and not gather revenue amounting to a tax. The Committee found that in this instance the empowering legislation did not allow the charging of fees in excess of costs and, therefore, the 2005 notice was outside the objects and intentions of the statute under which it was made.¹⁸²

The Committee took a similar approach to the purpose of the empowering Act with regard to a sharp tightening of a time limit in its report on the Legal Services Regulations 2012.¹⁸³ The regulations, authorised by the empowering Act, set the timeframe for legal aid service providers to claim payment from the Ministry of Justice at three months (whereas previously there had been no time limit). The Committee assessed the time limit against the purpose of the empowering Act, which was found to be the delivery of services in an effective and efficient manner. It found that, while the existence of a time limit was not inconsistent with the purposes of the Act, such time limits needed to be set reasonably having regard to the statutory purpose identified. Applying this approach, the Committee took the view that the administrative burden on service providers and both the high level of delay and a significant backlog on the part of the Ministry meant that the current time limit did not provide for effective or efficient service delivery and that, accordingly, an SO 327(2)(a) complaint was made out. The Committee did not recommend disallowance on this ground because, since the complaint was laid, the regulation had been amended to provide a six month limit, which the Committee considered would be consistent with the purpose of the empowering Act.

The Committee also raised concerns, in response to a complaint, about whether the Social Security (Income and Cash Assets Exemptions) Regulations 2011 were not in accordance with the general objects and intentions of their empowering legislation.¹⁸⁴ The Regulations made compensation and ex gratia payments from the Crown exempt from certain social security calculations – but not compensation and payments from non-Crown bodies – and imposed a 12-month time limit on any exemption. The Committee recommended the Minister of Social Development consider the concerned raised. As a result, subsequent regulations extended the exemptions to non-Crown compensation and payments, as well as removing the 12-month time limit.

III Regulation-Making Powers

The crucial aspect of any delegated law-making power, as noted earlier, is the extent to which restrictions are placed on the use of that power. This is done by specifying the purposes for which regulations may be made. In deciding whether a regulation is in accordance with the objects and intentions of an Act, the Committee may undertake an examination as to whether the content of the regulation fits with one of the purposes specified.

A A Matter of Interpretation

In 1991, the Committee received a complaint regarding the Lake Taupo Regulations 1976. Section 232(11) of the Harbours Act 1950 allowed regulations to be made to regulate the use of wharves or docks, quays, landing stages and other landing places. Regulation 27(1) provided that no person shall use a launching ramp on Lake Taupo, but that it shall be a defence to a charge of doing so if a valid permit is held. Permit holders were required to pay a fee to obtain the permit. The Committee was of the opinion that the Department of Internal Affairs had no authority to charge a fee for use of the ramps under section 232(11). The Committee rejected the argument that implicit in the power to “regulate” the facilities was a power to charge fees to recover costs. It concluded that unless there was clear authority to impose a charge for a service, a body exercising delegated authority had no right to do so. Accordingly, the regulations were deemed to be in breach of this Standing Order ground.

B The ‘General’ Purpose

A list of specific purposes for which regulations may be made is often accompanied by a ‘general’ purpose. This typically authorises regulations to be made for such matters as are contemplated or are necessary for giving full effect to the provisions of the Act under which the regulations are made. The common law has constructed this type of provision to cover matters that are ancillary or incidental to what is enacted in the statute, but does not support a widening of, or departure from, the underlying intent and purpose of the Act.¹⁸⁵ Likewise, in 1962 the Delegated Legislation Committee stated that the general purpose authorised the making of regulations for subsidiary or incidental matters only, a view shared by the Regulations Review Committee.¹⁸⁶ Recently, the Committee has noted that any regulations adding extra regulatory steps to existing processes that are neither contemplated by the empowering Act nor necessary to fulfil the purpose of that Act, will likely breach this Standing Order ground.¹⁸⁷

Section 165(x) of the Biosecurity Act 1993 allowed regulations to be made “providing for such matters as may be contemplated by or are necessary for giving full effect to this Act and for its administration”.¹⁸⁸ The Biosecurity (Rabbit Calicivirus) Regulations 1997 were made pursuant to section 165(x). The effect of the regulations was that it was no longer an offence under section 21 of the Animals Act 1967 to introduce or possess the rabbit-killing ‘calicivirus’ in New Zealand. The Ministry of Agriculture claimed section 165(x) properly authorised the making of the regulations. The Committee disagreed. It stated that “this type of provision authorises subsidiary and incidental matters but cannot be used to broaden the scope of regulations and include matters that would be more appropriately dealt with by parliamentary enactment”.¹⁸⁹ It was felt that as the regulations were highly contentious, and because they amended the application of the Animals Act 1967, the regulations contained matters more appropriate for parliamentary enactment. In the Committee’s opinion, the regulations could not be described as merely incidental or subsidiary and were not authorised by the section 165(x) ‘general’ power.

C Conditions that Attach to the Regulation-Making Power

A regulation-making power may be limited not only by the purposes specified in the regulation-making power but also by other conditions placed on the use of that power. For example, section 28(1) of the Citizenship Act 1977 allowed regulations to be made prescribing fees payable for an application for citizenship. Section 28(2) provided that every fee must be “reasonable” having regard to the costs and expenses incurred by the department in processing the application. The Citizenship Regulations 1978, Amendment No 6 increased the costs of applications, while requiring child applicants to pay the same amount as an adult.¹⁹⁰ Having considered the work required to process a child’s application, the Committee concluded that the fee was being used to cross-subsidise the costs of adults’ applications, and that this was unreasonable.¹⁹¹ Given that section 28(2) required any fees to be reasonable, the regulations were deemed to be not in accordance with the objects of the empowering Act.¹⁹²

Before a regulation is made, a regulation-making power may require the individual or organisation exercising the power to undertake certain tasks or to consider certain matters relevant to the making of that regulation. On several occasions the Committee has had to consider whether a minister (or other body) failed to discharge certain obligations prior to the making of deemed regulations. In one instance, section 9(2) of the Land Transport Act 1993 required the Minister of Transport to take into account a number of factors prior to issuing a Land Transport Rule under section 5(e) of the Act (for instance, the cost of implementing land transport safety measures).¹⁹³ In reviewing Land Transport Rule 32012, the Committee examined whether the minister had considered all the matters specified in section 9(2). Having been satisfied that they had in fact been considered, the Committee found no breach of Standing Order 315(2)(a).

On another occasion, however, the Committee was not satisfied that all obligations had been met.¹⁹⁴ Prior to the issuing of a Food Standard under section 11C of the Food Act 1981, the Minister of Health was required to consider several matters, one of which was the need to protect the public. The New Zealand Food Standard 1996, Amendment No 11 imposed mandatory warning labels on all products containing royal jelly, bee pollen, or propolis. The complainants alleged that there was insufficient scientific and technical evidence to support the safety concerns that the standard purported to address. The Committee agreed and found that Ministry of Health had acted on inadequate information and had failed to produce a substantive and comparative risk-assessment for all three products. As a result, the Committee felt that it was not possible that the minister could have satisfied the requirement to consider the need to protect the public given that the information relied upon was inadequate for this purpose. The Committee stated that “while the Minister has a discretion in deciding the weight to be given to different considerations there must be evidence available to support the decision”.¹⁹⁵

More recently, the Committee considered a complaint from the Animal Rights Legal Advocacy Network in relation to a code of animal welfare.¹⁹⁶ Section 10 of the Animal Welfare Act 1999 requires owners of an animal to ensure that the physical, health, and behavioural needs of the animal are met in a manner that is consistent with good practice and scientific knowledge. Under the Act, codes can be issued establishing minimum standards for the care of animals and recommending best practices. The Animal Welfare (Layer Hens) Code of Welfare 2005 was issued pursuant to the Act, and amongst other things, provided for the minimum sizes of cages for layer hens to be up to 550sq cm per bird. The National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC) was the body charged with reviewing whether a proposed code included minimum standards necessary to ensure that the purposes of the Act would be met. NAWAC had recommended to the Minister of Agriculture that the code be issued. Yet, in its evidence to the committee, NAWAC openly acknowledged that the 550sq cm limit did not allow layer hens to display normal patterns of behaviour, and therefore that the code did not comply with section 10 of the Act. However, under section 73(3) NAWAC could recommend a code that did not meet the requirements of section 10 in “exceptional circumstances”. Under section 73(4), NAWAC had to take into account several factors in deciding whether exceptional circumstances existed.

In recommending that the code be issued, NAWAC had stated that uncertainty as to whether alternative layer systems (such as barn and free-range systems) would provide consistently better welfare outcomes for layer hens meant that exceptional circumstances did exist. While individual members of the Committee questioned the validity of this stance, in its report the Committee stated that “it is not our role to determine what is a good practice or what is the scientific basis of the welfare of layer hens under a code”.¹⁹⁷ The Committee nevertheless found the code to be in breach of Standing Order 327(2)(a). This was because NAWAC had stated that it would not review the use of the current cage systems until 2009. The Committee was of the view that it was stretching the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” to allow for a code that was in breach of section of the Act for such a long period. Accordingly, the Committee recommended that NAWAC review the code with a view to inserting a fixed date into the code specifying when a review would take place and providing for the transition to an alternative cage system.

The Committee reiterated their unwillingness to question expert evidence in a complaint about the Animal Welfare (Layer Hens) Code of Welfare 2012.¹⁹⁸ NAWAC had adopted a legal interpretation of s 10 of the Animal Welfare Act that may have amounted to an unusual use of regulatory authority, by distinguishing between welfare-essential and non-welfare- essential normal behaviours. The regulation could either be justified as reflecting NAWAC's expert judgment about hen behaviour or interpreted as rules adopted for improper reasons. The Committee could not be sure, even if the latter was the case, that a correct application of the Act would have resulted in a different code and was reluctant to find a breach accordingly.

A similar approach was taken when considering a complaint regarding the Shipping (Charges) Amendment Regulations 2013 and Marine Safety Charges Amendment Regulations 2013.¹⁹⁹ During consideration of the complaint, the Committee sought advice from the Office of the Auditor-General that indicated the fees and levies which were subject of the complaint were set using a reasonable, albeit opaque, process that was unlikely to exceed cost recovery. Therefore, the Committee considered the charges levied would not be so high as to frustrate the intention of Parliament (or be an improper use of regulatory power, or a matter more suited for parliamentary enactment).

D Legitimate use of Power Not Determinative

Even though a regulation has been made legitimately pursuant to a regulation-making power, the Committee might still conclude that the regulation is not in accordance with the objects and intentions of the empowering Act. For example, one of the objects and intentions of the Dairy Industry Restructuring Act 2001 was the promotion of efficient dairy markets by regulating Fonterra’s activities in order to provide a level playing field for competition.²⁰⁰ Section 115 of the Act permitted regulations requiring Fonterra to supply raw milk to independent processors at an agreed price or a price based on a methodology for determining that price. Regulation 8(6) of the Dairy Industry Restructuring (Raw Milk) Regulations 2001 established a formula for setting the default milk price of raw milk supplied to independent processors. The Committee accepted that the regulations were made legitimately, in that they were intended to promote the object of promoting a level playing field. However, it took the view that, in practice, the formula used and associated definitions for calculating the default price for raw milk supplied to independent processors were open to manipulation to such an extent that it undermined the objects and intentions of the Act. The Committee recommended amendments to regulation 8(6) to prevent such manipulation occurring. The government response directed the Ministry of Agriculture to incorporate the Committee’s findings into a general review of the regulations.²⁰¹

A further example related to regulations made pursuant to section 10 of the Reserve Bank Act 1964. Section 10 provided that unless authorised by regulation, it shall not be lawful for the Reserve Bank to engage in trade or have a financial interest in any commercial undertaking.²⁰² Clause 3 of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Order 1988 provided that the Bank was authorised to trade to the extent of acting as the agent of “any person” in regards to securities. This was done to allow the Bank to act for State Owned Enterprises. While finding that section 10 of the Act did allow for the regulation to be made, the Committee was of the opinion that the section 10 exemption was not intended to allow the Bank to become involved in trading activities beyond the public sector. By using the term “any person” in the Order, the Committee considered that it would be quite possible for the bank to act for private interests and thus contrary to the objects and intentions of the Act. The Committee recommended an amendment to the Order to make it clear that the Bank could only act for the public sector.

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163 The other two grounds most often discussed are SO 327(2)(b) (undue trespasses on personal rights and liberties) and 327(2)(c) (unusual or unexpected use of a regulation-making power).

164 Statutes Revision Committee “First Report on Delegated Legislation” [1985] AJHR I5A at 8.

165 Regulations Review Committee “Sixth Australasian and Pacific Conference on Delegated Legislation and Third Australasian and Pacific Conference on the Scrutiny of Bills” [1997] AJHR I16D at 11.

166 Regulations Review Committee “Sixth Australasian and Pacific Conference on Delegated Legislation and Third Australasian and Pacific Conference on the Scrutiny of Bills” [1997] AJHR I16D at 11 at 10.

167 Regulations Review Committee “Complaint Relating to Legal Services Board (Civil and Criminal Legal Aid Remuneration) Instructions 1998” [1998] AJHR I16M.

168 Regulations Review Committee “Complaint Relating to the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance (Employment Premiums) Regulations 1995 and 1996” [1997] AJHR I16C.

169 See Regulations Review Committee “Complaints Relating to the Accident Insurance (Insurer’s Liability to Pay Costs of Treatment) Regulations 1999” [1999] AJHR I16V, which also dealt with the objects and intention of the Accident Insurance Act 1998.

170 Regulations Review Committee “Complaint Regarding the Limits and Exclusions on Class 4 Venue Costs Notice 2004” [2005] AJHR I16M.

171 Regulations Review Committee “Complaints Relating to the Accident Insurance (Reviews Costs and Appeals) Regulations 1999” [1999] AJHR I16W.

172 A minority of the Committee believed that the non-litigious nature of the review process was beneficial and, therefore, that the level of remuneration was consistent with the empowering Act.

173 Regulations Review Committee "Investigation into the Canterbury Earthquake District Plan Order 2014" [2015] AJHR I16A.

174 The Committee has produced a report on the setting of fees by regulations. For a summary of the report see Chapter 14(II).

175 Regulations Review Committee “Investigation into the Disputes Tribunals Amendment Rules 1997 and the Disputes Tribunals Amendment Rules 1998”, above n 10.

176 Regulations Review Committee “Investigation and Complaints Relating to Civil Court Fees Regulations” [2002] AJHR I16M and Regulations Review Committee “Investigation and Complaints Relating to Civil Court Fees Regulations 2004” [2005] AJHR I16H.

177 Regulations Review Committee “Complaint regarding the Resource Management (Forms, Fees, and Procedure) Amendment Regulations 2009” [2009] AJHR I16C.

178 “Government Response to Interim Report of the Regulations Review Committee: complaints regarding SR 2009/73 Resource Management (Forms, Fees, and Procedure) Amendment Regulations 2009” [2010] AJHR J1 at 5.

179 Regulations Review Committee “Complaint Regarding the Resource Management (Forms, Fees, and Procedure) Amendment Regulations 2009 (SR 2009/73)” [2011] AJHR I16M.

180 Regulations Review Committee “Complaint Regarding Midwifery (Fees) Notice 2005” [2007] AJHR I16H at 9.

181 Office of the Auditor-General “Guidelines on Costing and Charging for Public Sector Goods and Services” (18 June 2008) <www.oag.govt.nz > and Treasury, “Guidelines for Setting Charges in the Public Sector” (27 June 2008) <www.treasury.govt.nz>.

182 It also found that this breached Standing Order ground 327(2)(f), see Chapter 10.

183 Regulations Review Committee “Complaint regarding the Legal Services Regulations 2011” (19 September 2013).

184 Regulations Review Committee “Complaint about the Social Security (Income and Cash Assets Exemptions) Regulations 2011” (September 2019).

185 Shanahan v Scott (1957) 96 CLR 245.

186 Regulations Review Committee “Inquiry into the Drafting of Empowering Provisions in Bills” [1990] AJHR I16.

187 Regulations Review Committee “Investigation into the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Reclamation Fees Regulations 2012” (30 September 2013).

188 Regulations Review Committee “Investigation into the Biosecurity (Rabbit Calicivirus) Regulations 1997” [1998] AJHR I16E.

189 Regulations Review Committee “Investigation into the Biosecurity (Rabbit Calicivirus) Regulations 1997” [1998] AJHR I16E at 8.

190 Previously applications from children that accompanied an adult’s application were processed free of charge.

191 Regulations Review Committee “Investigation into the Citizenship Regulations 1978, Amendment No 6, Promulgated under the Citizenship Act 1977 and their Impact on Children of Families Granted to New Zealand on Humanitarian, Re-unification, or Refugee Grounds” [1996] AJHR I16H.

192 See also Regulations Review Committee “Inquiry into the Accident Compensation (Accident Experience) Regulations 1992” [1992] AJHR I16G. In this instance, section 120 of the Accident Compensation Act 1992 contained the regulation-making power. An entirely separate section of the Act, s 40(2), placed conditions on the use of that regulation-making power. These conditions were not complied with when the regulations were made and the Committee recommended that the government review the regulations to correct the unfairness that had resulted.

193 Regulations Review Committee “Complaint Relating to Land Transport Rule 32012 - Vehicle Standards (Glazing)” [1998] AJHR I16K.

194 Regulations Review Committee “Complaint Relating to the New Zealand Food Standard 1996, Amendment No 11” [1999] AJHR I16Q.

195 Regulations Review Committee “Complaint Relating to the New Zealand Food Standard 1996, Amendment No 11” [1999] AJHR I16Q at 11.

196 Regulations Review Committee “Final Report on the Complaint About Animal Welfare (Layer Hens) Code of Welfare 2005” [2006] AJHR I16A.

197 Regulations Review Committee “Final Report on the Complaint About Animal Welfare (Layer Hens) Code of Welfare 2005” [2006] AJHR I16A at 16.

198 Regulations Review Committee "Complaint about Animal Welfare (Layer Hens) Code of Welfare 2012" (14 October 2016).

199 Regulations Review Committee "Complaint regarding Shipping (Charges) Amendment Regulations 2013 and Marine Safety Charges Amendment Regulations 2013" (12 December 2016).

200 Regulations Review Committee “Complaint Regarding the Dairy Industry Restructuring (Raw Milk) Regulations 2001” [2007] AJHR I16K.

201 “Government Response to Report of the Regulations Review Committee: Complaint Regarding the Dairy Industry Restructuring (Raw Milk) Regulations 2001” [2007] AJHR J1.

202 Regulations Review Committee “Report on the Inquiry into the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Order 1988” [1988] AJHR I16.