Chapter 4: Regulation-making Powers in Bills
I Introduction
The Regulations Review Committee plays an important role in shaping the empowering provisions under which such regulations are made, in addition to its role reviewing regulations once they have come into force. Under Standing Order 326(3) the Committee may, in relation to a bill before another committee, examine, among other things, any regulation-making power.108 In some cases, a select committee considering a bill containing a regulation-making power or powers will refer that particular aspect of the bill to the Committee. In any event, the Committee undertakes routine scrutiny of regulation-making powers in all bills that are referred to a select committee.
After considering any regulation-making powers in a bill, the Committee will then set out its findings in a letter to the committee considering the bill. It is up to the committee considering the bill to decide whether or not to include any of the Committee’s recommendations in its report to the House.109 It is notable, however, that although not formally obliged to, committees mostly “recommend to the House that a regulation-making power be amended in accordance with the advice of the Regulations Review Committee.”110 Former Committee Chairperson, Sir Doug Kidd, has described this regulation-making power review function as the “most important… in that it is a top of the cliff function and of enduring value”.111 In other words, by aiming to ensure that regulation-making powers in primary legislation are appropriately drafted, the Committee provides an initial safeguard against poor quality or inappropriate regulation-making.
In examining regulation-making powers in bills, the Committee is not confined to the scrutiny grounds set out in the Standing Orders. It does, however, consider it a useful to test of a regulation-making power to ask whether “regulations made under the empowering provisions [may] potentially transgress any such grounds.”112 Additionally, it will consider whether the “regulation-making provisions infringe well established principles.”113 For example, that regulation-making provisions should not permit the making of regulations that deal with matters of policy, amend primary legislation, or have inadequate provision for “scrutiny and control.”114
This Chapter sets out examples of common issues that the Committee has identified when examining regulation-making powers in bills before other committees and its recommendations to those committees. Where possible, it also sets out:
- whether those recommendations were adopted and/or referred to by the relevant committee in its report to the House; and
- if the recommendations were adopted, whether this resulted in any amendment to regulation-making power in the relevant Act as ultimately passed.
II Matters of policy and substance
It is a well-established principle that statutes should set out the policy of a law, while regulations may provide the detail necessary for the implementation of that law.
There are a number of examples of the Committee considering regulation-making powers that allowed for the making of regulations dealing with matters of policy, and the Committee ultimately recommending that these powers either be amended or omitted altogether, particularly under Standing Order 327(2)(f).115
First, clause 22 of the Aviation Security Legislation Bill proposed to amend section 100 of the Civil Aviation Act (a regulation-making provision). The Committee took the view that an amendment proposed by clause 22(1), which allowed regulations to be made under a broad empowering provision for “assisting or enhancing aviation security”, dealt with matters of policy.116 It noted in particular that this seemed to be at odds with the technical focus of the other regulation-making powers in section 100. The Committee recommended that the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee seek further information on, among other things, why the regulation-making power was drafted so widely, and ways to limit its scope. The Transport and Industrial Relations Committee agreed with the Committee and recommended in its report to the House that the power be amended to include a list indicating the matters to be covered by the regulations.117 This recommended amendment was included in section 100(ee) of the Civil Aviation Act 1990, as inserted by Civil Aviation Amendment Act 2007.
Secondly, the Public Lending Right for New Zealand Authors Bill, which dealt with payments to New Zealand authors for books lent in local libraries, proposed that the definitions of author, New Zealand author, and book be contained in regulations made under a regulation-making power in clause 10(2). The Committee pointed out that this would mean that regulations would determine whom the Bill applied to.118 It identified similar concerns with clause 10(3) of the Bill, which allowed regulations to be made specifying the eligibility criteria for both New Zealand authors and books that entitled New Zealand authors to payments under the Act. The Committee took the view that these were all matters of policy deserving full parliamentary scrutiny and not something that should be dealt with in regulations. The Committee’s concerns were ultimately addressed by Supplementary Order Paper, moved by the minister, which inserted appropriate definitions in the Bill.119
Thirdly, the Energy Safety Bill proposed a new section 169A of the Electricity Act 1992 allowing regulations to prescribe, among other things, how owners of electricity supply systems were to implement and maintain a safety management system that ensures that the electricity supply system does not present a significant risk of serious harm to any member of the public, or of significant property damage. The meaning both of “serious harm” and of “property damage” was also to be set out in detail in regulations. Further, the definition of “electricity supply system” contained in the Bill was wide enough to include New Zealand households, unless otherwise limited by regulation. The Committee took the view that these factors were all matters of policy and, accordingly, were best dealt with in an Act rather than delegated legislation.120 As a result of this finding, the Committee recommended that the amendments to the empowering Act (the Electricity Act 1992) should more clearly identify the requirements for a safety management system, what works or electrical installations are part of an electricity supply system, and what constitutes serious harm or significant property damage. The Commerce Committee agreed with these recommendations, including them in its report to the House.121 Its recommendations were ultimately included in the Electricity Amendment Act 2006.
III Henry VIII Clauses
A Henry VIII clause is a provision in an Act that allows primary legislation to be amended, suspended or overridden by delegated legislation. As discussed in Chapter 14, the Committee has generally taken a dim view of these clauses on the basis that only Parliament should able to amend its own laws. The Committee has taken a broad view of what constitutes a Henry VIII clause, including regulation-making powers that alter the scope or effect of legislation, even if the text of the legislation is not changed.122
The Committee used to take the view that these clause should be only used in exceptional circumstances (and never routinely in reforming legislation) and be drafted in “the most specific and limited terms possible.”123 The Committee has said:124
The Committee would often recommend the deletion of Henry VIII clauses.
Since 2018, however, the Committee has scrutinised these clause “in a more practical manner”, focusing on whether the regulation-making power is “necessary” and has “appropriate constraints on the use of the power”.125
A number of examples illustrate the Committee concerns about the use of Henry VIII clauses.
First, clause 27 of the Policing Bill authorised amendments to a schedule by Order in Council. The Committee took the view that amendments to the schedule, which specified policing roles performed by police employees and the powers conferred on those employees when carrying out the specified role, would involve a significant amount of policy content and not just matters of technical detail.126 It expressed particular concern about the lack of any limits in clause 27 on the nature of the powers that could be conferred on police employees through amendments to the schedule. The Committee was not convinced that its scrutiny of any regulations made under clause 27 for technical correctness would provide a sufficient level of parliamentary oversight of amendments to the powers of police employees. It suggested the clause be omitted and amendments to the schedule be made by an amending statute, as this would ensure changes in the powers conferred on police employees were subject to full the scrutiny of the House and its committees. The Committee noted that an acceptable alternative would be annual confirmation of changes by statute (as recommended by the Legislation Advisory Committee). In its report on the Bill, the Law and Order Committee did not recommend clause 27 be omitted, but recommended that clause 27 be amended to require the confirmation of an Order in Council by an Act of Parliament.127 The recommendations were ultimately included in sections 27(3) and (4) of the Policing Act 2008.
Secondly, clause 36(a) of the Affordable Housing: Enabling Territorial Authorities Bill authorised regulations to prescribe results additional to those set out in clause 8(3) that must flow from a method of assessing the need for affordable housing. Clause 36(b) authorised regulations “prescribing criteria additional to those in section 13(2) for the allocation of affordable housing that must be stated in an affordable housing policy.” The Committee took the view that clauses 36(a) and 36(b) both raised matters of policy, because they affected the decision-making processes of territorial authorities.128 It was not convinced there were any circumstances justifying dealing with such policy matters through delegated legislation. It noted in particular that there was no obvious need for urgency. It also expressed concern about the lack of any additional procedural safeguards or level of scrutiny. Accordingly, the Committee recommended that clauses 36(a) and 36(b) be omitted altogether.129 The Local Government and Environment Committee adopted the Committee’s recommendations in its report to House.130 These recommended amendments were included in the Affordable Housing: Enabling Territorial Authorities Act 2008.
Thirdly, the Dog Control Amendment Bill (No 2) proposed a new section 78A allowing breeds of dog to be added to a schedule by regulation following consultation by the responsible minister. The consequences of adding a breed of dog to the schedule were that it may be prohibited from importation into New Zealand, and that it may be classified as being potentially dangerous and thus require muzzling in public. The Committee expressed a number of concerns about adding breeds of dog a schedule through regulation, as this was a matter of policy that should be dealt with by an Act of Parliament.131 The existing legislation already provided a mechanism for dealing quickly with dangerous dogs, eliminating any need for an expeditious amendments to the Act. It was also concerned that the consultation requirements for additions to the schedule were an inadequate substitute for the scrutiny of the House and its committees. As a result of these concerns, the Committee recommended the new section 78A be removed from the Bill altogether. In this instance, the Local Government and Environment Committee did not include or refer to the Committee’s recommendation in its report to the House.132
Similarly, the Child Protection (Child Sex Offender Register) Bill provided a schedule of a list of offences that could mean an offender might be registered. This schedule could be amended by Order in Council. The Committee believed this power appeared unjustifiable: there were no reasons or exceptional circumstances given as to why this power was required and there was no criteria given for this power to be used. Following the Committee’s advice, the Social Services Committee considered that this power could not be justified and recommended to the House that clause 50 be deleted.133
Clauses which allow regulation to amend the definition of the primary Act in an attempt to 'future proof' the legislation also risk the dangers posed by Henry VIII clauses. For example, the Taxation (Land Information and Offshore Persons Information) Bill 2015 allowed amendment of the central definition of "specified estate in land". In the specific context of estates in land, the Committee considered the policy decisions inherent in such an amendment would be more appropriate for parliamentary enactment. Similarly, the Customs and Excise Bill provided that the definition of “specified enactment” was to be defined by Order in Council. What enactments were appropriate to trigger a detention power would therefore be left to the discretion of the Executive. The Bill further provided that the definition of “serious default” could be amended by Orders in Council. In response to the Committee’s concerns, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee recommended deleting the reference to “specified enactments” and instead addressing extensions to the power in clause 187 when new statutes are drafted. The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee also recommended including a monetary threshold to “serious default”, limiting the scope of the Henry VIII power.134
IV Limits of regulation-making power
The Legislative Advisory Committee has said that “empowering provisions… should be drafted so that the limits of the delegated legislative power are specified as clearly and precisely as possible.”135 Drawing on this general rule, the Committee has, at times, taken the view that the limits on a particular regulation-making power are unclear or are too broadly drawn.
A number of examples illustrate this principle. First, clause 75(1)(e) of the Public Health Bill empowered the Governor-General to make regulations:
The Committee suggested that, among other things, both the purpose and the extent of this clause were unclear, and that it potentially allowed any regulations to be made as long as they related to the NCSP in some way.136 It recommended that clause 75 be amended to, among other things, clarify and prescribe the intent and extent of the power being delegated. The Health Committee did not accept or refer to this recommendation in its report to the House.137
Secondly, clause 11 of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Amendment Bill (No 3) proposed a new section 157L of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act, which contained a broadly drafted power to make regulations “for the purpose of imposing requirements in relation to the governance of deposit takers.” Paragraphs (a) to (d) of the section then went on to list four non-exhaustive matters illustrative of the regulations which could be made. The Committee recommended that, unless there was good reason for keeping the regulation- making power so broad, it should be restricted to the matters set out in paragraphs (a) to (d).138 The Finance and Expenditure Committee recommended that the regulation-making power in new section 157L be omitted altogether and that the Bill be amended to specify, in the primary legislation, the requirements relating to governance.139 These recommended amendments were ultimately included in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Amendment Act 2008.
Thirdly, the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Amendment Bill added two new sections relating to disclosure of information. The provision, as introduced, appears to suggest that the regulation could extend the purpose for which information may be disclosed. In particular, the regulation-making power did not require recipients of information under a specific section to have a “proper interest” in receiving the information, seemingly inconsistent with requirements elsewhere in the bill. The Committee recommended greater limits on the regulation-making power relating to information sharing and the Law and Order Committee similarly acknowledged that “the framework provided for information sharing under clauses 38, 40 and 48 is unduly broad”. Consequently, amendments were made and a new section was created, allowing for regulations relating to information sharing to be made by Order in Council. This sections however imposes additional safeguards, such as required Minister consultation with the Privacy Commissioner.140
V Omnibus Provisions
An omnibus provision is the most general form of empowering provision and offends the principle that requires the limits of delegated legislative power to be specified as clearly and precisely as possible.141 For example, clause 37 of the Rail Network Bill provided for the making of regulations “providing for any other matters contemplated by this Act or necessary for its administration or necessary for giving it full effect”. In its recommendations on clause 37 to the Government Administration Committee, the Committee said “the significance of this type of provision is whether it confers any substantive authority as opposed to authorising only procedural provisions.”142 The Committee said case law supports the view that a provision such as clause 37 will only “cover matters that are incidental or ancillary to what is enacted in the statute itself, and will not support attempts to widen, vary or depart from the general intent or purposes of the empowering legislation.”143 The Committee recommended that if specific regulation-making powers were intended, they should be clearly identified. In its report to the House, the Government Administration Committee recommended that clause 37 be amended to make specific provision for a process for preparing rail network development plans.
The form of omnibus provisions has changed over time. Before 1962, regulation-making powers were generally framed by first authorising the making of “any regulations deemed necessary for giving full effect to the Act” (similar to clause 37 above); and second by authorising the making of regulations for a number of specified purposes without limiting the general power. Since 1962, the general or omnibus provision has instead been placed as a catch-all after any specific regulation-making provisions, reversing the previous order. The Committee in 1986 stated that doing so more clearly sets out the exact limits of the regulation-making powers contemplated by Parliament.144 In 2014, the Committee reiterated that placing the omnibus provision after specific regulation-making powers allows the general power to be “read down” and limited by the content and context of the specific powers.145
In considering the Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2014, the Committee noted that clause 21 of the proposed bill used the pre-1962 structure. The Committee wrote to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee recommending that the omnibus provision be amended to the post-1962 form, for two reasons.146 First, if the clause were not amended, Parliament would have little control over the exact purposes for which regulations could properly be made under it. Second, without amendment, the courts would have a reduced and unclear jurisdiction in determining the validity of regulations made under clause 21 vis- à-vis the ultra vires principle. The Justice and Electoral Select Committee recommended such an amendment, and the bill was enacted consistent with the post-1962 style of omnibus provisions.147
Omnibus provisions continue to arise from time to time. For example, in 2015 the Radiation Safety Bill permitted regulation via codes of practice for a list of purposes, the last being "any provision of the Act".148 The Committee continues to recommend that such provisions are used sparingly and with appropriate safeguards, such as consultation or ministerial approval. Similarly, in 2017, the Committee recommended the regulation- making power in the Customs and Excise Bill 2016 be re-drafted “to reflect a more common drafting style that is consistent with its purpose of empowering regulations that are ancillary or incidental to the specific regulation-making powers in the bill”; this recommendation was adopted.149
VI Scrutiny and control
Another issue the Committee often confronts is whether law-making powers have been delegated without adequate provision for scrutiny and control of the instrument. One of the major concerns here is that delegated legislation is not subject to the same level of scrutiny as primary legislation. Accordingly, the Committee may recommend that provision be made for some other form of scrutiny or control of the content of delegated legislation.
An important means of ensuring a level of scrutiny over the content of delegated legislation is the requirement of consultation before delegated legislation is made. To this end, the Committee has recommended on a number of occasions that consultation requirements be included or strengthened in the bills it is considering.
First, the Committee was concerned about the adequacy of the proposed consultation requirements for regulations amending the schedule of dangerous dogs in the Dog Control Act. The Committee recommended that if the Henry VIII regulation-making power was enacted (which it recommended against), the consultation requirements set out in the new section 78A should be strengthened. This was because amendments to the schedule had the potential to affect a wide spectrum of the public, but consultation was limited to those special interest groups that the minister thought appropriate. Accordingly, the Committee recommended a requirement of public notification that a consultation process was underway. It took the view that this requirement would go some way to offsetting the lack of select committee scrutiny ordinarily available in the case of amendments to primary legislation. The Local Government and Environment Committee did not accept or refer to these recommendations.150
Secondly, the Committee recommended to the Commerce Committee that consultation requirements be strengthened in the Energy Safety Review Bill in relation to, among other things, licensing matters.151 The Committee expressed concern that clause 82 of the Bill required the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board to consult before issuing notices designating classes of licence, but not before issuing notices dealing with matters such as minimum standards, terms and conditions and licences, requirements for competent and safe work practices, and recognition of overseas qualifications. Accordingly, the Committee recommended that clause 82 be amended to require that before a notice is issued in relation to any of these other matters, “the Board consult with licensed plumbers, gas fitters and drainlayers or any person, representative of persons or classes of persons affected by the notice.”
The Commerce Committee accepted this recommendation, recommending in its report to the House that the broader consultation obligation be inserted.152 This recommended amendment was ultimately included in the Electricity Amendment Act 2006. It is noteworthy, however, that the Commerce Committee did not accept or refer to two other recommendations the Committee made in relation to consultation. The first recommendation was that the new section 169A, discussed above, be amended to include a general requirement to consult with affected parties. The second recommendation was for a general requirement “to consult with representative organisations for persons affected by proposed regulations to be made under the various Acts amended by the Bill.”
VII Status of instrument made under an Act
At times it will not be clear if an instrument made under a proposed regulation-making power falls within the definition of a disallowable instrument in section 38 of the Legislation Act 2012. Clarity on this question is important because an instrument’s status will determine, among other things, whether or not it will be susceptible to the scrutiny of the Committee and the disallowance procedure set out in the Legislation Act 2012. Accordingly, where it is unclear whether an instrument made under a proposed regulation-making power is a disallowable instrument for the purposes of the Legislation Act 2012, the Committee will usually recommend that this be clarified in the instrument’s empowering legislation.
An example of this (under the Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989 framework) arose in the Committee’s recommendations to the Finance and Expenditure Committee on the Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill.153 The Bill proposed a new section 62F of the Electricity Act 1992 that would permit the Minister of Energy to grant or vary an exemption by notice in the Gazette. In the Committee’s view, such an exemption notice might fall under paragraph (b) of the definition of regulation in section 2 of the Regulations (Disallowance) Act.154 It recommended the new section 62F state whether or not the notices would be regulations under the Regulations (Disallowance) Act. The Finance and Expenditure Committee accepted this recommendation and recommended that the new section 62F be amended to clarify that exemption notices were not regulations for the purposes of the Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989 or the Acts and Regulations Publication Act 1989.155 This recommended amendment was included in the Electricity (Renewable Preference) Amendment Act 2008.
VIII Constitutional Considerations
Wider constitutional considerations may inform the Committee’s recommendations about regulation-making powers. For instance, concerns about executive interference with the independence of a judicial body informed the Committee’s recommendations to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the Real Estate Agents Bill.156 Clause 155(m) of the Bill allowed regulations to be made prescribing the maximum amount of compensation to be awarded under clause 107(2)(g) by a newly established disciplinary tribunal. The Committee expressed concern about the ability of the executive to limit the tribunal’s jurisdiction in this way. It noted in particular that the executive should not be allowed to reduce the amounts the tribunal can award, should the tribunal not perform as it expected it to. The Committee suggested that, instead, this kind of decision was a matter properly deserving the full scrutiny of the House. It recommended that clause 155(m) be omitted and that clause 107(2)(g) be amended to specify any monetary limit the tribunal may order. The Justice and Electoral Committee agreed with the Committee’s recommendations and included them in its report to the House.157 The recommended amendment was ultimately included in the Real Estate Agents Act 2008.
IX Material Incorporated by Reference
At times, legislation (particularly delegated legislation) will give legal effect to material from an extrinsic source without repeating the contents of that material in the incorporating legislation. A common example of this practice is the incorporation by reference of technical standards. The Committee has released two occasional reports on the incorporation of material by reference,158 both of which are discussed in detail, along with associated government responses and the changes made by Part 3, Subpart 2 of the Legislation Act 2012, in Chapter 14.
One example of the Committee making specific recommendations concerning the use of material incorporated by reference occurred in its recommendations to the Health Committee on the Health (Drinking Water) Amendment Bill. Clause 7 of the Bill allowed the Minister of Health to issue or adopt drinking water standards. Clause 9 of the Bill inserted sections that regulated the use of material incorporated by reference (in a way that the Committee concluded was appropriate in the circumstances). The Committee expressed concern that the relationship between standards “adopted” by the minister and material incorporated by reference was unclear. This was because the Bill allowed material to be incorporated by reference into standards “made” or “issued” under the Act, but the minister was empowered to “issue” or “adopt” standards. This left unclear whether material could be incorporated by reference into standards that were adopted. The Committee pointed out that it was possible that “the adoption of a standard is, in itself, an incorporation by reference, rather than the republication of the adopted standard.”159 It suggested that if this were the case, it might be preferable if the provisions regulating the use of material incorporated by reference also applied to standards that are adopted. The Committee went on to say that it would not be good legislative practice if such adopted standards incorporated further material by reference. This was because giving such further incorporated material the status of law could have “unintended consequences,” including problems with accessing such material and with assessing its currency. The Committee recommended clarification about what was meant by adoption of a standard and whether the provisions regulating the incorporation of material by reference also applied to adopted standards. Although the Health Committee referred to and discussed the Committee’s recommendations in its report to the House,160 it did not ultimately accept them.
Another example is the Maritime Transport Amendment Bill, where the Committee raised concerns about the accessibility of material incorporated into maritime and marine protection rules.161 The proposed clauses only required that documents incorporated be made available for inspection at the head office of Maritime New Zealand. However, Committee recommended that the incorporated material also be made available on Maritime New Zealand’s website, except where publication would infringe copyright. Transport and Industrial Relations Committee did not adopt this recommendation, instead recommending that the incorporated material be made available for inspection at all Maritime New Zealand’s offices.162
108 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2020, SO 326(3)(a). However, there is no formal requirement in the Standing Orders that all regulation-making powers in bills be referred to the Committee.
109 Some committee reports will record under the heading of “Committee Process” that the Regulations Review Committee made a report to them, while others may not. Even where committees do refer to a Regulations Review Committee report, such committees do not always explain why its recommendations were or were not followed, there being no obligation in Standing Orders to do so.
110 Hunt, above n 13, at 403. See also Regulations Review Committee “Activities in 2008” (30 September 2008), at 12.
111 Kidd, above n 88, at 4.
112 Regulations Review Committee “Activities in 2008”, above n 110, at 12.
113 Regulations Review Committee “Activities in 2008”, above n 110, at 12.
114 Regulations Review Committee “Activities in 2008”, above n 110, at 12.
115 See Chapter 10 for further discussion of this Standing Order.
116 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee regarding the Aviation Security Legislation Bill 2007 (110-2) (24 May 2007).
117 Aviation Security Legislation Bill 2007 (110-2) (select committee report).
118 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Government and Administration Committee regarding the Public Lending Right for New Zealand Authors Bill 2008 (227-1) (6 August 2008).
119 Supplementary Order Paper 2008 (246) Public Lending Right for New Zealand Authors Bill (104-1). The Bill was discharged due to the expiry of the reporting deadline; thus, the Government Administration Committee did not respond to the Regulations Review Committee’s concerns because no report was issued.
120 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Commerce Committee regarding the Energy Safety Review Bill 2006 (269-2) (1 March 2006).
121 Energy Safety Review Bill 2006 (269-2) (select committee report).
122 Regulations Review Committee “Activities of the Regulations Review Committee in 2012” (19 March 2014) at 18.
123 Regulations Review Committee “Inquiry into the Resource Management (Transitional) Regulations 1994 and the Principles that Should Apply to the Use of Empowering Provisions Allowing Regulations to Override Primary Legislation During a Transitional Period”, above n 84 at 16.
124 Regulations Review Committee “Investigation into the Road User Charges (Transitional Matters) Regulations 2012 (13 November 2012)” at 3.
125 Regulations Review Committee “Activities of the Regulations Review Committee in 2018” (20 March 2019) at 4.
126 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Law and Order Committee regarding the Policing Bill 2008 (195-2) (14 May 2008). Other examples of Henry VIII clauses in bills that the Committee has considered include the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Amendment Bill (No 3) 2007 (174-1), new ss 157G(1) and 157(2), Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill 2007 (187-1), new s 62N(1)(a), and Waitakere Heritage Area Bill 2006 (15-1), cl 7.
127 Policing Bill 2008 (195-2) (select committee report).
128 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Local Government and Environment Committee regarding the Affordable Housing: Enabling Territorial Authorities Bill 2008 (189- 2) (22 May 2008).
129 The Committee made a further recommendation applicable to either clause if it was retained. It noted that neither clause 8(3) nor clause 13(2) stated that additional criteria could be added by regulation, leaving the reader unaware additional requirements may need to be taken into account. The Committee recommended remedying this by making it clear in the clauses that other criteria could be prescribed by regulation.
130 Affordable Housing: Enabling Territorial Authorities Bill 2008 (189-2) (select committee report).
131 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Local Government and Environment Committee regarding the Dog Control Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008 (176-2) (6 March 2008).
132 Dog Control Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008 (176-2) (select committee report).
133 Regulations Review Committee “Activities of the Regulations Review Committee in 2016) at I.16C at 6.
134 Regulations Review Committee “Activities of the Regulations Review Committee in 2017" [2017] AJHR I.16D at 5.
135 Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on the Process and Content of Legislation (2001 edition with amendments, Wellington, 2007) at [10.1.7] Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on the Process and Content of Legislation (Wellington, 2014), chapter 13.5 and Legislation Advisory and Design Committee Legislation Guidelines (Wellington, 2017), chapter 13.
136 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Health Committee regarding the Public Health Bill 2008 (177-2) (14 May 2008).
137 Public Health Bill 2008 (177-2) (select committee report).
138 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Finance and Expenditure Committee regarding the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Amendment Bill (No 3) 2008 (174-2) (3 April 2008).
139 Reserve Bank of New Zealand Amendment Bill (No 3) 2008 (174-2) (select committee report).
140 Regulations Review Committee “Activities of the Regulations Review Committee in 2017” [2017] AJHR I.16D at 6.
141 See Part D above.
142 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Government Administration Committee regarding the Rail Network Bill 2005 (28 July 2005).
143 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Government Administration Committee regarding the Rail Network Bill 2005 (28 July 2005), citing Shannahan v Scott (1956) 96 CLR 245.
144 Regulations Review Committee “Regulation-making powers in legislation” [1986] I.16A, at [5.16].
145 Regulations Review Committee “Activities of the Regulations Review Committee in 2014” (8 August 2014) at 17–18.
146 Regulations Review Committee “Activities of the Regulations Review Committee in 2014” (8 August 2014) at 17–18.
147 Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015, s 26.
148 Regulations Review Committee “Activities of the Regulations Review Committee in 2015” [2015] AJHR I16A at 12.
149 Letter from Regulations Review Committee to Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee regarding Customs and Excise Bill (9 February 2017); Customs and Excise Bill 2016 (209-2) (select committee report).
150 Dog Control Amendment Bill (No 2) 2008 (176-2) (select committee report).
151 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Commerce Committee regarding the Energy Safety Review Bill (269-2) (1 March 2006).
152 Energy Safety Review Bill 2006 (269-2) (select committee report) at 29.
153 Letter from Regulations Review Committee to Government Administration Committee about Civil Defence Emergency Management Amendment Bill (17 March 2016) (recommending status of various instruments be clarified).
154 A regulation under paragraph (b) of the definition in that Act was: “an Order in Council, Proclamation, notice, Warrant, or instrument, made under an enactment that varies or extends the scope or provisions of an enactment.”
155 Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill 2007 (187-2) (select committee report).
156 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Justice and Electoral Committee regarding the Real Estate Agents Bill 2008 (185-2) (14 May 2008).
157 Real Estate Agents Bill 2008 (185-2) (select committee report).
158 Regulations Review Committee “Inquiry into Material Incorporated by Reference” [2004] AJHR I16G, and Regulations Review Committee “Further Inquiry into Material Incorporated by Reference” [2008] AJHR I16O.
159 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee regarding the Health (Drinking Water) Amendment Bill 2007 (55-2) (7 September 2006).
160 Health (Drinking Water) Amendment Bill 2007 (55-2) (select committee report) at 7-8.
161 Letter from the Regulations Review Committee to the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee about the Maritime Transport Amendment Bill 2016 (200-2) (1 December 2016).
162 Maritime Transport Amendment Bill 2016 (200-2) (select committee report) (16 May 2017).