Discerning ‘the Fascist Creed’:
Counter-subversion and Fascist Activity in New Zealand, 1950s-1960s

Across April/May 2015 historical security files investigating the extreme right were declassified and transferred to Archives New Zealand. A particular focus within these records is a series of cases through the 1950s and the early 1960s investigating outbursts of fascistic and anti-Semitic activity. If not exactly examples of Nazi-hunting, these investigations illustrate efforts to gather and analyse information on aberrant social elements and this article considers these cases as affording an opportunity to consider New Zealand counter-subversion in motion. To this end it considers the historical development and characteristics of state counter-subversive apparatus, the historical milieu in which these cases occurred (and which effective counter-subversion had to comprehend) and the process by which investigations moved up the learning-curve.

A useful entry point which highlights the idiosyncrasies of the topic are the origins of several of the investigations. Firstly, on the 28 August 1952, Cabinet Minister and future Prime Minister John Marshall received a congratulatory letter on his recent proclamation on the threat of communist infiltration. Referring to an enclosed leaflet, the writer added that ‘few people know that Zionism is the driving force behind communism.’ The leaflet purported to transcribe a speech delivered on the 12 January 1952 by ‘Rabbi Emanuel Rabinovich’ to the ‘Emergency Council of European Rabbis’ in Budapest. Aping the content and melodramatic tone of The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, the expository-laden speech outlined the progress of a millennia old, fantastically-intricate conspiracy to make ‘every Jew a king and every Gentile a slave’. Machinations within this plot included instigating the Second World War (the result of ‘our propaganda campaign during the 1930s’), complying with the Holocaust (a ploy to justify the execution of national leaders as war criminals) and manufacturing the Cold War superpower standoff. ‘Rabinovich’ sketched the Council’s next step as to provoke a third world war which would devastation all belligerents and clear the way for a ‘Pax Judaica’. In this new order, Gentile capacity for resistance would be systematically destroyed by the eradication of Christianity and forced miscegenation: ‘I can state with assurance that the last generation of white children is now being born.’ Consequent Jewish primacy is presented as a certainty: ‘Our superior intelligence will easily enable us to retain mastery over a world of dark peoples.’ Marshall’s courtesy acknowledgment was brief; ‘thank you for taking the trouble of sending this to me. I have read it with some interest’.

The second case study relates to similarly unsolicited messages received by citizens in the early 1960s. On 13 July 1961 the manager of the State Picture Theatre, which was currently playing the film The Nazi Story (billed as ‘A Gruesome Saga of German Militarism!’), received a letter contained a cutting of State’s advertisement for the film, marked ‘Jew Lies’, together with fascist literature printed by the ‘N.Z. Nazi Party’. The Secretary of the Wellington Jewish Society received a note written in the same distinctively disguised handwriting and containing the British National Party’s paper Combat. Between 1962 and 1965 various people and addresses (including M.P.s, the editor of Truth and branches of the New Zealand Communist Party) received neo-Nazi literature and a card marked with the Nazi flag and the message ‘we are back’. On 17 August 1964, the Treasurer for the Zionist Council of New Zealand reported to the Wellington police that the Council had received notes indicating that ‘an anti-Jewish community is in operation in New Zealand.’ The letter was headed with a Reichsadler marked with a swastika and the title ‘National Socialist International’. Brief contents referred to Adolf
Hitler’s birthday and signed off ‘Juden Raus’ (Jews Out) and ‘Wir Kommen Wieder’ (we will return).

A third set of investigations related to messages transmitted in a more public fashion. In early 1960 national headlines reported a spate of ‘paint-pot Hitlers’ leaving graffiti, typically swastikas and anti-Jewish slogans, across the country. In January, in Christchurch, the front door of a Jewish-owned restaurant and a synagogue were defaced with reversed swastikas and slogans reading ‘Hitler will live forever’ and ‘Kill more Jews’. The following evening, a post in Mackworth Street, Woolston was painted with a swastika superimposed on a Star of David. Underneath, in German, was written ‘Jewish swine get out’. Shirley Intermediate School was also daubed with swastikas, an S.S. Death’s Head insignia and a German slogan relating to the same. Further examples were reported in Wellington in February at Victoria University, where reversed swastikas and ‘no Jews’ were painted. Further incidents were reported on the Hutt Road Ngauranga and in Napier. On the appearance of swastika graffiti, one correspondent noted ‘We who use public conveniences see it all too often.’

State counter-subversion

The security intelligence institutions charged with investigating these incidents were the Police Special Branch and, from November 1956, the New Zealand Security Service (later the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service - SIS). While there is presently little systematic or scholarly analysis of state security/intelligence operations in New Zealand, it is evident that the counter-subversion agendas of both organisations built upon a longer tradition of monitoring individuals and groups whose activities and politics were deemed to be threats to national interests and security. Building on pre-1914 apprehensions of industrial unrest and revolutionary elements within the labour movement, the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution saw the police directed to ‘keep in touch with the movements and actions of persons of revolutionary tendencies’ with increased monitoring of organisations and propaganda deemed revolutionary. Heightened security concerns during the Second World War led to the establishment of the short lived Security Intelligence Bureau (SIB) in late 1940. However, the Bureau’s legitimacy was fatally compromised when it was taken in by the hoax fabricated by a professional conman. The SIB was brought under police control in 1942 and disbanded at the end of the war, with counter-subversion operations reverting to the Police Special Branch. A decade of Cold War drama, and more specifically revelations from the 1954 defection of KGB agent Vladimir Petrov, saw prompts for a professionalisation of security work with the implication that counter-subversion was an enduring concern beyond ordinary policing. In November 1956 this impetus saw the SIS emerge as the institutional inheritor of the counter-subversion mandate.

Declassified security files show that the reach of counter-subversion extended to various parts of the social body. Within the context of the early Cold War, where the nature and rationale of security work was essentially defined as being to counteract communist subversion*, this dynamic saw various groups brought to various degrees of scrutiny under concerns that they were communist fronts, or were working towards communist objectives, or were liable to communist penetration and might become subversive. Thus beyond the usual suspects of the

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* A 1951 briefing paper outlined the ‘Main Functions of Special Branch, Police Headquarters’ as:
  a) Study of International Communism
  b) Study of New Zealand Communist Party and ‘front organisations’
  c) Evaluation of security risks (personnel) arising from screening
  d) Co-ordination and evaluation of all reports received from agents

New Zealand Police Special Branch, 1st Tranche, p.196.
Communist Party, the Socialist Party of New Zealand and Friends of the Soviet Union*, a range of less obvious associations appeared on the counter-subversive radar. Often these came to attention via individual communists, communist organisations associating with them over shared causes or interests. The Rationalist Association of New Zealand, which garnered increasing attention from the 1940s, might serve as an example. Dedicated to promoting free speech and secularist literature, security reports observed the presence of known communist party members within the association, invitations to communist speakers and recommendations of Karl Marx’s works. A November 1941 report surmises that ‘The Party seems to have complete control of the Rationalists’ through [known communists] among the office holders.12 Other organisations subjected to varying levels of surveillance included the Esperanto Association, the Progressive Youth League and the New Zealand Peace Council. These and other groups were suspected of being communist fronts, of receiving funding from Moscow, of being heavily influenced by communists or as being exploited for communist purposes.13 Individuals also came to attention for their association with communists and communist organisations, attending functions at the Soviet Embassy, campaigning against the 1953 execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, protesting against the Korean War, supporting progressive causes, attending screenings of left-wing films or writing letters to the editor.14

Declassified records also highlight the variety of means counter-subversive work employed. Open source channels, which constitute the bulk of the records, were as ordinary as collecting newspaper clippings; the agencies were observant readers of mainstream newspapers as well as of the tabloid *Truth* and the communist *People’s Voice*. Somewhat more clandestine channels included subscriptions to organisation’s mailing lists, having agents attend and report on public meetings and accounts from informers operating under various motives. More deeply covert means of information gathering had been considered from before the SIS’s inception. A May 1956 briefing on the establishment of the new security agency made a series of proposals on this front, including the recommendation that ‘technical aids (telephone and mail interception, microphone techniques and photographic facilities) should be applied under Headquarters control. Technicians should be given suitable training by U.K. Security Services, which can also advise on equipment … the question of legislation and constitutional authority for employing such measures will presumably be given consideration.’15 Both before and after the establishment of the SIS, information was acquired by infiltrating agents into organisations, mail interceptions, installing listening devices and analysing records obtained in police raids. This work incorporated new technologies over time. Photography, used for identifying individuals, appears from the early 1930s; photostat technology, used to reproduce documentation, came into use by the 1940s; and listening devices were in use by the 1950s.

The fruits of this information gathering could be far-reaching.16 Consider one 1956 exercise to compile a 12-page list of the names (and often the addresses, employers names and car registrations) of all known CPNZ members and others in ‘front’ organisations and leftist groups throughout New Zealand.17 A slightly unorthodox measure of the richness of this document record (which often includes accounts of meetings, speech transcripts, organisational ephemera and character analyses) is their value as historical sources. Recently, one historian studying the 1951 waterfront strike, ‘uncomfortably’, acknowledged a debt to the SIS for maintaining and releasing the police files of 1951, noting that without them the historical record would be ‘much weaker’.18

The rationale for such activity was codified in the 1969 New Zealand Security Intelligence Act which described the SIS’s function as ‘to obtain, correlate, and evaluate intelligence relevant

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* And its successor associations, the Society for Closer Relations with Russia and the New Zealand-USSR Society.
to security, and to communicate any such intelligence to such persons, and in such a manner, as the Director considers to be in the interests of security.\textsuperscript{19} In this the SIS was intended to act in an advisory role, with little jurisdiction in regards to enforcing security. The same 1969 statute defined ‘security’ as ‘the protection of New Zealand from acts of espionage, sabotage, and subversion, whether or not they are directed from or intended to be committed within New Zealand.’ ‘Subversion’ was defined as ‘attempting, inciting, counselling, advocating, or encouraging (a) The overthrow by force of the Government of New Zealand; or (b) The undermining by unlawful means of the authority of the State in New Zealand.’\textsuperscript{20}

Defining matters in this manner granted potentially extensive boundaries in assessing what might be constituted as a security interest.\textsuperscript{21} A 1975 Ombudsman’s review of the SIS’s history of security policing observed this dynamic, noting that the ‘broader dimensions’ of counter-subversion operated under the ‘undoubtedly correct’ notion that subversive activity might develop from a movement not originally subversive in concept or nature. Consequently, ‘movements which are, or may be, the target for penetration by subversive groups or individuals are studied. So too are activities which might become subversive, including those of groups engaged in militant or anti-establishment protest or radical dissent.’\textsuperscript{22} Rather than representing this manner of mentality as paranoid, Laurence Lustgarten sees it as the logical essence of security institutions’ rationale to identify and assess threats – whether possible, embryonic or actual.\textsuperscript{23} Framing security issues in regards to subversion has also been observed as suggesting wider social implications. As one analysis puts it: ‘[i]f espionage is an affair of state, subversion may be targeted against the associations of civil society - schools, churches, trade unions, political parties, etc.’ which seemingly ‘entail[s] some idea of corrupting or weakening the moral and political fabric of society surreptitiously from within.’\textsuperscript{24}

Despite the dearth of methodical investigation, wider passions, concerns, critiques and commentary regarding subversive activity and security measures mean that New Zealand counter-subversion has acquired a definite shape. Civil libertarians have reproached the flexibility in what might constitute subversion and its openness to abuse; ‘this term seems capable of being stretched to cover almost any criticism of the status quo.’\textsuperscript{25} For sections of social commentary, and especially so within activist circles, it is a truism that state counter-subversion is focused leftwards (a variant charge notes a blind-spot regarding the far-right), is neurotically sensitive in perceiving subversion and radiates an aura of sinister bungling. Roger Boshier’s 1969 critique, for example, argues that ‘at one level, the Security Service is a pseudo James Bond cloak-and-dagger outfit, but at another level it is a “comic opera” police force.’\textsuperscript{26}

Interpretations of the institutional psyche of the security agencies undertaking this counter-subversion vary. Some perceive Cold War counter-subversion practitioners as wearing red-tinted glasses and perceiving monolithic communism as the root cause for diverse and unrelated activities.\textsuperscript{27} In September 1962, W.J. Scott said of H.E. Gilbert, the Director of the SIS between 1956-1976, ‘It is a sign of his political naivety that he seems to equate radical political activity with Communism. If his remarks correctly convey his state of mind, he must waste a large amount of time investigating people who are utterly reliable and trustworthy, trying to find traitors in places where they are least likely to exist.’\textsuperscript{28} In lieu of mistaken analysis, naivety or imbalances between security and liberty, other critics see cynical or political agendas.\textsuperscript{29} An extreme rendition is evident in Rex Holliss’ tract \textit{A Documented Exposure of Secret Police in N.Z}. Looking through the lens of the Communist Party ideology, Holliss argued that the SIS was the conscious instrument of reactionary capitalism, that its staff were ‘carefully hand-picked for their right-wing, anti-working-class outlook’ and that the organisation’s ‘primary role’ was ‘thought control.’\textsuperscript{30} He continues:
The facts show that the main task of the Security Intelligence Service is to keep the working-class in its place as a docile, unquestioning source of profit for the rulers of New Zealand – the big local and foreign businessmen ... Their connections with neo-fascist organisations and other right-wing extremists of the anti-Communist brigade would be very interesting if revealed. After all, neo-fascists have the same objectives as the Secret Police – to protect the big monopolies by attacking the Communist Party and progressive movement … That is why the so-called ‘Security’ police direct their activities against the Communists, who defend working class organisations and democratic rights, while giving free play to Nazis and would be Nazis."31

Across its history the SIS has done relatively little in regards to attempting to shape the counter-subversion narrative; the result, presumably, of a ‘need to know’ ethos, and recognition that responses would draw attention to an organisation content with a low public profile.32 Recalling the establishment of the SIS, John Marshall’s memoir argued the benefits of discreetness, ‘I still hold the view that the service can function best when it is out of sight and out of mind. That is the way the opposing forces prefer to work, if they can."33 More recently, a 2002 official FAQ responded to the question of ‘why won’t the service be more open about the detail of its operations’: ‘If the Service released detailed information about specific operations, the effectiveness of these and any future operations would be seriously compromised."34 The SIS’s few public statements made concerning Cold War era counter-subversion impress Soviet espionage and communist fronts as legitimate concerns with counter-subversion work necessary to safeguard national security and interests.35 In regard to James McNeish’s criticism of security vetting as ‘the New Zealand brand of McCarthyism’, for example, the SIS website argues ‘the reality that the Soviets were directing and funding subversive activity in New Zealand during the Cold War’.36 The occasional popular or insider account, such as Michael Parker’s The S.I.S. (1979), C.H. Kit Bennett’s Spy (2006) and Graeme Hunt’s Spies and Revolutionaries (2007), have also emphasised the realities of subversive activity and have generally, if occasionally critically, presented counter-subversion work as necessary.37

**Historical context**

With effective counter-subversion relying on establishing a workable analysis of the subject under investigation, it is worth dissecting the broader historical context in which investigations of fascistic activity occurred. At a first glance any confusion security agents experienced over the appearance of such activity would seem understandable. Despite the appearance of what has been termed ‘alternative conservatism’ during the 1930s, with both similarities to and distinctions from European fascism, such movements proved fleeting and were ultimately marginalised, not least by the success of popular conservatism.38 Furthermore, antagonism towards Jewish New Zealand has been a historical rarity, perhaps reflecting its size (censuses in 1951 and 1961 record those identifying as Hebrew at 3,661 and 4,006 respectfully39), its clustering in Auckland and Wellington, and its tradition of integration. As Stephen Levine notes

‘Because they were so few, and were striving to be so modern, the Jews who came to New Zealand in the nineteenth century first responded by abandoning those elements of polity that had previously been considered an indivisible aspect of Jewishness and Judaism.’40

Fascistic creeds and anti-Semitic conspiracy peddling were confined to the lunatic fringe and proved lonely work; one of the reasons 1930 era anti-Semites like Arthur Field sought overseas
support is that his notions of Jewish machinations to enslave the Christian world found limited local reception. Open hostilities have rarely strayed beyond vulgar acts of vandalism, graffiti and propaganda. In their study of New Zealand anti-Semitism past 1945 Paul Spoonley and Helen Cox note that:

‘New Zealand has not experienced the extensive and often violent anti-semitism that has marked the history of practically every European country. Nevertheless, there has been evidence of local anti-semitism and for the target group, the Jews, any indication of such beliefs and feelings, however minor, is a matter for concern.’

In historical terms, anti-Semitism has been associated with dislocation, crises and consequent intensification of existential questions in which Jewish presence is granted a huge explanatory power; in this regard anti-Semitism has been described as ‘the stupid answer to a serious question’. Thus Great Depression era anti-communism and calls for monetary reform could, and did, stray from general suspicions and criticisms of bankers, socialists, international capitalism and international communism into elaborate conspiracies of Jewish plots. The traditionalist dislocation of the 1970/80s has, likewise, been seen to lead to a more forceful radical-right presence. The period has been described as an ‘era of protest and the public attacks on accepted norms’; dramatic clashes on racial and gender politics, nuclear and rugby tests and the fraying of the broader post-war consensus on social and economic issues provide salient examples. One study of the extreme right through the 1970/80s speaks of radical right-wing responses to such events and trends as the Politics of Nostalgia, based around a longing for ‘the untroubled days of the immediate post-war period’ and frequently citing anti-Semitic notions of a Jewish presence as the root cause of disharmony.

In the period under review, this correlation of crisis and anti-Semitism would seem to complicate rather than clarify. Recollections of New Zealand across the 1950s and early 1960s tend to recall an era of ‘untroubled days’ and ‘golden weather’ of economic stability, rising affluence and, perhaps stifling, cultural consensus. As always, the period is more multifaceted than the mythology would suggest and the politics of nostalgia may have started early. 1961 saw Britain’s first bid to join the European Economic Community (EEC), rumbling a longstanding pillar of New Zealand’s economic and cultural orientation. The Federation of Labour described the EEC bid as ‘the gravest problem New Zealand has faced in its whole history’ while the New Zealand Branch of the League of Empire Loyalists were perhaps the most active far-right group in denouncing a move it claimed would ‘tear asunder the bonds of trade, loyalties, culture, traditions, and ties of spirit between Britain and ourselves’.

Adding further context is the renewed international contemplation of the Second World War which occurred in the early 1960s. Traumatic events are often observed as sowing periods of silence or sanitised narratives that can be followed by bursts of reconsideration. Increased discussion of fascism and the Holocaust circa 1960 would appear to fit this phenomenon, with specific global events appearing to have acted as catalysts. In late 1959 the first publicised cases of swastika daubing appeared in West Germany, quickly spawning imitators across Europe, the United States and, as noted, by mid-January in New Zealand. Even more dramatically, the abduction of the war criminal Adolf Eichmann from Argentina by Mossad agents in May 1960 grabbed global headlines. Subsequent events from the start of his trial in April 1961 through to his execution in June 1962 stimulated commentary, historical study,

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* The League of Empire Loyalists followed on from Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists with the intention of arresting the decline of the British Empire. It concerned itself with advocating against Jewish influences and non-white/non-Christian migrants (all of which it linked with decline), advancing pan-British sentiments, championing white-rule in Africa and opposing British entrance into the EEC. 

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biographies and memoirs. A particularly relevant set of reactions were criticisms over Israel’s actions. Some critics mixed expressions of approval that the architect of the Holocaust would be held accountable with concern over the manner in which Eichmann had been apprehended and executed. Among some these sentiments blurred into notions of Jewish vengefulness, which became part of background context for the anti-Semitic outbursts of the early 1960s.

The context of security service investigations into such incidents also reflect another set of complexities: while New Zealand fascism has been a negligible political force, visions of fascism possess a far more complex position within the theatre of political and cultural identity. Responding to the emergency powers wielded by Prime Minister Sidney Holland’s National government during the 1951 waterfront conflict, in a 1952 essay, social critic Bill Pearson described New Zealanders as ‘fretful sleepers’ and pondered the potential dangers of an observed disposition for conformity and a passive acceptance of authority:

‘But in countries nominally democratic, fascists have first to prepare the ground. In New Zealand the ground is already prepared, in these conditions: a docile sleepy electorate, veneration of war-heroes, willingness to persecute those who don’t conform, gullibility in the face of headlines and radio peptalk … Fascism has long been a danger potential in New Zealand.’

A popular edge to evoking fascism also developed during the 1950s. Protest literature produced during the waterfront conflict had made a staple of Holland as Hitler, the ‘Secret Police’ as the Gestapo and the emergency regulations as fascism. Post-1951 this dynamic endured within critical commentary, and thrived during the generational and countercultural shifts of the 1960s. A 1969 university student stunt offers one example. Combining elements of prank and protest, university students infiltrated SIS headquarters on Taranaki Street, Wellington and draped a stylised swastika banner over the building’s front (figure 1).
However, this use of the swastika to evoke and denounce tyranny was very different from the more apolitical rebellion of those alienated youth and gangs who began appropriating Third Reich regalia and rituals during the 1960s. This dynamic gave the Stormtroopers gang their name while others adopted swastikas, stahlhelms, Sieg Heils and fascist salutes. Jarrod Gilbert’s history of New Zealand gangs describes this dynamic as ‘little more than symbols flaunting a rejection of social norms’ and as a means to transgress social mores without, necessarily, adopting any political tenets; certainly, many commentators have noted the oddity of those Maori and Pacific Island gang members donning the trappings of white supremacy. On wearing swastikas, young protest leader Tim Shadbolt noted, ‘We were proud of being rejected because we didn’t want to be like those who rejected us. That’s why we wore swastikas - it really seemed to bug people. The swastika meant as much to us as Napoleon’s tricolour meant to our parents.’ On his first point Shadbolt was undoubtedly correct and registrations of apprehension, disgust and outrage (often by refugees and veterans of the Second World War) formed a theme in commentary on the appearance of fascist symbolism in New Zealand. At times the flux in symbolic intent makes motives and messages difficult to read. On the 4 July 1966 a United States flag with a swastika worked into the stars and stripes was found on the flagpole outside the Nelson Cathedral. It seems unclear whether this was intended as a sincere gesture (intended to celebrate the United States as a Christian and Aryan nation on the country’s Independence Day), an anti-American statement (condemning the United States as a fascist country) or something else altogether.

The learning curve

Counter-subversion investigations into the activities outlined at the beginning of this article saw sustained efforts to gather information on the forces behind such activities. Effective counter-subversion, however, relies on more than gathering information concerning the subjects’ world (appearance, associates, networks and addresses) and requires cultivating an understanding of their worldview (ideologies, objectives and motives). It has been observed that ‘it is at the analysis stage that “information” is converted into “intelligence”.’ In this regard, the acquisition and analysis of information saw multiple and varied explanations and theories raised and subjected to sustained testing over the course of investigations. This learning-curve saw some ideas rejected and others refined, resulting in a growing understanding of fascistic activity in New Zealand.

One consideration was the possibility that fascistic elements had immigrated into New Zealand among those displaced by the war. This idea had arisen across 1953-1954 when Truth produced several articles (which were clipped and collected in security files) citing fascistic attitudes. These queried wartime activities among some European immigrants, with a central focus on the circulation of the Hungarian language periodical Hidverok, which was deemed to be neo-Nazi literature. A 1953 letter to the Director of Special Branch from the Secretary for Internal Affairs noted:

‘For some time it has been fairly clear that the wartime activities of a certain number (probably not a large number) of the displaced persons in New Zealand were highly dubious. Provided, however, the people concerned show by their conduct in New Zealand that they left their political conduct behind them when they came here, it is probably the fair and possibly the only feasible course to accept the position and let by-gones be by-gones.’

A November 1953 Special Branch memorandum for the Prime Minister likewise questioned the effectiveness of post-war, screening procedures to detect extremists.
‘There are now 23,000 aliens in New Zealand. All alien immigrants who have arrived here since 1945 were security screened before their departure from Europe, but the standard of this screening varies a good deal and has proved inadequate in some cases. Special Branch should be studying questions of alien security but no expert with the necessary specialist knowledge of alien mentalities is available to them, and with present staffing all that can be done is to examine carefully the few hundreds of aliens who apply for naturalization each year.’

Ideas of ‘dubious pasts’ and concealed war criminals flared again in the early 1960s in the context of Eichmann’s apprehension and anti-Semitic vandalism. Some commentators made links between international outbreaks of anti-Semitism and a post-war scattering of fascist elements. Rabbi Astor, for example, asserted that ‘anti-semitic hooliganism had its origin in Germany and that easy immigration to Australia and other free and democratic areas had given ample scope for infiltration.’ He added that ‘New Zealand had fortunately been free of inhuman persecution’. Days later, the first reports of comparable anti-Semitic vandalism challenged such assertions of New Zealand exceptionalism. The communist newspaper People’s Voice (collected by SIS records) asserted ‘there is considerable evidence that not only have ex Nazis and S.S. men been allowed to immigrate, but that they are forming new groups in New Zealand with a strong concentration in Christchurch.’

Another distinct response focused on the possibility that organised neo-fascist movements were active in New Zealand. Certainly variations of the ‘we are back’ message appeared to play to this theme and some far-right groups coveted such publicity. In 1962 a Dunedin labourer, Alan McKechnie, made headlines with his announcement of the formation of a National Socialist Party which claimed a nominal membership of 400. An investigation followed the receipt of a letter sent to the ‘Security Police’, dated 1 May 1962, detailing an encounter with an Auckland University student who proclaimed a ‘hatred for the Jewish race’ and claimed membership within an Auckland based group ‘whose avowed aim is to “rid” New Zealand of Jews by fair means or foul.’ The student claimed the group was 2,000 strong, had attracted the interest of ‘people in quite high places’, was responsible for swastika graffiti, was compiling lists of Jews and threatened to undertake ‘big offensives’ within a year. The writer signed off noting that ‘you will probably think I’m nuts … [however] if what this girl says is true, and that these people do wish to cause strife in the community, then this is an action against national security – and this is why I’ve written to you.’

A variation on the idea of a co-ordinated movement raised the idea of a communist conspiracy. The idea of communists producing anti-Semitic propaganda had been raised in regard to circulation of the 1952 ‘Pax Judaica’ conspiracy. Likewise public commentary and security records revisited the idea in the 1960s. To this effect a public letter, signed ‘Don’t be a sucker’, asserted that communists had the most to gain from stimulating anti-fascism: ‘I think this whole so-called “Nazi” affair can reasonably be regarded with grave suspicion in the matter of its origins – perhaps the very reverse of Nazism!’ Such theories might in part reflect a backlash against the ongoing accusation from the communist movement that the state and/or police were collaborators with, or were de facto, fascists. Likewise, in regard to swastika daubing, a New Zealand intelligence report noted that while ‘some of the individuals concerned were affiliated with extreme Right-Wing organisations … there is also evidence that Communist or Communist sympathisers were involved.’

The results of investigations, however, failed to unearth such evidence and reports tended towards scepticism over the extent and influence of systematic campaigns - whether neo-Nazis
or communist ‘false flags’. A report dated 4 April 1960 noted ‘there is no evidence to support any suggestions that the [swastika daubing] incidents were part of an organised neo-Nazi campaign.’\textsuperscript{74} Likewise the investigation concerning the allegation of a mass Auckland-based anti-Semitic society concluded, ‘While it is possible there is an Anti-Semitic movement in Auckland, it is likely some evidence of its existence would have been brought to light during the course of this enquiry.’\textsuperscript{75} Commenting on the New Zealand National Socialist Party’s claim of ‘400 nominal members’, Director Gilbert noted that ‘the operative word may be “nominal”’.\textsuperscript{76} Similarly the theory of a communist false flag was deemed improbable. A 26 April 1960 report noted ‘There is no evidence of group organisation nor is there any of communist participation.’\textsuperscript{77} Special Branch had similarly discounted theories that communists were responsible for the 1952 ‘Pax Judaica’ leaflet; ‘[the idea that] the Communist Party is responsible for this propaganda is not supported by previous evidence.’\textsuperscript{78}

Such scepticism over co-ordinated campaigns and mass movements advanced with growing documentation of the extreme-right scene. As with other counter-subversive work this exploited various channels of information gathering and the results could be extensive. A file on Donald Arthur Lindsay, for example, lists details concerning his history, occupations, known addresses, mail subscriptions and the contents of his leased postal box. The file also refers to identification photographs and affirms samples of his handwriting against anti-Semitic literature posted to Rothschild & Sons.\textsuperscript{79} As with other counter-subversion work, investigations monitored wider social networks and affiliations which brought associating individuals to attention. Records relating to monitoring of the League of Empire Loyalists provide one case with the political content of communications recorded, correspondence networks mapped and organisational structures charted.\textsuperscript{80} In one February 1962 example, New Zealand House in London forwarded a complaint from the Board of Deputies of British Jews that anti-Semitic propaganda had been posted to Rothschild & Sons from New Zealand. The letter suggested the involvement of the League of Empire Loyalists and forwarded names listed under the League’s New Zealand section. A memorandum in July 1962 cross-referenced those names with other records, and noted: ‘the five names listed are known to us and doubtlessly do represent the New Zealand League Committee in or about 1957.’\textsuperscript{81}

The ongoing processes of gathering and analysing intelligence sketched out various features of an emerging picture of a fascistic scene, broadly conceived. Major points on this learning curve included recognising the diverse elements - immigrant fascists, social rebels and isolated cranks - and varied affiliations within that milieu. For example, 1950s era investigations resulting from allegations of immigrants with dubious pasts had revealed anti-Semitic attitudes and literature of concern to the authorities; ‘he is so anti-Semitic in his outlook that he is of security interest’; ‘any person who favours its [Hidverok’s] political ideology is of definite security interest and must be regarded as undesirable from the viewpoint of prospective citizenship.’\textsuperscript{82} Likewise the results of swastika daubing cases would seem to broadly fit the assessment of a 4 April 1960 memo: ‘In New Zealand the isolated incidents appear to be the work of hooligans and odd individuals with strong anti-Semitic feelings. They were probably engendered by the publicity given to the [European] outbreak by the overseas and local press, which has had an effect throughout the world of stirring latent anti-Semitic sentiments and of fostering imitation.’\textsuperscript{83}

This appraisal is consistent with the limited knowledge some vandals displayed of Third Reich symbols and German grammar: incorrectly orientated swastikas and grammatically flawed German slogans suggest, at least in some cases, transgressive temperaments over political fanaticism.\textsuperscript{84} It is also consistent with the circumstances of those apprehended. The swastikas
tagged on Victoria University, for example, were the work of six young men, aged between 17 and 23. Judgement attributed their actions less to political or racial prejudice than to intoxication and loutish behaviour. All were sentenced and fined. Likewise a swastika drawn in lipstick on an Invercargill window was found to be the work of a twenty year old youth already on probation. His legal counsel denied that there was any sinister motive, claiming his client was too young to realise just what the insignia meant. The Magistrate seemed to approach the case as an act of social rebellion and criticised the accused’s dress - a shiny silver-threaded sports coat and stove-pipe trousers. He advised him to reconsider the impression he was making, as people would think him ‘peculiar’ and that he would ‘start life under a handicap’.

Investigations recognised the broad contacts many ‘true believers’ maintained; failures to thrive locally seemingly leading to searching further afield for allies. In December 1964 Director Gilbert forwarded a report to the Prime Minister impressing this point. ‘Although the number of people in New Zealand attracted by National Socialism is infinitesimal, there are continuing cases, usually one or two a year, coming to notice of individuals communicating with National Socialist organisations overseas and professing an interest in the fascist creed.’ Such international association is particularly evident in propaganda distribution. Indeed in May 1965 Gilbert contacted J. Edgar Hoover at the FBI noting that a police raid on an individual claiming to be the head of the National Socialist Party of New Zealand revealed a ‘brisk correspondence’ with National-Socialist movements in the United States. The Director forwarded these addresses for Hoover’s consideration. Other analyses recognised the influence of other overseas anti-Semites including the Australian De Wykeham de Louth (noted as a Holocaust denier) and Einar Aberg (a Swedish veteran anti-Semite, founder of the Anti-Jewish Action League of Sweden and known for his wide distribution of propaganda). Neither were these links one way. Several of Arthur Field’s books were reissued by American right-wing publishers in the 1960s and 1970s. A.K. Chesterton, founder of the League of Empire Loyalists and the National Front, and Eric Butler, founder of the Australian League of Rights and author of a major anti-Semitic book, both publicly acknowledged a debt to Field.

The Special Branch investigation of the 1952 ‘Pax Judaica’ leaflet offers an in-depth illustration of such networks in action. Uncovering the leaflet’s distributors proved easy, there being no secrecy around the operation; the letter sent to John Marshall was signed and listed an Auckland address. When the investigating Senior Detective, J.P. Marsh, met with one of the distributors, he reported that he was enthusiastically greeted and that the man described the leaflet as a ‘smasher’. The investigation revealed that two elderly Auckland pensioners, L. Alex and G. Harrison, had started corresponding with Einar Aberg, who had forwarded them a copy of the ‘Pax Judaica’ leaflet, alongside other anti-Semitic material. Aberg claimed he had received the leaflet from Eustace Mullins, a veteran United States anti-Semite, conspiracy theorist and Holocaust denier thought to be the originator of piece. Aberg noted he was spreading the word as far as he could, and was currently translating the leaflet into French and German. He invited Harrison and Alex to join this endeavour.

Despite their meagre resources (though Harrison received an old-age pension, it was noted that Alex ‘refuses to be seen by a Doctor, even for Social Security Benefit’, and his only means were stated as the weekly £2 his wife forwarded) the two decided to distribute the leaflet. Due to an outstanding account with their regular printer they had approached D.F. McDonald of Artcraft Printing to produce a thousand copies of the speech. A subsequent police inquiry saw

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1 Not their real names.
2 Not his real name.
the manager submit that he had not seen the leaflet before it was printed, and that had he known
the nature of the material he would not have done so; ‘the subject matter of the pamphlet is
contrary to my convictions and if necessary I am prepared to publish my disbelief of the
correctness of the contents of the pamphlet. I have many Jewish friends whom I would not like
to offend.’

A confiscated distribution list for the leaflet records dozens of figures. Besides Marshall, other
New Zealand politicians to be sent the leaflet include James George Barnes, Dean Eyre, James
Carroll and Walter Nash. However the effort to spread the word extended well beyond national
politicians, with the duo writing to figures from a variety of backgrounds. These include a
series of international leaders (Dwight Eisenhower, Robert Menzies and Winston Churchill)
and individuals with various levels of authority, influence and prestige (the Director of the CIA,
Sir Keith Park, the Queen Consort, the Argentine Consul General and the President of the
Rotary International) as well as rather lesser known figures (‘chap in Devonport fruit shop’,
‘Uncle Joe’, ‘mate on ferry’). Harrison also estimated that ‘about 100’ copies had been posted
to addresses selected arbitrarily from the telephone directory, and that others had been left in
random letterboxes around Auckland.

In assessing motives, Marsh dwelled on the mental fitness of those involved, noting a letter
from Aberg as ‘fairly indicating the writer’s mental rating which is similar to that of Alex and
Harrison - low and not stable’. Marsh’s report, and secondary correspondence, note that both
men had spent time in psychiatric hospitals. Harrison was described as ‘not as bad mentally as
Alex’ but as having ‘fixed ideas and worries himself about world affairs.’ A meeting with
Harrison’s son noted that his father had ‘been a problem to his family for many years and that
his association with Alex had not improved matters.’ Alex’s wife was described as ‘a simple
type and subservient to her husband; the only reading she enjoys is comic strips’. In regards
to Alex, the report observed his habit of contacting people of influence; he alleged that he was
on friendly terms with, and had sent various pamphlets to, Princess Te Puea and
claimed that he had previously maintained correspondence with Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini and Harry
Truman. The report noted: ‘eventually he will become certifiable for admission to a mental
hospital.’ Assessment of motives included the duo’s self-perception that their activities
represented a sense of public duty; ‘In their own way these two men considered they were
being extremely loyal citizens’. Both were noted as having no previous convictions and as not
previously coming under the notice of Special Branch.

The conclusion of the investigation saw the 528 remaining pamphlets handed over to the police
along with other material sent by Einar Aberg. Alex and Harrison were informed that the
pamphlet was a hoax and warned that further distribution could result in prosecution. Both
men provided statements. Harrison reported that he would ‘give an undertaking that I will
discontinue printing, publishing, or distributing the pamphlets, produced.’ Alex noted that he
was ‘still convinced the leaflet is “the good” but I am taking you at your word that in dropping
it I am serving a greater loyalty’. The regional Superintendent noted on his summation of the
report that ‘It appears likely that these mental bankrupts will cease their activities in this
particular field.’ A record on Alex was retained by Special Branch but is noted as having been
destroyed in 1985.

A footnote in the aftermath of the investigation serves to articulate its rationale. Several months
after the case was closed, a letter written to the Minister of Police inquired under what authority
had distribution of the literature been stopped. The response from W.H. Fortune, the Minister
in Charge of Police, described the material as ‘lying, scurrilous anti-semitic propaganda of the
worst type calculated to arose feelings of ill-will against the Jewish community’, and that the Police would have been failing their duty to preserve peace and order had they not advised the distributors of the probable consequences of activities ‘likely to encourage disorder, violence or lawlessness.’

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The learning curve demonstrated in these investigations continued as more forceful fascistic movements sought influence from the late 1960s. In Britain, 1967 saw the emergence of the National Front bring various elements of neo-fascist and racial populist politics together. Despite its failure to secure mass support or recognition, the next decade saw more public manifestations of far-right activity through marches, attacks on ethnic minorities and presentations of candidates for local and national elections. The New Zealand scene imitated this new wave (albeit in a far milder form) and a 1981 sociological study by Paul Spoonley charted the origins and positions of dozens of far-right organisations. Some organisations were branches or inspired by overseas movements, with a New Zealand National Front emerging in 1967 and a New Zealand branch of the Australian League of Rights being established in 1970. Others were more local. The career of Colin King-Ansell as a member or founder of various far-right groups (including the National Socialist White People’s Party, Unit 88, the New Zealand Fascist Union and the National Front) points to some prominent examples. In 1969 he led the National Socialist Party of New Zealand (taking the name of Alan McKechnie’s folded organisation), campaigned in the 1972 general election and contested the Mount Eden seat in 1975 and 1978. In 1967 he was sentenced to 18 months for an attack on a synagogue, and in 1979 he was fined $400 for distributing anti-Semitic leaflets which breached the Race Relations Act. Ultimately, the recurring pattern in the far-right scene is one of fringe movements kept small or transitory by internal dissention and external repulsion.

Likewise, counter-subversion efforts to cultivate a workable understanding of fascistic activity was ongoing across the 1970s-1980s, building on existing understandings and methods. Open source channels saw organisational literature collected, media reports clipped and commentary assessed; Spoonley’s study, for example, is included within security records. Though there does not appear to be any evidence of security service infiltration of far-right groups, lists of individuals known to be involved or interested in National Socialism were drawn up and, in regard to key individuals, details regarding backgrounds, characters, networks were collected and, in some cases, references to photographic identification are made. There were specific investigations of particular individual’s political positions and associations and inquiries into the interest of members of the Armed Services in National Socialist literature as well as possible links between National Party MPs and the National Front.

Conclusion

Given the embryonic nature of New Zealand counter-subversion scholarship it is perhaps most expedient to conclude by contemplating how case files regarding the far-right might inform a broader understanding of the subject. Perhaps the foremost implications of these unclassified documents is how they illustrate the operation of counter-subversion work through the era. Aspects of this include the identification of suspected subversive activities, the techniques used to acquire information, the manner in which intelligence was analysed and analyses tested and the consequent accumulation of institutional knowledge.
The documentary record also illustrates the nuances of the processes that sought to synchronise analyses and realities. To be effective, such work required the capacity to recognise mistaken preconceptions, faulty analyses, flawed information and the ability to abandon discredited theories and consider new ideas. Ultimately, an accurate analysis of the forces in play necessitated discerning between the various elements dabbling (in various ways, to various extents and for various reasons) with fascistic activity. Some activity was generated by neo-fascist associations seeking to establish a local presence while other instances reflected relatively isolated elements linked, via ideology and international mail, to counterparts across the globe. Motivations for those engaged in this activity were often heady mixes of subscription to conspiracy theories, political agendas, apolitical rebellion and unstable mental health.

Beyond presenting material relevant to counter-subversion work, aspects of these cases might also add to debates concerning its ends and existence - easily the major area of public engagement with the topic. Much commentary and criticism on state surveillance emphasises the lawful, harmless and/or admirable nature of those surveilled. While these cases add to the debates about how state security and the concept of an open society relate, that debate would be enriched if it was expanded to consideration of less admirable, indeed utterly contemptible, political positions. The point here is not to argue for expanded surveillance or for greater civil liberties for anti-Semites and neo-Nazis, but to spur more sophisticated contemplation on how the boundaries of radical or subversive activity might be drawn and patrolled.

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1 Further details on this transfer are available at http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/archives/second-transfer/.
3 Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL), Marshall, John Ross (Sir), 1912-1988, MS-Papers-1403-022/2, ‘Papers - Communism’.
6 Truth, 19 January 1960, p.12. While not overtly fascist, a slogan painted on a rock outcrop near Shag Rock Christchurch in September, described as ‘clearly visible to traffic going towards Summer’, had undertones of anti-Semitism: ‘Empire Loyalists Say Beware the Money Power’ was being Christchurch Star, 2 September 1960, p.1.
11 For the evolution of New Zealand’s security intelligence apparatus see Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 2nd ed. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp.67-81.
13 In regards to the belief that the Peace Council, the Progressive Youth League and the Society for Close relations with Russia were ‘communist organisations’, George Fraser, who worked as an informant for the Special Branch during the 1950s, asserted that ‘in truth many members had no such loyalties.’ George Fraser, Seeing Red: Undercover in 1950s New Zealand (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1995), p.60.
14 Did this focus entail a ‘blind spot’ to the extreme right? Certainly, some post-war briefings considered far-right subversion as a far lesser concern. A November 1951 Special Branch memorandum, for example, noted: ‘The most dangerous political elements may be broadly described as “Leftists” of extreme views, i.e., those elements favouring and fighting for, as an ultimate aim, the establishment of a Soviet form of government in this country. Extreme “Rightists” – Nazi or Fascist elements – could likewise menace the security of this country but there appears to be little, if any, real grounds for apprehension in that respect at the present time or indeed in the near future.’ However, it would seem too far to claim that this focus entailed an inability to conceive of subversive threats from the right. As a 1948 planning paper noted: ‘it should be understood that Communism is not the only threat to the Security of the State; the threat may take other forms, e.g., Fascism.’ See ‘Report of Senior Detective J.J. Halcrow’, 24 November 1951, 1st Tranche of Professor Richard Hill’s Papers (private collection), p.160; ‘Defence of the Realm – Security Organisation’, 16 April 1948, 1st Tranche, p.212.
17 ANZ-R24118480-ADMO-24890-W5933-7-OPR 1956-3, ‘Recording sheets S.56/461 to S.56/631’.
19 New Zealand Statutes (NZS), 1969, no.24, section 4.
20 NZS, 1969, no.24, section 2.
22 Guy Powles, Security Intelligence Service: Report by Chief Ombudsman (Wellington: Government Printer, 1976), p.27. This point is balanced against the assertion that ‘Absolute security in New Zealand would require the Service to obtain and record at least some details about every adult New Zealander, but that would be manifestly impracticable. In anything other than a totalitarian state, it would also be manifestly abhorrent. In a democracy, there are other values, including the protection of privacy and of freedom of opinion and expression, which compete with those of security.’ Powles, p.28.
26 Roger Boshier, Footsteps Up Your Jumper: Activities of the New Zealand Security Service (Wellington, 1969), p.2. For further variations on this theme see Tony Simpson’s assertion that ‘the New Zealand security services had their origins in farce, and had continued as they began through a career characterised by thud and blunder’; Hugh Price’s character assessment of
an agent (‘We find a shallow person who longed to be a square-jawed, gun-toting secret agent like those you see in B movies’); or George Fraser’s line ‘I had become the bunny in an enormous but sick joke called the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.’ See Hugh Price, ‘The Heyday of New Zealand McCarthyism’, Civil Liberty: Newsletter of the New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties, 51 (April 1996), pp.12-13; Tony Simpson, ‘Thud and blunder’, New Zealand Books Pukapuke Aotearoa (1 March 2007); Fraser, p.151.


31 Holliss, pp.21, 28.

32 The 2014 appointment of Rebecca Kitteridge to the Directorship of the SIS has seen some recent development in this regard with sustained publicity emphasising increased openness and accountability. This effort to win public trust has accentuated the end purpose of the institution rather than the means of intelligence gathering. In Director Kitteridge’s words ‘the purpose of it [the SIS] is security, The purpose of it is not to spy.’


35 These points are evident in, for example, in public talks Director Gilbert gave to the RSA and an article he wrote on security work for Salient, the Victoria University of Wellington student magazine. See Salient, 6 August 1962, p.8.


39 J. Melzer, Wellington Jewish Community: A Historical Survey (Wellington: Wellington Hebrew Congregation, 1974), p.31. While there are flaws with these figures for the purpose of charting the size of New Zealand’s Jewish community - significant numbers elected to decline to answer questions on religious affiliation and that some doubt might be raised as to whether those grouped under Hebrew are Jewish as understood in regards to orthodox Judaism - they meaningfully convey the small size of the community.


41 Hunt, p.306.

42 For a case study see Hal Levine and Michelle Gezentsvay, ‘The Wellington Cemetery Desecrations of 2004: Their Impact on Local Jews’, INZS, 4, 5 (2006), pp.91-109. A more recent example was seen in the 2014 national election in which the vandalism of National Party Billboards mixed slurs against Prime Minister John Key’s Jewish heritage, anti-Semitic graffiti and references to socio/political issues (notably the Israel/Palestine situation and economic policies).

43 Spoonley and Cox.


45 Such conceptions were notable within the Social Credit movement. See Marinus Franciscus La Rooij, ‘Political Antisemitism in New Zealand during the Great Depression: A Case Study in the Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy’ (M.A. thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1998). It has, however, been argued that ‘anti-Semitism was not a predominant feature of monetary reform groups’ and was ‘unlikely to provide the basis of a right-wing movement.’ Michael C. Pugh, ‘The New Zealand Legion and Conservative Protest in the Great Depression’ (M.A. Thesis, University of Auckland, 1969), p.146.

46 Belich, p.514.


48 For a period portrait touching on this dynamic see Belich, pp.297-321.


52 Novick, p.128.


54 Bill Pearson, ‘Fretful Sleepers: A Sketch of New Zealand Behaviour and its Implications for the Artist’, *Landfall*, 23 (September 1952), pp.203-204. A further socially engaged advocacy reaction was the 1952 formation of the Council for Civil Liberties as a watchdog organisation. According to the Council’s website, ‘NZCCL was formed in 1952 as a direct result of the Police Offences Amendment Bill which was introduced into parliament after the 1951 waterfront strike.’


64 5 November 1953 ‘The Work of Special Branch’, 1st Tranche, p.137.

65 The extent of this connection between immigration and far-right attitudes has emerged over time and was revisited in the early 1990s. An overview is available in Anthony Hubbard, ‘Murderers Among Us’, *New Zealand Listener*, 21-27 May 1990, pp.10-13 and Hubbard, ‘Sanctuary: How we let in the war criminals’, *New Zealand Listener*, 28 May-3 June 1990, pp.24-28. A subset of this debate has come to turn on the role and attitudes of Dr Reuel Lochore in the registration of aliens. See also W.J. Scott, ‘Civil Liberties in New Zealand’, *Landfall*, 37 (March 1956), pp.35-42.

66 Such dynamics echo in a more recent, October 2009, episode in which schoolboys visiting the Auckland War Memorial Museum spurred controversy when they were photographed ‘worshipping’ a swastika.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 An assessment dated 4 April 1960 observed that ‘The Communist press has already used the outbreak for propaganda purposes and will probably continue to do so with these aims in view

(a) To promote Western disunity;

(b) To evoke hostility towards Western Germany;

(c) To distract world attention from the active and continuing anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and its satellites.’

ANZ, R24716778, ‘Miscellaneous Organisations: Fascist, Anti-Semitic, Extreme Right-Wing’.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.


77 ANZ, R24716778, ‘Miscellaneous Organisations: Fascist, Anti-Semitic, Extreme Right-Wing’.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.


81 ANZ, R24716778, ‘Miscellaneous Organisations: Fascist, Anti-Semitic, Extreme Right-Wing’.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

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86 ANZ, R24716778, ‘Miscellaneous Organisations: Fascist, Anti-Semitic, Extreme Right-Wing’.

87 Ibid.


89 Ibid.
ANZ, R24716778, ‘Miscellaneous Organisations: Fascist, Anti-Semitic, Extreme Right-Wing’.


91 Subsequent case details are taken from ANZ, R24716778, ‘Miscellaneous Organisations: Fascist, Anti-Semitic, Extreme Right-Wing’.

92 Ibid.


94 Spoonley, ‘New Zealand First’.


97 Ibid.