Russia-Ukraine war: Lost amid the distractions

21 January 2026

As we approach the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there’s a risk that much of the world will barely register the anniversary, amid the competing distractions of Greenland, Venezuela and Iran.

Moscow will welcome any eclipse of global interest in Ukraine.

The capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and the regime-threatening popular unrest convulsing Iran, two key Moscow allies, are unquestionably setbacks for Russia and will unnerve the Kremlin.

That Moscow has been unable to influence and succour its allies in Caracas and Tehran, any more that it was able to save the Assad regime in Syria in late 2024, undermines the Kremlin’s efforts to portray Russia as a global power and dependable ally.

Yet offsetting these losses for Moscow has been the disruptive impact of US foreign policy, which has indirectly contributed to advancing Moscow’s two key objectives in its Ukraine war.

First, Washington’s unpredictable approach to the Ukraine conflict, often surprising and wrong-footing allies and adversaries alike, has bought Moscow valuable time.

From the outset, Vladimir Putin has been convinced Russia could outlast Kyiv and its Western supporters. Analysts correctly highlight the heavy casualties incurred by Russia in what has become a slow and costly war of attrition, and to the mounting domestic economic costs the war has imposed on Russia. But real as these pressures are, they have not deflected President Putin from his unshakeable determination to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, drawing it back within Moscow’s sphere of influence. Nor are they likely to do so.

While Washington’s eagerness to reach a deal to end the fighting in Ukraine is commendable, its approach has unfortunately played into Moscow’s hands. Its unorthodox negotiating approach has delivered up-front concessions to Moscow, including promising (at times) territorial wins, security guarantees and normalised US-Russia political and economic relations – all without the Kremlin having to yield any ground on its core aim of subjugating Ukraine.

Scrambling to respond to Washington’s initial lop-sided 28-point “peace plan” last November (evidently reflecting strong input from Moscow, but not Kyiv), Ukraine and its European allies have since worked with administration officials to develop a more balanced 20-point negotiating plan on which the US president himself has yet to deliver judgement.

Going forward, Russia will continue to buy time.

On the one hand, Moscow will profess interest in a negotiated settlement – although it will plainly only accept a deal on its own uncompromising terms. On the other, Moscow will carry on inexorably prosecuting the war: exposing and exploiting Ukraine’s deficit of manpower and resources, and trying to undermine the Ukrainian economy and popular morale through unrelenting missile and drone attacks on energy infrastructure and the civilian population.

Besides bringing Kyiv to heel, Moscow’s key strategic objective has been to advance the long-time Russian (and before that, Soviet) goal of undermining the transatlantic alliance, dividing the United States from its European allies.

Through this, Moscow aims to reshape Europe’s post-Cold War security structure in Russia’s favour and reassert its great power standing.

Here too, the Kremlin must be pinching itself at its good fortune.

Deepening ructions in relations between the United States and its long-time European allies – ranging across multiple issues of politics and governance, economy and trade, and security – are jeopardising the foundations of the transatlantic alliance.

A striking, albeit implicit, alignment is emerging in American and Russian geopolitical outlooks.

The new US National Security Strategy, amplified by administration officials, emphasises Washington’s determination to pursue a foreign policy driven by a realistic appraisal of America’s national interests, based on strength and hard power.

Not surprisingly, this shift has been welcomed in the Kremlin, whose spokesman described it as “a positive step” and “largely consistent with our vision”. Not least, Moscow welcomes the administration’s endorsement of the concept of great power spheres of influence – something Moscow has been seeking to reassert in its own near neighbourhood, particularly in Ukraine, but also in Moldova and Georgia. But the National Security Strategy’s guiding principle of “flexible realism” will also strike a chord with Moscow, together with Washington’s emphasis on the need to re-establish “strategic stability” with Russia.

The fact that President Putin has been invited to join Washington’s new Council of Peace, ostensibly focused on Gaza but seemingly with a more ambitious global mandate, will be welcomed by the Kremlin as recognition of Russia’s global standing and as a signal of Moscow’s rehabilitation on the international stage.

Washington’s more muscular foreign policy has certainly delivered major setbacks for Russia in Venezuela and Iran, uncomfortably exposing the limits of Moscow’s influence. Moscow likely hopes that Washington’s assertiveness could backfire, embroiling the United States in dealing with prolonged instability abroad.

But regardless, Moscow will calculate that, so far, it has gained much more on the strategic priorities that really matter to the Kremlin – above all, squeezing Ukraine, undermining transatlantic relations, and bolstering Moscow’s great power standing.

The article was first published on The Interpreter.

Ian Hill is a retired senior career diplomat in the New Zealand foreign ministry.  He is currently Adjunct Professor in the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University and Senior Fellow in the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington.