

SCHOOL OF HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

INTP586 APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TRIMESTER 1 & 2 2011

28 February to 12 November 2011

Trimester dates *Trimester One* Teaching dates: 28 February to 3 June 2011 Mid-trimester break: 18 April to 1 May 2011

Trimester Two Teaching dates: 11 July 2011 to 14 October 2011 Mid-trimester break: 22 August 2011 to 4 September 2011 Study week: 17-21 October Examination period: 21 October 2011 – 12 November 2011

Please note: The assessment for this course includes a final exam, which will take place during the examination period for trimester 2. Students must be available for the whole of the exam period (17 October – 12 November 2011)

Withdrawal dates

Information on withdrawals and refunds may be found at http://www.victoria.ac.nz/home/admisenrol/payments/withdrawlsrefunds.aspx

Name and contact details

Lecturer: Dr. Ben Thirkell-White Room: Murphy 540 Phone: 463 5796 Email: <u>ben.thirkell-white@vuw.ac.nz</u> Office hours: Monday 4-5pm, Wednesday 10-11am

Class times and locations

Classes take place on Thursdays from 5pm-6.50pm in MY401

Course delivery

The course is taught via a weekly seminar over two trimesters. There is a final examination that will occur in the end-of-year examination period from 21 October to 12Q November 2011. The exact date for the examination will be released during Trimester 2.

Attendance at and active participation in <u>all seminars</u> is **compulsory** unless a specific arrangement has been made otherwise. Students may miss up to two seminars without penalty; absences beyond that number will be taken into account when calculating the final grade.

Communication of additional information

Additional information will be communicated via the course Blackboard site and sometimes to email addresses linked to Blackboard. You must check your *Victoria* e-mail address and the Blackboard site regularly.

Course content

This course suveys the fundamental concepts (e.g. state sovereignty, anarchy, imperialism, international norms) and theoretical debates (e.g. realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism, feminism) within International Relations. Subsequently, core issues of contemporary relevance in world affairs are considered (e.g. global governance, security, aid and development, humanitarian intervention, and global civil society).

Learning objectives:

A student who has achieved a standard of work and understanding sufficient to pass the course will:

- Understand some of the key theoretical and practical issues that are presently debated in the International Relations discipline;
- Have some empirical knowledge of events and circumstances that are referenced by debates in the discipline;
- Be able to critically analyse issues and events in IR;
- Be able to use both parts of the course to make the connection between theoretical frameworks for the study of IR and international practice; and
- Be able to use terminology and concepts introduced in both parts of the course to interpret contemporary international issues and events.

NB: These objectives are for the course as a whole, i.e. both parts 1 and 2

Expected workload:

In accordance with Faculty Guidelines, this course has been constructed on the assumption that students will devote a total of 300 hours to the course. This includes time in seminars.

Essential readings:

Any standard textbook on international relations will cover aspects of the course, but the course content will follow the assigned readings lists, which will be available on Blackboard or through the library web pages.

For a general overview of IR, you may wish to refer to the following texts that are available from the Library:

- 1. Joshua Goldstein, International Relations, Brief 3rd Ed., (Pearson Longman, 2005);
- 2. Scott Burchill, et al., *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd Ed., (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005);
- 3. Baylis and Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, (Oxford University Press, 2005);
- 4. David N. Balaam and Michael Veseth, *Introduction to International Political Economy*, (Prentice Hall, 1996; and
- 5. Theodore H. Cohn, *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice*, 3rd Ed., (Pearson, 2005).

Customers can order textbooks and student notes online at <u>www.vicbooks.co.nz</u> or can email an order or enquiry to <u>enquiries@vicbooks.co.nz</u>. Books can be couriered to customers or they can be picked up from the shop the day after placing an order online. Opening hours are 8.00 am – 6.00 pm, Monday – Friday during term time (closing at 5.00 pm in the

Opening hours are 8.00 am – 6.00 pm, Monday – Friday during term time (closing at 5.00 pm in the holidays)

10.00 am – 1.00 pm Saturdays.

Phone: 463 5515

You should get to know and keep a watchful eye on the following periodicals and papers. Some are available in the University library, including:

Millennium: Journal of International Studies International Studies Quarterly International Organization European Journal of International Relations World Politics New Left Review Review of International Studies Alternatives Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs International Security Review of International Political Economy Economist

Assessment requirements

Overview

The assessment for this course involves:

- 4 'mini assignments' short essays of 1,000 words (worth 20% of the final grade overall 5% for each essay)
- 1 long essay of 3,500 words (worth 30% of the final grade)
- 1 assessed oral presentation (worth 10% of the final grade)
- 1 x 3 hour exam (worth 40% of the final grade)

Details

All word limits include footnotes but not bibliography.

The four 1,000 word mini-assignments should be handed in during the Thursday class in weeks 2,4,5 & 6. One copy should be handed in, typed in 12 point type , 1.5 or double spaced. Essay questions for theses assignments are listed under the relevant weeks' tutorial reading list below. These assignments are to make sure students have a grasp of the most fundamental and pervasive theoretical approaches to international relations (liberal and realist theory). They also provide an opportunity to get feedback on study skills and writing skills for students that have been away from academia for some time.

A single paper copy of the 3,500 word essay should be handed in during the class on Thursday 14th July (just after mid-year break), typed in 12 point type, 1.5 or double spaced. Students should also upload an electronic copy of their essay to Blackboard. The essay topic must be chosen from one of the topics listed at the end of this course outline. The essay is designed to test students' ability to conduct in-depth research and analysis on a particular topic in international relations theory and to develop their writing skills in the format of a longer essay. Feedback should help prepare students for the long research essays and dissertation produced for the other courses in the MIR programme.

Each student will conduct an oral presentation during the second part of the course in Trimester 2. This presentation should be 12-15 minutes long. Dr Thirkell-White will stop you from speaking at the 15 minute mark and not mark any remaining material. You should either provide a brief handout for the class or produce powerpoint slides to accompany your presentation. Presentation topics will be assigned at the end of trimester one. This assessment develops students' ability to identify the most important aspects of a more empirical topic an present those aspects in a logical and coherent fashion. It will also help students to develop oral communication skills.

The final exam will take the form of 3 one hour questions. Students will be required to answer at least one question from the material in each half of the course. A sample past exam paper is available on Blackboard.

Marking criteria for essays and exams

I use the following categories to decide what grade to award.

Does the essay answer the set question?

Is it well written in a way that communicates clearly to the reader?

Does it demonstrate that the student fully understands the essay topic?

Does it do a good job of introducing evidence that effectively supports the claims being made?

(Is there enough evidence to justify claims made in the essay? Has the student thought about how persuasive the evidence is and addressed any flaws or weaknesses in it?)

Does the essay show that the student has done enough research?

(For mini-assignments, students must demonstrate that they have read both compulsory readings. The best assignments will probably also build on one or two

additional sources. For a 3,500 word essay, I expect students to have spent several days consulting a good range of sources. I expect most of a student's sources to come from academic journals, not pieces in newspapers, textbooks or random web pages. Textbooks can get you started and newspapers can provide good evidence on recent events but *most* of your evidence should come from academic sources).

Does the essay show that the student has analysed their different sources, deciding whether they are more or less persuasive, accounting for different views and drawing together the information into a credible answer to the set question?

Does the student's analysis show critical engagement with the material and an 'original' argument ? (ie. a position on the question that is clearly the students' own)

I do not allocate a specific mark for each assessment category – essay quality doesn't work like that! Adequacy of research and evidence is the most important criterion for deciding whether an essay will pass or fail. Good analysis and structure then tend to distinguish between the B- to A- grades. Finally, A grades need good analysis and structure *and* some kind of clear, well-developed and interesting answer to the set question. Further advice on good essay writing will be given in lectures and tutorials.

I will provide more information on feedback and essay writing during classes in the early part of the course.

Marking criteria for presentations

- Did the presentation answer the set question?
- Was the verbal delivery clear and easy to hear?
- Was the presentation structured clearly in a way that made it easy for listeners to absorb material and follow the argument?
- Was the presentation at an appropriate level for the class?
 - Did it cover the basics in a way that set the class up well?
 - Did it also provide a little of the students' own analysis to make a point or raise some questions for discussion?
 - Did the presentation show adequate research?
 - Did it show clear knowledge of the set reading and one or two extra pieces of work?
- Did the presentation show adequate analysis?
 - o Did the student select an appropriate subset of the possible material to present?
 - o Did they organise that subset of material appropriately?
 - Did it show some critical engagement with sources and some attempt to make a particular point or statement / raise a small number of important questions or points for class analysis and discussion?

Further guidance on presentations will be provided in class towards the end of the first semester.

Return of assignments

Mini-assignments will be returned during the following seminar. The research essay will be returned approximately two weeks after the submission deadline. Those not collected in the seminar will be available for picking up from the PSIR office, 5th floor Murphy Building, **but only between 12 and 2pm.**

Penalties

Students will be penalised for late submission of essays – a deduction of 5% for the first day late, and 2% per day thereafter, up to a maximum of 8 days. Work that is more than 8 days late can be accepted for mandatory course requirements but will not be marked. However, penalties may be waived if there are valid grounds (for example, illness [presentation of a medical certificate will be necessary] or similar other contingencies). In all such cases, prior information will be necessary.

Mandatory course requirements

To gain a pass in this course each student must:

a) Submit the written work specified for this course, on or by the specified dates (subject to such provisions as are stated for late submission of work);

AND

b) Take the final exam.

Academic Integrity and Plagiarism

Academic integrity means that university staff and students, in their teaching and learning are expected to treat others honestly, fairly and with respect at all times. It is not acceptable to mistreat academic, intellectual or creative work that has been done by other people by representing it as your own original work.

Academic integrity is important because it is the core value on which the University's learning, teaching and research activities are based. Victoria University's reputation for academic integrity adds value to your qualification.

The University defines plagiarism as presenting someone else's work as if it were your own, whether you mean to or not. 'Someone else's work' means anything that is not your own idea. Even if it is presented in your own style, you must acknowledge your sources fully and appropriately. This includes:

- Material from books, journals or any other printed source
- The work of other students or staff
- Information from the internet
- Software programs and other electronic material
- Designs and ideas
- The organisation or structuring of any such material

Find out more about plagiarism, how to avoid it and penalties, on the University's website: <u>http://www.victoria.ac.nz/home/study/plagiarism.aspx</u>

Use of Turnitin

Student work provided for assessment in this course may be checked for academic integrity by the electronic search engine http://www.turnitin.com. Turnitin is an online plagiarism prevention tool which compares submitted work with a very large database of existing material. At the discretion of the Head of School, handwritten work may be copy-typed by the School and subject to checking by Turnitin. Turnitin will retain a copy of submitted material on behalf of the University for detection of future plagiarism, but access to the full text of submissions is not made available to any other party.

WHERE TO FIND MORE DETAILED INFORMATION

Find key dates, explanations of grades and other useful information at <u>www.victoria.ac.nz/home/study</u>. Find out how academic progress is monitored and how enrolment can be restricted at <u>www.victoria.ac.nz/home/study/academic-progress</u>. Most statutes and policies are available at www.victoria.ac.nz/home/about/policy, except qualification statutes, which are available via the *Calendar* webpage at <u>www.victoria.ac.nz/home/study/calendar.aspx</u> (See Section C).

Other useful information for students may be found at the website of the Assistant Vice-Chancellor (Academic), at <u>www.victoria.ac.nz/home/about_victoria/avcacademic</u>.

(An additional list of topics for Part II of the course, which takes place in trimester 2, will be provided at the end of trimester 1)

Trimester 1

Week One

Introduction

Compulsory Reading:

Ian Clarke, "Beyond the Great Divide: globalization and the theory of international relations" *Review of International Studies* (1998), 24, 479–498

Skim through an international relations textbook from the library: Read the table of contents to see what is covered. Read the introduction and conclusion to chapters that look interesting or where you have no idea what the chapter is likely to be about. Maybe skim through the headings of most chapters, summary boxes etc.

In class, I may get you to 'draw' international relations....

I will ask you a little about what is covered in IR

I will ask you what you found surprising (if anything) about what your textbook spent most and least time on, what was included and what was left out.

I will also go over the content of the Ian Clarke article to see how much of it you understood.

The rest of the class will be spent on administration / explaining how the course works etc.

Additional Reading on 'the discipline of IR':

Rosenberg, Justin, 'International Relations — The 'Higher Bullshit': A Reply to the Globalization Theory Debate', *International Politics*, Vol. 44.4 (Summer 2007) 450-459

Bull, Hedley, 'Society and Anarchyin International Relations', in Butterfield, H., and Wight, M., eds., *Diplomatic Investigations: Essay in the Theory of International Politics*, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966, 35-50

Buzan, Barry and Richard Little, 'Why International Relations Has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to Do About It', *Millennium*, 2001, 30(1): 19–39

Walker, R. B. J., 'International Relations and the Concept of the Political', in Booth, K., and Smith, S., eds., *International Relations Theory Today*, London: Polity Press, 1997, pp. 306-327

Tooze, R., & Murphy, C., 'The Epistemology of Poverty and the Poverty of Epistemology: Mystery, Blindness and Invisibility,' in: *Millennium*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1996

Price, R., 'Interpretation and disciplinary orthodoxy in international relations', in: *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, April 1994

Krombach, H., 'International Relations as an Academic Discipline', in: *Millennium*, Vol. 21, No. 2, Summer 1992

Lapid, Y., 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era,' in: *International Studies Quarterly*, 33, 3, 1989, 235-5

Xiaoming Huang, 2007. "The invisible hand: modern studies of international relations in Japan, China, and Korea" *Journal of International Relations and Development* 10(2): 168-203

Christopher LaMonica "Modelling Global Patterns of Political Thought: Challenges and Prospects," in Robbie Shilliam, ed., *Non-Western Thought and International Relations: Retrieving the Global Context of Investigation of Modernity* (forthcoming).

Ben Thirkell-White & Nick Rengger, *Critical International Relations Theory After 25 Years* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Waltz, K., *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, chapters 2-3 Schmidt, B., 'The historiography of academic international relations,' in: *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 4, October 1994

Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie. 1986. International organization: a state of the art on the art of the state. *International Organization*, 40: 753-775.

Tickner, J. Ann, 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists,' in: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, 1997, 611-632

Peterson, V. Spike, 'Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender and International Relations', Millennium, 1992, vol. 21, no. 2

Week Two

What are states and why do we have them?

Mini-assignment: answer one of these two questions in not more than 1,000 words.

Why does Hobbes think that having a state is so important that we cannot rebel against the one we have? Is he right?

What are the advantages of having one state for each piece of territory on earth? Do they outweigh the disadvantages?

Compulsory reading:

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Various, 1651) 13, 14, 17

Richard Devetak, "The Modern State and its Origins", in Devetak et al, *An Introduction to International Relations* (2007)

Reading Help

Hobbes

In class, I will ask you to repeat Hobbes' argument about why people join a state.

Hobbes isn't really giving us a history of where states came from. Instead he's asking us to imagine what life would be like without a government in an attempt to make us aware of the dangers of trying to overthrow / disobey the one we have.

How convincing do you find his argument?

What are the most convincing bits? What are the least convincing bits?

The obvious part of Hobbes' argument is that someone needs more force than everyone else to keep the peace.

A careful reading of Hobbes, though, shows he's also extremely keen on a single person having the right to make judgements, judging people's conduct or setting out the rules for living together. What are the advantages of a single rule-making body? What role does judgement play in Hobbes' theory?

Do people need (on average) to be morally weak or prone to violence to make Hobbes' argument work? How good would human nature need to be to make Hobbes' argument unconvincing?

The bit of Hobbes I've asked you to read is about domestic politics – about why populations need a government. International relations scholars have tried to borrow Hobbes' argument to highlight problems with the international system, which has no Leviathan (see, for example, Bromley on the reading list). Do you think this move works? Can we borrow an argument about people needing a state and translate it to one about states needing world government? For a suggestion that Hobbes' arguments might not apply at the international level, see Noel Malcolm's piece on the reading list.

Devetak

Hobbes (writing in the 17th century) tries to provide us with a timeless understanding of why all human beings will always require a state, relying on a very minimal human goal – self-preservation. The international relations discipline has also often taken states for granted as the central point for understanding international relations.

Devetak's article reminds us that political life hasn't always been organised in this way.

For me, one of the reasons to look at the history of the modern state is that it helps us to imagine other ways of organising political life and to see their advantages and disadvantages. (Think back to Ian Clarke's article last week....what contemporary challenges might suggest that we need to 'think past' the nation state as a way to organise political life?)

(The reading list also has a bunch of books that suggest alternative readings of the state, particularly drawing out some ways in which ideas of the states system have been deployed in ways that women or the subjects of colonialism have found oppressive).

What do you think some of the problems might have been for the multi-level system of political authority in mediaeval Europe that Devetak describes?

In what ways did the consolidation of the idea of states and sovereignty overcome these problems?

Who will have lost out in this process?

Devetak tends to concentrate on war and force as at the heart of this process (I'll suggest some reasons why he might want to do that in class). Can you think of any reasons apart from war-making that might have encouraged the shift to the state system? (have a careful look at the section where Devetak discusses Spruyt's arguments).

Finally, if we have time in the seminar, I will try to get you to think about the very different ways on thinking involved in the Hobbes piece and the Devetak piece. Does it make sense to think about politics in the kind of abstract, model-building way Hobbes does? Or is it better to start with history? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches? Is one better than the other or do we need both? How do they fit together?

Additional Readings

Malcolm, Noel 'Hobbes's Theory of International Relations' in Malcolm, N *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002)

Bartelson, J. 1995. *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Bromley, S 'International Politics: States, Anarchy and Governance' in Bromley et al. (Eds) *Making the International: Economic Interdependence and Political Order* (Pluto Press / Open University, 2004) Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, (Routledge, 1992), chs. 17-18 Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D. & Skocpol, T. 1985. *Bringing the State Back In.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

John G. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations" in *International Organization* 47:1 (1993),

Special issue on "Empires, Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics", *Review of International Studies* 27:5 (2001)

Holsti, K., 1995. War, Peace, and the State of the State. *International Political Science Review*, 16(4), 319-339.

Philpott, D., 2002. The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations. *World Politics*, 55, 66-95.

Weiss, L., 'Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State,' *New Left Review*, No. 225, September/October 1997.

Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648* (London: Verso 2003). <u>Chapter one is a good critique of historical</u> <u>explanations of modern sovereignty in IR</u>

Forum on Michael Mann (influential sociologist of modern state sovereignty) in *Millennium* 34 (2) 2006.

Politics without sovereignty: a critique of contemporary international relations / edited by Christopher J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe and Alexander Gourevitch. London: University College London Press, 2007.

F.H. Hinsely, Sovereignty (London, 1966).

J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (Various). <u>The classic treatise on "popular sovereignty"</u>

Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (Routledge, 1998). <u>*Ch.4.is a good overview of the link</u>* <u>*between the "nation" and the modern sovereign state.*</u></u>

State sovereignty as social construct / edited by Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber. New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996

Diana Coole, Women in Political Theory: From Ancient Misogyny to Contemporary Feminism (Lynne Rienner, 1993). <u>A great feminist critique of Hobbes in one of the chapters.</u>

C. Mackinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge MA, 1989)

Shaw, M., 2000. *Theory of the Global State: Globality as Unfinished Revolution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

J. Elshtain, Women and War (Harvester, 1987). A classic feminist critique.

Anghie, Antony. *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Week Three – Dr Thirkell-White in Montreal. Compensatory extra class added in week Six. Please use this opportunity to read ahead a bit. Week five's session is a bit reading heavy and then, in week six, we have two sessions. I recommend that as many people as possible meet up in the normal class room on Thursday evening. Have a chat about what you've read and maybe start going over your answers to my reading questions for week Four.

Week Four

Liberal theories of the state

Mini-assignment: answer one of these two questions in not more than 1,000 words.

Why does Locke think that we have the right to revolution? Is he right?

Is it better for the international community to let developing countries decide who governs them, even when government is incompetent, authoritarian or corrupt?

Compulsory reading

Laslett, Peter 'Introduction: Part V' in Laslett (Ed) *John Locke: Two Treatises of Government*' (you could also read chapters 7-9 of the Second Treatise, available on the web at <u>http://libertyonline.hypermall.com/Locke/second/second-7.html</u> or the section of Laslett's introduction that compares Locke and Hobbes)

Jackson, Robert H 'Quasi-States, Dual Regimes and Neo-Classcial Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World' *International Organization* 41 (1987) pp517-49

Reading help

Last time, we looked at Hobbes' rather austere vision of the state, which suggested states basically exist to maintain order. Writers in the liberal tradition, though, have tended to see states differently. They have tended to take the existence of government for granted and then ask questions about the *quality* of government provided. The primary liberal question tends to be 'is the state providing goods for the population, or is it ruling over them for its own ends'? For liberals questions about the state are not about order versus chaos, they're about what we need from a government in order to live a/the good life.

Locke

Liberal and realist views of the state share the conviction that it is rational to obey government. However, liberals tend to be more optimistic about the possibility for non-coerced cooperation. Locke's state of nature is rather more friendly than Hobbes'. Locke suggest that humans can manage OK without a government but that government can provide them with positive goods. Citizens consent to be governed by governments that do this job reasonably well but citizens ultimately reserve the right to revolution against tyranny (note Locke has in mind the English revolution....his views also formed an important part of the justification for the American Revolution).

What differences do you notice between Locke and Hobbes?

What are the consequences of those differences – how do small differences in assumptions lead to quite big differences in expectations about government and politics?

Why might Hobbes have thought Locke's views were risky / dangerous?

How do you feel about Locke's insistence that maintaining *property* is central to what government is supposed to do? Does thinking of the right to private property as absolute rule out some kinds of government action? Is that a good thing, bad thing or mixed? (List reasons!). Does having property protect you against tyranny? How?

Does your knowledge of history suggest some groups of people that were particularly concerned about a right to property in the 18th century?

Jackson

Jackson's piece asks whether Locke's vision of a social-contract from below reflects the reality of statehood. He points out that some states were largely created from above by the international community ('international society' if you like). That creates some tricky problems for liberals. If a state looks 'bad' from the outside, should one intervene to make it better? Or does doing so violate the population's right to self-determination?

Jackson seems to prefer international intervention? Why?

Why might intervention be a problem? (Are you comfortable with intervention in Somalia? In Iraq? Why?)

What makes Jackson an 'English School' thinker? (I'll explain this in the talk in class in week three) How often (if at all) do you think we need an English School approach to understand international relations?

Additional readings on liberalism and 'The English School'

Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society especially chapters 1 & 2

Bull, H & Watson, A The Expansion of International Society

Dunn, J Locke (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1984)

Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis and Andrew Hurrell, (eds.) *Order and Justice in International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press (2002)

Franke, M. 1995. Immanuel Kant and the (Im)possibility of International Relations Theory. *Alternatives* 20 (3): 279-322

Frances Fukuyama, "The End of History?" National Interest 1989

Gong, Gerrit W. *The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984 Hurrell, A *On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) See, particularly, the chapter on democracy and human rights Hurrell, A. 1990. Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations. *Review of International Studies* 16 (3): 183-205

Hurrell, Andrew, 'Keeping History, Law and Political Philosophy Firmly within the English School', *Review of International Studies*, 27:3, pp.489-94.

Jackson, Robert *Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990)

Keene, Edward, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics, Cambridge: CUP 2002

Little, Richard, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, 2000, 6:3

Moravcsik, Andrew 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics' *International Organization* Vol.51 No.4 (1997) pp. 513-53

Richardson, J.L., 'Contending Liberalisms – Past and Present,' *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1997.

S. Suzuki, "Japan's socialization into Janus-Faced European International Society", *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (1) 2005

Zhang, Yongjin (1991a) 'China's entry into international society: beyond the standard of "civilization", *Review of International Studies* 17:1.

Week Five

Classical realism versus classical liberalism in IR theory.

Mini-assignment: answer in not more than 1,000 words.

Would the world be a better place if Foreign Affairs Ministers were more moral?

Compulsory reading:

Woodrow Wilson "The Coming Age of Peace (1918)", in E. Luard, *Basic Texts in International Relations* (1992) (very short)

Hans Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs Power Politics* (University of Chicago Press, 1946), chs.2-3 Ralph Pettman, "Power and Morality: A Misleading Dichotomy", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21 (2) 2008

(Very useful but not quite compulsory reading Doyle, M.W. 1993. "Liberalism and International Relations". In *Kant and Political Philosophy: the Contemporary Legacy*, edited by Ronald, B. New Haven: Yale University Press:)

Reading help

The three articles here talk to each other, so it's tricky to know which order to read them in. I would personally read Pettman first.

The basic background is that classical liberals drew on liberal ideas to suggest how Europe might find peace after World War I.

A liberal interpretation of WWI

In the late 19th Century, states tried to maintain European stability through the 'Concert of Europe'....basically the great powers agreed that there should be a 'balance of power' in Europe based on blocks of allies that were roughly equal in military strength. If two countries are equal in strength, war between them will be very costly so they should try to avoid it out of fear. Many liberals felt that the system of alliances set up had accidentally forced countries into war. Minor countries got into disagreements and then major powers felt they must support the minor countries so as to retain the credibility of their alliance promises. A small disturbance led to continent-wide war.

For many inter-war liberals, the system of 'secret diplomacy', organised by aristocratic diplomats, had created a terrible war that had little to do with the millions of ordinary people who ended up dying in it. They argued that diplomacy should now be carried out publicly and exposed to democratic scrutiny. The League of Nations was set up to try and be a centre for negotiations that could take place in public. It was also hoped that democratic scrutiny of foreign policy would promote peace.

Liberal and realist interpretations of WWII

However, in the run up to the Second World War, arguably people paid too little attention to the cumulative impact of 'minor conflicts' on the balance of power in Europe. The French and British allowed Germany to take many small steps towards war before getting involved militarily. This 'appeasement' policy arguably incited Hitler to further violence as he felt he could get away with it and, as he swallowed up central European nations (particularly Czechoslovakia) the Western Europeans lost potential allies and Germany grew stronger.

Realists have tended to argue that the key mistakes were (a) putting too much trust in international organisations and legal rules and (b) allowing domestic populations too much say instead of leaving matters to the 'experts' (diplomats) who knew how to deal with one another. Liberals reply that the real problems were:

- the unfair treaty of Versaille at the end of the first world war, which punished Germany so badly that breaches of the rules were inevitable (see Keynes *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* a classic and fairly short political tract)
- and that inter-war economic relationships were handled in a way that led to conflict and undermined faith in liberal capitalism and democracy

You should read Wilson (written by an inter-war liberal) and Morgenthau (written by a German-Jewish emigre in the US after WWII) with that in mind.

What does Wilson think will create peace? Which parts of his argument do you find most credible? Which bits do you find less convincing?

Morgenthau writes as though he is producing a neutral academic argument. Which historical events does he have in mind? Why is he so anxious about mixing up 'morality' in international affairs? How does he distinguish politics and strategy from morality? Does his distinction make sense? Why? After you've read Morgenthau, would you rather have Machiavelli or Locke as your foreign minister? Why? Finally, what is Ralph Pettman trying to say about morality and politics? Do you find him convincing?

Additional Reading

Other liberal classics

Kant, I. 1991. Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch. In *Kant's Political Writings*, edited by Reiss, H.S. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 93-130.

Angell, Norman, "The Quest for Enlightenment," in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Perspectives on Peace. 1910-1960,* London: Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1960, pp. 177-194. <u>Angell is taken to be one of the quintessential liberal internationalists of the inter-war period.</u>

Keynes, J M *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* Available at <u>http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/15776</u>

Rostow, W.W., 1991. *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <u>Very famous tract. Wilson updated for the Cold War?</u>

Other realist classics

Carr E H The Twenty-Years Crisis (1939) Machiavelli The Prince Morgenthau Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace Lebow, R N The tragic vision of politics: ethics, interests, and orders (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2003)

The first great debate

Nicholas Guilhot, "The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR Theory", *International Political Sociology* 2 2008

Schmidt, Brian C. (2002) 'Anarchy, World Politics and the Birth of a Discipline', *International Relations*, 16:1, 9-31.

Morgenthau, H.J. 1952. Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the U.S. *The American Political Science Review* 46 (4):

Wilson, Peter, 'The Myth of the 'First Great Debate'', *Review of International Studies*, 24, Special Issue, 1998.

Booth, K. 1997. 75 Years On: Rewriting the Subject's Past. In *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, edited by Smith, S., Booth K. & Zalewski, M. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Quirk, J. & Vigneswaran, D. 2005. The Construction of an Edifice: the Story of a First Great Debate. *Review of International studies* 31 (1): 89-107

Thies, C.G. 2002. Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: the Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate. *European Journal of International Relations* 9 (2): 147-185

Sometimes realists want peace...(.but not usually for 'moral' reasons?) Meyer, K.E. 2003. Weighing Iraq on Morgenthau's Scale. *World Policy Journal* 20 (3): 89-92 E. Rafshoon, "A realist's moral opposition to war: Hans J. Morgenthau and Vietnam", *Peace and Change* 26 (1) 2001

Week Six

TUESDAY Special Guest Class on the nature of EU foreign policy

Compulsory Reading:

Checkel, J 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework' in Checkel, J (Ed) *European Identity and socialization in Europe* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007)

Borzel, T, Risse, T 'Venus Approaching Mars? The EU as an Emerging Civilian World Power' Both are on Blackboard

Reading help

Profs Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse are visiting VUW this week. They are both full Professors at the Free University of Berlin and amongst the most prominent IR academics in Germany. It seemed a shame not to take advantage of their visit for you guys (though ideally, they would have come in about week 10 when we do constructivism!!).

Their current research programme revolves around EU foreign policy. They ask whether the EU has a particular kind of identity that plays an important role in its foreign policy.

We are hopefully all familiar with arguments that the US has tried to shape world order. Some see this primarily in terms of US interests (access to world markets, for example), while others emphasis American values, democracy, free markets, the rule of law and perhaps a certain kind of 'consumer freedom' (you might think of Joseph Nye's writing about soft power).

Risse and Borzel's recent work asks whether we can identify similar processes at work in Europe. Can we identify a set of IR-relevant 'European ideas' that are distinctive? Is the EU able to project these ideas outwards so that they are taken up by other states or in other regions? If so, through what kinds of processes can it perform this task of projection. (I might also ask, what benefits might the EU get from this process? In what ways does it serve EU interests, in the way that many argue US projections serve US interests).

Their theoretical perspective is broadly constructivist. They are committed to the view that 'ideas matter', so foreign policy goals can be promoted by changing peoples' minds as well as through carrots and sticks. Risse is particularly famous for an earlier theory piece called 'Let's argue', which suggested that debate and persuasion might play an important role in international politics.

Additional Reading

Bull, Hedley (1982) 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 21, 2:149-164.

Checkel, J., 1999, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," *International Studies Quarterly* 43: 83-114.

Checkel, J., and Moravcsik, A., 2001, 'A Constructivist Research Program in EU Studies?' *European Union Politics* 2 (2): 219-49.

Diez, Thomas (2005) 'Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'', *Millenium* 33, 3: 613-636.

Hill, Christopher (1993) 'The Capability Expectation Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role', *Journal ofCommon Market Studies* 31, 4: 305-328.

Kelley, J., 2004, 'International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialisation by International Institutions' *International Organisation* 58: 425-57.

Kent, A., 2002, "China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations," *Global Governance* 8: 343-364.

Manners, Ian (2002) 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, 2:235-258.

Manners, Ian (2006) 'Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads', *Journal of European PublicPolicy* 13, 2: 182-199.

Risse, T 2000 'Let's Argue: Communicative Action in World Politics' *International Organization* Vol.54 No.1 pp1-39

Schimmelfennig, F 2000, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," *European Journal of International Relations* 6 (1): 109-139.

Youngs, Richard (2004) 'Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity', *Journal of CommonMarket Studies* 42, 2: 415-435.

THURSDAY

The 'neo-neo' debate

Mini-assignment: answer in no more than 1,000 words.

Does widespread cooperation in the international system mean the neorealists are wrong and the neoliberals are right?

Compulsory reading

Axelrod, Robert & Keohane, R., 'Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions', *World Politics*, 1981, 34(1): 1-24.

Waltz, K 'Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power' in Keohane (Ed) *Neorealism and its critics* G. Hellmann and R. Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO", *Security Studies* 3 (1) 1993

Reading help

We're now back to where I expected us to be! This week looks at a fairly technical debate that dominated IR in the 1980s and early 1990s. It is a useful debate, though, because it helps you understand realism and liberalism in their most popular modern forms. The NATO peace also helps you to see how these theoretical debates affect empirical policy questions.

From classical to modern neorealism

Classical realists like Morgenthau draw on a lot of history and political theory. They base their views on a combination of historical experience and views of human nature. Modern neorealists are worried that this is a bit unscientific – 'don't we just end up disagreeing about human nature, with no obvious way to decide who's right?'. Kenneth Waltz iconic book *The Theory of International Relations* (like it or hate it, this is *the* most influential book in contemporary IR) tries to take a more

'scientific' approach. He tries to keep his assumptions about states to an absolute minimum. He argues that, in a system where there is no over-arching sovereign ('anarchy' in Waltz terms), states simply have to engage in self-interested, security-oriented behaviour or they will cease to exist. Waltz claims his only assumption is that it's OK to think of the international system as a bunch of individual states and that each state is 'rational'. If states will always behave self-interestedly, it will be really hard to have any cooperation in the international system because states will always break any agreed rules if it is in their interests to do so. I've given you a sample of Waltz's work here that talks more about the practical consequences of his theory. All serious IR theorists should really read the book length version.

From classical to modern neoliberalism

Keohane and Axelrod want to defend the possibility of international cooperation *even if Waltz is right*. In other words their theory basically accepts the realist view of states as unitary actors (there's a 'thing' out there called New Zealand and it makes sense to talk about 'New Zealand' as a rational being) and as self-centred ones. Even so, they argue, states can gain from cooperation. Problems of trust can be overcome if contacts are repeated frequently over time because breaches of trust will have negative consequences. Clear rules and plenty of information can help to make it clear who is trustworthy and who is not.

Questions to ask yourselves before tutorial:

What's 'scientific' about Waltz? Does his 'scientificness' make his theory more convincing or 'better' in some other way than, say Morgenthau's writing?

Does Waltz make more assumptions than he claims to? If so, what are they?

How much cooperation might we expect if we believed Keohane and Axelrod?

In what sense are K & A 'liberals' – where do they overlap with domestic liberals like Locke, where do they disagree?

What would be the limits to cooperation under their assumptions?

Can you think of issues that aren't being discussed by either group?

Does the NATO piece prove one or other group wrong? Can you reformulate the neorealist and/or neoliberal position to be more consistent with the evidence?

Overall, do you find yourself feeling like a liberal? A realist? Some combination of the two?

A couple of trickier questions for the end of the seminar....Does it make sense to be 'some combination of the two? Can evidence ultimately resolve the debate between the two approaches? Is realism versus liberalism really a factual empirical question or are the authors ultimately driven by some other set of concerns? What might those concerns be?

Further reading

Waltz, K.N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. London: McGraw-Hill

Waltz, K.N. 1995. Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory. *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge,* edited by Kegley Jr., C. New York: St. Martin's Press Waltz, Kenneth N. 1990. Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory. *Journal of International Affairs*. 44 (1)21-37.

Keohane, Robert O. (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press 1986, esp. chapters by Keohane and Grieco

David Long, "The Harvard School of Liberal International Theory: A Case for Closure", *Millennium* 24 (3) 1995

Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, 30:2, 1978 pp. 167-214 Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation", *International Security* 24 (1), 1999 R.B. McCalla, "NATO's persistence after the cold war" *International Organization* 50 (3) 1996 Walt, Stephen, 'Why Alliances Endure or Collapse', *Survival* 39 (1), (Spring 1997) Baldwin, David, 'Power and Interdependence: A Conceptual Analysis', *International Organisation* 34, 4 (1980)

Axelrod, Robert & Keohane, R., 'Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions', *World Politics*, 1981, 34(1): 1-24.

Robert Keohane, "Can interdependence work?", Foreign Policy (110), 1998

Keohane, R.& J. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, London: Harper Collins, 1989, chapter 1.

Nye, J., 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism,' World Politics, Vol. 40, Jan. 1988.

Deudney, Daniel, and John G. Ikenberry, 'The nature and sources of liberal international order,' *Review of International Studies*, 25(2), 1999, pp.179-196

Mearsheimer, John J., 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, 19, 3, (Winter 1994/95) and exchange in 20, 1.

Ganesan, N., 'Testing neoliberal institutionalism in Southeast Asia,' *International Journal*, 50(4), 1995, 779-804.

Keohane, Robert O., 'Governance in a Partially Globalized World', *American Political Science Review*, 95:1 (2001), pp. 1-13.

Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, ch. 1.

R.B. McCalla, "NATO's persistence after the cold war" *International Organization* 50 (3) 1996 (neoliberal/neo-institutionalist viewpoint)

Week Seven

The Economic basis of military power

Compulsory Reading:

Moran, T 'Grand strategy: the pursuit of power and the pursuit of plenty' *International Organisation* Vol.50 No 1, 1996

Crawford, B 'Hawks, Doves, but No Owls: International Economic Interdependence and Construction of the New Security Dilemma' in Lipschutz (ed) *On Security* available at

http://wwww.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz16.html

Reading Help

Realists tend to claim to know about power....but they're actually much better at explaining how people *use* power than they are about how people get it.

Once upon a time, you basically became a powerful state because you had a big population, that was willing to fight for you, and a nice big stockpile of food and metal weapons. Generally power was a combination of country size and some basic resources (fertile land, access to weapons). Taking over other countries tended to make you stronger. Arguably that is why the British were so keen to go out, conquer the 'empty' bits of the world and exploit the people they found there.

These days physical empire looks a lot less attractive (think cost-benefit analysis on invading Iraq), though there are some issues around particularly valuable resources like oil and those weird minerals they put in mobile phones.

I would argue that the most important shifts in power in the world at the moment are driven by economics. To understand security, then, we really ought to also understand economic power. In a sense, that doesn't raise difficult intellectual questions. Countries want to be rich and militarily

strong since wealth buys guns, bombs and soldiers' wages.....but what if the effort to be militarily strong comes into conflict with 'good' economic policy? Both this weeks' articles ask this question in different ways.

Crawford basically accepts that globalised production is more efficient and creates quicker technological advances. The problem for the military, though, is that multinational production is not under their control. How can US planners ensure that US companies are part of the consortia making the best stuff? How can they ensure that the best stuff can keep on being produced even if political problems emerge between the different countries producing bits of military kit? Security suggests producing everything at home....but producing everything at home is inefficient. It diverts money from the economy....that slows growth and adds to the risk that US business will fall behind.

The other big issue, which is more Moran's focus, is how much to trade. Liberals generally think that free trade is way better economically and it's kind of 'generally friendly'...you treat everyone the same way and no-one gets cross (think back to Wilson and the classical liberal view that friendly economic relationships prevent war). Moran wonders whether countries might not prefer to give the 'benefits' of trade to their friends and try to damage their enemies by refusing to do business. (Of course the risk is you lose the benefits of the cheaper products you might have consumed). He also wonders whether you might actually get ahead better by *not* trading fully....but worries about the political costs of 'unfair' competition of this type.

Tutorial questions for this week will revolve around US-China relationships in the context of a rising China....please *don't* read anything about China though (we'll do that next semester!) Instead ask yourselves these questions based on what you now know about the relationship between economic and security considerations:

Should the US be concerned about the economic rise of China? Why?

What might the economic and security consequences be of continuing to have fairly liberal trade relationship with China be?

What might the economic and security consequences of a more restricted trading relationship? What else might the US do, economically, if it is concerned about China's rapid economic growth? Overall, what kinds of political and economic actions are open to a state that witnesses the rapid economic rise of a weaker power?

Additional Reading:

Friedberg, A 'The Changing Relationship Between Economics and National Security' *Political Science Quarterly* Vol.105 No.2, 1991 pp265-276

Grieco 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism' International Organization Vol.42, Summer 1998, pp485-508 Harlen, Christine 'A Reappraisal of Classical Economic Nationalism and Economic Liberalism'

International Studies Quarterly Vol. 43 No.4, 1999 pp733–744

Helleiner, Eric 'Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism? Lesson from the 19th Century' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.46 No.3, 2002 pp 307-29 Hont, Istvan *Jealousy of Trade* (Cambridge, Bellknap Press,) 2005

Kirshner, J 'Political Economy in Security Studies After the Cold War', *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol.5 No.1 1998 pp.64-91

Viner, J 'Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', *World Politics* Vol.1 No.1 1948

Mastanduno, M 'Economics and security in statecraft and scholarship' *International Organization* Vol.52 No.4 pp 835-854

Week Eight

Marxism (the economic basis of everything???)

Theodore Cohn *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice* (2nd Edition) Chapter 5 The Historical Structuralist Perspective

K. Marx, *Communist Manifest* (Penguin, 1848), section: "Bourgeois and Proletarians" Cohn

And either

Benno Teschke, "Bourgeois Revolution, State-Formation and the Absence of the International" in *Historical Materialism* 13:2 (2005), pp.3-26

Or

De Santos, Theotonio 'The structure of dependence' American Economic Review Vol.60 No.2 1970 Or

Callinicos, A 'The Grand Strategy of American Empire' *International Socialism Journal* No.97, 2002 (on Blackboard)

Reading Guide

Last time, we looked at a view of economics that tended to see it as a game that people played more or less skilfully (good and bad trade or economic policy), creating shifts in the global balance of power.

This week we're going to see economics as a much more political kind of game in which the rules are clearly fixed in favour of some groups rather than others (in classical Marxism) and some countries over others (in Lenin's imperialism, dependency theory and world systems theory). This is what Cohn means when he describes Marxist approaches as 'structural'.....the politics is in the structure of the rules, more than in how people play the game.

Economic motives, Marx thought, were at the heart of all political life. Marx himself was primarily interested in domestic class conflict. He argued that the way we produce stuff and structures of political power are tightly intertwined. He was particularly interested in how domestic politics changed with the rise of capitalism (from the late middle ages to the industrial revolution). Here's a very impressionistic summary:

In the feudal period in Europe, most production was agricultural. Birth and political privilege allocated land to the aristocracy. Everyone else worked on the land to produce food for themselves and surplus that was taken by the landowners.

Over time, trade became more geographically disbursed and people started escaping from the land to become craftsmen, selling luxury goods, tools etc. In Marx's terms, the means of production began to change (the way we make stuff)....and that eventually led to a radically different kind of politics.

These trades-people were outside the traditional power structures (in cities) and became gradually more powerful as they developed new production techniques. The feudal system got in the way of

their interests. They couldn't acquire land and rules for trade were different in different places (different feudal lords in charge etc.). Later, they also struggled to get enough workers for their factories as poor people were still clinging to land rights that enabled them to farm. Gradually the new group of bourgeois / proto-bourgeois traders began to develop new ideas about how politics should operate. They used their independence (they owned property without license from the king, and they gradually became the sources of taxes kings need to finance conflict) to leverage their political power. In England parliament gradually wrested power from the crown. In other countries these new-rich city types were involved in 'bourgeois' revolutions (the French and American revolutions in particular).

So the feudal economic system structured one's life chances. The form of production changed (from mostly agriculture on feudal estates, to more factory-type work in the city), which changed the relations of production (from lord-serf, to capitalist-proletarian) and in turn created shifts in social power. These shifts in social power than translated into new ways of organising politics (the economic 'base' determined the social and political 'superstructure'.) This idea that economic relationships condition political life and are the driving force of history is known as 'historical materialism'.

Basically, according to Marxists, it was bourgeois revolution that laid the foundations for the states' system as we currently know it and the states system continues to operate, broadly in the interests of this bourgeois class. The 'international' then is profoundly shaped by the requirements of capitalism and capitalists....if we only think about state power, we are missing this important dimension of what shapes the world.

In contrast to feudal governments, modern states claim to govern on the basis of popular consent and a set of rules that are applied equally to everyone. Talent, instead of birth, should determine who has political power. Likewise, wealth apparently comes from one's ability to compete in the market. Marx, however, argues that this is in fact a distortion and that the power of one group to dominate another continues under capitalism. For Marx the most important dimension of power is that of the bourgeoisie (capitalists who own property) over the proletariat (workers). In the feudal period people had some right to cultivate their land. As capitalism advances, many were evicted from the land and couldn't produce anything except as employees. The bourgeoisie owned the 'means of production' (factories that make stuff) and the proletariat, in the last instance, are forced to work for them.

Marx argues that this relationship is fundamentally exploitative. Business owners profit from the work of their employees (if you don't believe me read '*Rich dad poor dad'*). Their ownership of property gives them more power, choices and freedom. Marx argues that political power is likely to be exercised in order to cement these privileges. 'Power' here includes ideological power – the claim that things could not possibly be organised otherwise. Marx, though, thinks things could be organised differently and better. Capitalism is wasteful because (a) we are encouraged to buy stuff we don't need so profits can keep growing (b) lots of companies compete to produce the same product and many go bust, wasting resources. Under socialism, production would be organised by everyone (presumably via a highly democratic state), so we'd only produce what we need and there'd be no waste. It would also eliminate power-based inequalities.

These days people are pretty sceptical about Marx's utopia but his analysis of how capitalism works should still be interesting to anyone who feels 'the system' might not be entirely fair.

The communist manifesto, which I've asked you to read, is a bit more subtle than this broad-brush account but remember it too is a political tract, rather than Marx's most sophisticated writing. Read

it (a) with an eye to summarising the main story (b) looking for anything that strikes you as interesting or surprising – take a note and be ready to share (c) and just because everyone should read it once in their lives – it's much more fun than Waltz.

Tutorial question: Who are Marx & Engels addressing? What are the most important things they want their audience to learn and understand?

Now for the three option choices: each is an attempt to deal with some of Marx's shortcomings – filling gaps in the theory or adapting it to the contemporary world/contemporary problems. Pick one piece and I'll put you in groups in the tutorial to discuss it.

In each case:

Identify the new problem

Think about what is Marxist about the solution proposed (for me, at least, the defining feature of Marxism is this idea of an inter-linkage between political and economic power, based finally on the relations of production)

Think about what sits a little more uncomfortably with Marx's ideas

Are these tricky bits a good innovation, or something that confuses issues / distracts us from the most important problems?

Benno Teschke is a Marxist trying to bring Marxism, history and international relations together to understand the birth of the modern state system as we currently know it.

Alvin So introduces a Latin American form of Marxism that has been very influential in development studies and, to a certain extent, IR. In this variant, the move to question whether economics is a level playing-field is played at the international level, rather than the domestic one. Dependency theorists argue that the global economic system is not one of free competition but rather one of exploitative relationships in which the deck is clearly stacked in favour of the developed world, which gets rich at the developing world's expense.

The key question here is what kinds of mechanisms make this happen?

Alex Callinicos discusses war in Iraq in terms of American imperialism, in a way that fuses concerns with economic and political power. Do you think Callinicos's account is 'Marxist'? Is it any different from something an economically aware realist might have written?

Additional Reading

Marxism and IR theory

K. Marx, Capital Vol 1. (Various), Part 8: "So-called Primitive Accumulation"

Midnight Notes Collective, 1990. The New Enclosures. *Midnight Notes*, 10. <u>You can find this online</u>, <u>it's an update of Marx's argument on "Primitive Accumulation"</u>.

Berki, R.N. 1971. On Marxian Thought and the Problem of International Relations. *World Politics* 24 (1): 80-105

Rosenberg, J. 1994. *The Empire of Civil Society – a Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations.* London: Verso

Justin Rosenberg, "Why is there no International Historical Sociology?" in *European Journal of International Relations* 12 (2006)

Benno Teschke, "Bourgeois Revolution, State-Formation and the Absence of the International" in *Historical Materialism* 13:2 (2005), pp.3-26

Halliday, Fred, 'A Necessary Encounter: Historical Materialism and International Relations', in Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations*, London: Macmillan 1994, chapter 3.

Ben Thirkell-White "Globalisation and Development" in *Issues in International Relations (2nd Revised Edition)*, Trevor Salmon, M. F. Imber (ed.), (Taylor and Francis, 2008)

Wallerstein, I., 1974. *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York: Academic Pres. <u>This is the very influential "world systems approach".</u> <u>See the very last bit, the conclusion.</u>

Imperialism, Dependency and World Systems

Amin, S., 1976. Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism, New York: Monthly Review Press. <u>Amin is very famous for writing on capitalism's</u>

"underdevelopment" of the Third World

Brewer, B Marxist theories of imperialism: A critical survey

Cardoso & Faletto *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (to my mind, still the best book on development ever written – not that I agree with all of it!)

Frank, A G Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil Lenin, V Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism

Mies, M., 1986. *Patriarchy and accumulation on a world scale: women in the international division of labour*, London : Zed Books. <u>A classic feminist critique, in the "world systems" tradition</u>

Skocpol, T 'Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique' American Journal of Sociology Vol.82 No.5 March 1977 pp1075-90

Wallerstein, I *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*

Warren, B Imperialism: Pioneer of capitalism

Wood, E.M., 1981. The separation of the economic and the political in capitalism. *New Left Review*, (127), 66-9

Week Nine

Constructivism

Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What Stakes Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization* 46 (2), 1992

And either:

Weldes, Jutta, "Constructing National Interests," *European Journal of International Relations*, 2:3, 1996, pp. 275-318

Or

Judith Squires and Jutta Weldes 'Beyond Being Marginal: Gender and International Relations in Britain' *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* Vol. 9, 2007, pp185-203

Reading help:

Constructivism is a bit of a slippery term. In some ways, constructivist writing simply reminds us that the social world is made by 'us' in ways that the natural world is not necessarily. Laws of social behaviour, therefore depend on human behaviour.

Most constructivists started out by criticizing realists and liberals for being 'positivist' or perhaps materialist. What they mean by this is that both tend to think we can answer questions about how

politics works by looking at the world around us and finding what material resources actors have to deal with the problems they face. We can decide the resources people have and the problems they face quite easily and use the 'facts' to prove whether we're right or wrong.

Constructivists argue that the facts don't tell us enough to understand the world. We always *interpret* facts – we have to make sense of them. We do the making sense on the basis of conventions that we have learnt collectively. Sometimes we don't do stuff on the basis of a calculation of our interests, we do it 'because it's right' (they talk about a 'logic of appropriateness', rather than a 'logic of consequences'). Unless we understand where these conventions come from and how they change, we can never fully understand international politics.

The Wendt article is a classic because it hits at the core of realist international relations. He argues that anarchy does not necessarily lead to the combative self-help world Waltz describes. Self-help realism is one rational set of responses but another rational response might be to agree collective forms of cooperation that enable us to live together comfortably....a sort of Lockean, rather than Hobbesian, state of nature. Which world we end up in is determined by a set of social choices, which ultimately become re-enforcing. If states had all decided to behave in a Lockean manner, there would be serious consequences to behaving like a Hobbesian selfish interest-maximizer. All other states would consider it outrageous and introduce sanctions or whatever. So, what Waltz argues is natural and inevitable, Wendt says is the outcome of social convention....a set of human choices. However, that doesn't necessarily mean that any individual can change it.

Wendt's argument is fundamentally theoretical.....we have no examples of a world of Lockean states. Jutta Weldes is more practical, looking at how states decide what the national interest is, who their friends are, who their enemies are and what constitutes a threat. Put briefly, why is China having nuclear weapons more of a 'threat' than the UK having them? It is not possible to explain this purely on the basis of material facts.

The other piece, by Weldes and Squires, starts to take the 'constructivism' idea rather deeper by talking about the influence of constructions of gender on International Relations. As I read it, this 'gendering' of IR can move in different dimensions. It can be about the way in which international social structures create gendered senses of identity in us (shape what it is to be 'manly' or 'feminine') and about the ways in which our gendered lenses alter our thinking about the international.

Some tutorial questions: Summarise Wendt's article. Did you find it convincing? If not, why not? Are you already socialised into an IR mindset? How did that happen? Are social conventions arbitrary? Can anything become a social convention? Or are there limits? If we accept that the world is socially constructed, does that make it easier to change it? How might one go about trying to do so?

From the optional piece you choose: How is the relevant author using 'constructivism'? Does constructivism add anything important? What exactly does it add? Do you think the author is doing a good job of their constructivist approach or would you explain the phenomena they describe in a different way?

Further readings:

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Reus-Smit, "Imagining society: constructivism and the English School", British Journal of Politics and International Relations 4 (3) 2002

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Acharya, Amitav. 2004. How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. *International Organization* vol.58: 239-375.

Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver et al, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, 1998), ch.2. MacKenzie, Megan. "Securitization and De-securitization: Female Soldiers and the Construction of the Family," *Security Studies* (summer 2009). <u>Ask Megan for an advanced copy.</u>

M. Williams and I. Neumann, "From alliance to security community: NATO, Russia, and the power of identity" in *Millennium* 29 (2) 2000

Finnemore, Martha (1996) 'Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention' in Peter Katzenstein (ed), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press), 153-188.

Finnemore, Martha (2003) *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

David Capie, "Localization as Resistance: The Contested Diffusion of Small Arms Norms in Southeast Asia" *Security Dialogue*, vol. 39, no.6 (December 2008).

David Capie, "Constructing New Zealand in the World," in Raymond Miller and Michael Mintrom (eds.) *Political Leadership in New Zealand* (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2006).

Florini, Anne, 'The Evolution of International Norms', *International Studies Quarterly*, 40:3, 1996, pp. 363-90.

Biersteker, T.J. & C. Weber (eds.), *The Social Construction of State Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Samuel J. Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations" in *International Organization*, 48:1 (1994), pp.107-130;

Christian Reus-Smit, "Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty" in *Review of International Studies* 27:4 (2001), pp.519-538

Cohn, C. (1987a) 'Sex and death in the rational world of defense intellectuals', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 12:4, 687–718.

Enloe, C. (2000) *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives* (Los Angeles, CA and London: University of Califo rnia Press).

Peterson, V. S. (1990) 'Whose rights? A critique of the "givens" in human rights discourse', *Alternatives*, 15:3, 303–344.

Shepherd, L. (2007) ' "Victims, Perpetrators and Actors" revisited: Exploring the potential for a feministreconceptualisation of (international) security and (gender) violence', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 9:2, 239–256

Steans, J. (2003) 'Engaging from the margins: Feminist encounters with the "mainstream" of International Relations', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 5:3, 428–454.

Week 11

Neo-Gramscian IR and post-structuralism

Compulsory reading:

Robert Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", *Millennium* 12 (2), 1983

Michel Foucault, "Governmentality", in J. Faubion (ed), Power (Penguin, 2000) Nancy Fraser, "From discipline to flexibilization? Rereading Foucault in the shadow of globalization",

Constellations 10 (2) 2003

Reading help:

Please never quote me on this sentence because it's helpful for understanding but wrong in many ways.....'These authors all fuse something a bit like Marxism with something a bit like constructivism in order to understand the politics of contemporary neoliberal capitalism from a radical perspective'. To put it differently, these authors are all asking why we want what we want when (from their point of view) it clearly isn't good for us!!

Perhaps easiest is Cox. Cox is inspired by a turn of the century Italian Marxist called Antonio Gramsci. Marx had expected a revolution fairly soon in one of the most advanced capitalist nations, since capitalism would inevitably lead to socialism. Instead, Russia had a sort of revolution, England didn't and Italy showed some positive (from Gramsci's point of view) signs but never ultimately got there. Gramsci ended up in prison thinking about why Italy's revolution failed (he was involved in trying to organise it, hence the prison term). He decided that Marx hadn't paid enough attention to ideas.....Gramsci argued that the bourgeoisie maintained power partly through capturing the state and partly through:

- (a) telling good stories about how what was in their bourgeois interests was also good for everyone else
- (b) making alliances with other classes to create 'hegemony' by compromising their interests just enough to make the stories they told (a) reasonably plausible

Cox suggests that neoliberal globalisation works in broadly the same way. It serves some groups' interest rather than others. Those groups make some compromises and tell some good stories and then the vast majority think globalisation is good when it's not. The claim that 'there is no alternative' to neoliberal global capitalism is particularly key here....alternatives (a 'counter

hegemonic bloc') are difficult to build. You need a counter-coallition and a uniting set of counterideas. People won't just automatically see the possibility of revolution....they need teaching, organisation and sharp political strategy to make it happen.

Foucault also looks at subtle forms of international power. In his case the story is about how state power went from being very blunt but not very wide-spread (so hideous public torture of a very small number of people who got 'found out') to subtle but way way more pervasive. Governmentality, for Foucault, is our current system of government where we have all learnt to police ourselves through a combination of subtle incentives and socially re-produced stories of appropriate behaviour. We want to be hard-working competitive, good employees, pillars of society etc....

Nancy Fraser says Foucault was thinking of 'Fordist production' – welfare states and big factories with compliant workers. She argues that globalisation changed things but Foucault's ideas are still kind of relevant...If anything discipline is more subtle – based at creating lean, mean competitive individuals who constantly push themselves to be more efficient and therefore valuable. (You might also want to look at Robert Deuchars' recent attempt to explain the relevance of Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari for contemporary IR).

Tutorial questions:

What are the similarities and differences between the kinds of power that the three authors talk about?

Those of you with radical inclinations, once we've read that kind of writing is there anything we can *do* other than feel cynical and sophisticated?

Those of you with more conservative tendencies, did you find any of the stories being told convincing? Did you suddenly wonder how free you are? If so, which bits hit home and why? If not, how can you be sure that your very complacency isn't a sign these guys are right????

How much do you think we are able to form out own opinions about the world we live in freely and correctly? What might stop us from doing so?

Additional reading:

Gill, S. 2002. Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations. *International Studies Review* 4 (2): 47-65

Gill, S. 1995. Globalisation, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism. *Millennium* 23 (3): 399-423

Morton, A.D. 2003. Historicizing Gramsci: Situating Ideas In and Beyond Their Context. *Review of International Political Economy* 10 (1)

Social forces in the making of the new Europe : the restructuring of European social relations in the global political economy / edited by Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (Palgrave, 2001) Overbeek, H. (2000). Transnational Historical Materialism: Theories of Transnational Class Formation and World Order. In *Global Political Economy – Contemporary Theories*, edited by Palan, R. London: Routledge: 168-183

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Rupert, M. and Solomon, S. *Globalization and International Political Economy*. Romwan & Littlefield, 2005

Germain, Randall and Michael Kenny, 'Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians', *Review of International Studies*, 1998, 24:1, pp. 3-21

Shilliam, R. 2004. Hegemony and the Unfashionable Problematic of Primitive Accumulation. *Millennium* 33 (1): 59-88

Bakker, I. & Gill, S., 2003. *Power, Production, and Social Reproduction: Human In/security in the Global Political Economy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cox, R.W., 1987. *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Robinson, William I., Promoting Polyarchy, Cambridge: CUP 1995, Part I

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Foucault, M. 1986. Disciplinary Power and Subjection. In *Power*, edited by Lukes, S. Oxford: Blackwell: 229-242

Foucault, M. 1986a. Of Other Spaces. Diacritics 16

Keeley, J. F. (1990). "Toward a Foucauldian analysis of international regimes." *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 1: 83-105.

Tim Di Muzio, "Governing Global Slums: The Biopolitics of Target 11", *Global Governance* 14 (3) 2008 Campbell, D. The biopolitics of security: Oil, Empire and the sports utility vehicle. *American Quarterly*. 2005;57:943-972

Mark Salter, "The global visa regime and the political technologies of the international self: Borders, bodies, biopolitics", *Alternatives* 31 (2), 2006

Michael Dillon, "Correlating Sovereign and Biopower" in Edkins et al, *Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics* (Routledge, 2004)

Duffield, MR. 'Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-

Interventionary Society', Journal of Refugee Studies, 21 (2), (pp. 145-165), 2008

Duffield, MR. 'Development, Territories, and People: Consolidating the External Sovereign Frontier', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 32 (2), (pp. 225-246), 2007

Robert Deuchars (2004), *The International Political Economy of Risk: Rationalism, Calculation and Power*, Aldershot, Ashgate.

Further readings on poststructuralism in IR:

Der Derian, J. 1989. The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations. In *International/Intertextual Relations – Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, edited by Der Derian, J. & Shapiro, M. J. Lexington, M.A.: Lexington Books

Der Derian, J. 1995. A Reinterpretation of Realism: Genealogy, Semiology, Dromology. In International Theory - Critical Investigations, edited by Der Derian, J. Basingstoke: Macmillan Poststructuralism & international relations: bringing the political back in / Jenny Edkins (Boulder, 1999)

Connolly, W., 'Democracy and Territoriality' in: *Millennium,* Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter 1991. Kuehls, T. *Beyond Sovereign Territory: The Space of Ecopolitics,* Minneapolis: Minneapolis University Press, 1996.

Shapiro, M. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War, Minneapolis: Minneapolis University Press, 1997.

Walker, R.B.J., 1993. *Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <u>A seminal book in IR theory</u>.

Richard Ashley with Robert B. J. Walker (eds.), "Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies," special issue of *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 1990).

Campbell, D. 1992. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Manchester University Press

Richard Devetak, "The Project of Modernity and International Theory," *Millennium*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1995), pp. 27-51.

Week Twelve

Post-colonial IR – Western bias and the enduring idea of civilization

Compulsory reading

Bowden, B. "In the name of progress and peace: The "standard of civilization" and the universalising project." *Alternatives* 29 (2004): 43-68.

Ashis Nandy, "The Uncolonized Mind: A Post-Colonial View of India and the West", in *The Intimate Enemy* (Oxford University Press, 1983

Reading help:

Bowden is arguing that 'the international community' is still fundamentally racist in its evaluations of other countries and what they 'need'.

Are Western institutions and norms:

- (a) the best that we can possibly imagine
- (b) flawed but still better than what we see most other places
- (c) not better at all?

What do we mean by Western norms anyway? What might non-Western norms look like? Do you agree with Bowden's claim that there is Western (colonial) bias in international relations? Which of his examples did you find most/least convincing?

How important do you think ideas of civilization are in shaping international relations? (Ie. If he's right, how much does it matter?)

Nandy is trying to think in a way that isn't dominated by the West but finding it difficult. What makes it so difficult?

Can you make sense of the difficult passage where he provides the only example in the peace of genuinely non-Western forms of politics – a guru meditating in a prison cell. Does Nandy mean this literally? Is he trying to make us think in some particular way?

Further reading

Barkawi, T. and M. Laffey. 2006. The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies. *Review of International Studies* 32, 2: 329–52.

James Belich, "Myth, Race and Identity in New Zealand", in H. Hiery & J. MacKenzie, *European Impact and Pacific Influence* (Taurus)

R.L. Doty, "The Bounds of 'Race" in International Relations", *Millennium* 22 (3), 1993 Gruffydd-Jones, B. 2006. *Decolonizing International Relations*. London: Rowman and Littlefield. Hobson, John. "Civilizing the Global Economy: Racism and the Continuity of Anglo-Saxon Imperialism." In *Global Standards of Market Civilization*, edited by B. Bowden and L. Seabrooke, 60-76. London: Routledge, 2006.

Hobson, John (2004) *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Inayatullah, N. & Blaney, D.L. 2004. *International Relations and the Problem of Difference*. London: Routledge

Jahn, B. 2000. *The Cultural Construction of International Relations: the Invention of the State of Nature*. Basingstoke: Macmillan

Pagden, A. 1988. The "Defence of Civilization" in Eighteenth-Century Social Theory. History of the Human Sciences 1 (1)

Shilliam, R. 2006. What about Marcus Garvey? Race and the Transformation of Sovereignty Debate. *Review of International Studies* 32, 3: 379–400.

Marzec, R.P. 2002. Enclosures, Colonization, and the Robinson Crusoe Syndrome: A Genealogy of Land in a Global Context. *Boundary* 2 29 (2): 129-156

Said, E. 1983. The World the Text and the Critic. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. <u>Said is</u> perhaps the most famous postcolonial writer. See especially his critique of Foucault's eurocentrism. Said, E. (Various) Orientalism. <u>A real classic.</u>

Nandy, Ashis. "History's forgotten doubles." *History and Theory* 34, no. 2 (1995): 44-66. Chakrabarty, D., 2000. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Chatterjee, P., 1986. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*, Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Euben, R.L. 2002. Contingent Borders, Syncretic Perspectives: Globalization, Political Theory and Islamizing Knowledge. *International Studies Review* 4 (1): 23-48.

Gayatri Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?", in Nelson and Grossberg, *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (1988). <u>A seminal article – challenging and rewarding reading.</u>

Paul Gilroy *The Black Atlantic* (Verso, 1993). <u>A very important text on the racial constitution of</u> <u>America and the West.</u>

The post-colonial studies reader / edited by Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths & Helen Tiffin (Routledge, 2006). <u>A great resource for postcolonial thought.</u>

Essay Questions:

- Some people argue that we need both realism and liberalism to understand international relations since both pick up important (but different) aspects of human behaviour. Others argue that realism and liberalism produce contradictory and incommensurable views of the world so we must choose between them. Which of these two views is closer to the truth? Why?
- 2 How important is it to have a particular sovereign state responsible for each piece of territory on the planet? Is it so important that the quality of governance should play no part in international decisions about whether or not to recognise a sovereign state? (Answer with at least some reference to the political theory of Hobbes and Locke)
- 3 At the heart of Morgenthau's theory is the idea that the political realist must focus on the 'autonomy of the political sphere'? How does this view shape his view of world politics? Is his view that understanding 'interest defined as power' can be kept separate from subordinate concerns of morality or economics defensible?
- 4 What , if anything, can neorealism teach us about the functioning of international organisations?
- 5 'National security advisors should have no influence over economic policy' Discuss
- 6 'European foreign policy increasingly revolves around the external promotion of specifically European ideas and norms' Discuss

- 7 'We can only understand inequality in the modern world with the assistance of Marxist theories of imperialism' Discuss
- 8 'The most important forms of power in the international system are discourses: pervasive political ideas that alter ordinary peoples' habitual behaviour' Discuss in relation to the work of Foucault or the neo-Grasmcian IR theorists
- 9 How do ideas influence international relations?
- 10 'A gendered lens on international relations is more sociologically interesting than it is politically relevant' Discuss
- 11 'The idea of 'civilization' continues to naturalise and disguise relationships of domination in the international system' Discuss