SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE HISTORY SERIES

Identifying Communists: Continuity in Political Policing, 1931-1951

On 14 April 1931, Constable E.R. Trask wrote a report which began: ‘I respectfully report that acting on instructions received, I attended a Communist Meeting, which was held in the Communist hall.’ He carefully noted the names of all those who attended whom he believed to be communists. This typified police practice at that time. In other words, identification and surveillance of suspected or known communists in meetings, on demonstrations and in other settings, dominated political policing long before the Cold War. For the New Zealand Police Force, anti-communism was an organising worldview with communist influence their general explanation for any radical activity.

This article examines how New Zealand police officers understood dissent among unemployed workers in the 1930s and during the 1951 waterfront dispute, and concludes that continuity in political policing prevailed, despite the momentous events of World War Two and the early Cold War years which intervened. It argues that policing methodology is a form of social knowledge, so that the words in the written police archives need to be seen in the broader perspective of surveillance as a knowledge system into which new constables were socialised. For example, each year detectives from other centres were sent to Christchurch during its Show Week in November to keep their ‘own city criminals under observation and to point them out’ to local police. This model of policing was already dated by the 1930s, even more so by the 1950s, but it continued to inform and structure political policing.

The unemployed workers’ campaigns of the early 1930s, and the 1951 waterfront dispute, were two high-points of dissent that caused great anxiety to the state. From the police perspective they were similar threats, making comparison between the two productive. Communists were involved in both sets of events, but the majority of people who took action that the state found especially threatening – rioting in the 1930s and refusing to work or supporting the watersiders in 1951 – were not communists, at least in the sense of being members of the communist Party. Thus the police model, identifying and surveilling communists presumed to be behind the disturbances, was inadequate for explaining the cause and extent of dissent.

Studying police political surveillance during these two periods of unrest against the established political economy reveals both normal practice and its weaknesses. There is a practical reason for selecting the Unemployed Workers’ Movement (UWM) and waterfront dispute files to examine such issues: both have extensive police files that have been released to Archives New Zealand. In 1956, the newly established New Zealand Security Service (NZSS), later renamed the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS), took control of police political surveillance files. In recent years the NZSIS has begun transferring declassified files to Archives New Zealand. While only 104 files on historical subjects have currently been released, 13 of these cover the UWM and 18 cover the 1951 waterfront dispute. Taken together these two sets of events cover a substantial portion of the New Zealand political surveillance material that has been made accessible.

There is much scope for academic work on political policing in New Zealand history. Analyses of the reasons behind the transfer of political surveillance from the Police Force to the NZSS have inevitably focused on the inadequacies of political policing. Their work reinforces a traditional Cold War narrative that sees communists as a new and different threat after the end of World War Two. More useful for this article’s focus on continuity is Graeme Dunstall’s...
excellent official history of the police from 1918-1945. Dunstall dedicated a chapter to political policing and provided evidence of a long history of policing communists. Redmer Yska’s article about police surveillance of a Wellington social grouping in the 1950s (the ‘Vegetable Club’), whose attendees included some communists, demonstrates the effort police expended on labelling communists and the seriousness which undercover police gave to even trivial remarks on social occasions. This article builds on these two works by concentrating on case studies where the subjects of surveillance were involved in sustained unrest, and asks what these case studies can tell us about police analysis and worldview.

**The police model: monitoring and identifying communists as troublemakers**

In early April 1931, unemployed workers marched through the streets of Wellington, with many police officers in attendance. Each policeman present wrote a report carefully noting the names of those they had seen at the demonstration who they believed to be communists. Constable J.M. Bourke stated: ‘The only communists that I know by name who were in the parade were Brazier and Myrtle Jones.’ Three other constables mentioned these in their reports. Constable H.R. Rush identified Jones and another local communist called John Sandford; Constable L.W. O’Sullivan recognised Brazier and another he named as Riley; and Constable G. Tomlinson just recognised Brazier. Acting Detective R.H. Waterson, who spent a lot of time on political policing, gave the first and last names of the men he saw: John Sandford, Bernard Boston and Philip Gordon Brazier. While the ability and confidence of policemen to identify the communists varied, their emphasis on the need to name those on the march was consistent.

In their elaborations on the individuals who were named, police reports arising from the march in April 1931 were typical of political-policing practice in that period. Detective N.W. Laugeson discussed five such men in terms of their employment, all in the same format: ‘COMMUNIST YOUNG This Communist is at present employed at the Belfast Freezing Works.’ A police evaluation of George Budd, in preparation for his trial arising from the demonstration, stated: ‘He is a man of bad character and nothing can be said in his favour.’ Most of the evidence to support this analysis related to his involvement in the Communist Party rather than to any illegal actions. As well as identifying suspected communists, police also paid attention to both the flying and the singing of The Red Flag as signifiers of communism.

Detective P.J. Nalder, reporting on a meeting held 6 July 1930, noted not only the singing of The Red Flag at the end of the meeting but also that the accompanying violinist was a communist. In one report the singing of The Red Flag was marked in blue pencil, a marking that was reserved for events that required further police action.

All ranks of the police emphasised the identification of individual communists. Senior Sergeant Butler identified and named three communists out of a group of less than a dozen men protesting in December 1930. In each main centre one detective was assigned to the work of political surveillance. While their reports were more detailed and knowledgeable than those produced by constables, they too focused on identifying communists and their activities. Reports moved up the police hierarchy. When the Commissioner reported to the Minister of Justice about members of a deputation to Parliament, he used the language of those who made the initial identifications, giving reasonably full descriptions of four of the attendees and their history. Police also wrote extensive reports about identified communists when they travelled to New Zealand from elsewhere. From constables to Commissioner, then, the Police Force had a consistent model of understanding what lay behind dissident political activity.
One of the advantages of a labelling system of political analysis was that it was easy for police officers, without much education or political background, to understand. Dunstall described a new Dunedin detective who ‘made his first acquaintance with “Carl Marks”’ when a Communist from Wellington spoke on “Communism and Industrialism” in June 1921.19 Among other routes, constables learned about individual communists from senior colleagues, just as they learned about known criminals. In 1932 Constable Norris noted of a meeting that the ‘chairman was a man who Detective Laugeson informed me was Reginald Reedy’, the detective being in charge of monitoring communists in Christchurch.20 In April 1931, Constable E.R. Trask attended an UWM meeting in Wellington with Detective N.W. Baylis, who was responsible for the surveillance of suspected subversives in that city. Trask did not know a prominent person present, describing him as ‘a man named Sim’,21 while Baylis noted that ‘we were met by Communist Leo Sim.’22 In his next report, Trask wrote extensively about Sim with a confidence missing from his earlier report, indicating the probability of a briefing in the meantime.23

Police also used the Police Gazette, which included photographs of individuals in custody or released from gaol, to monitor communists. For example, in Detective O.S. Power’s report from April 1932 on ‘Communist Activities in New Zealand’, he referred to two individuals’ previous appearances in the Police Gazette, emphasising their communist affiliation. One of the entries reads: ‘KENNETH BAXTER who was to assist Blance in laying the foundation of a branch of the Communist Party here is referred to in Police Gazette 1926, page 110.’24

As well as identifying individual members of the Communist Party, where they used a tight definition of the word communist, the police also used it as a loose term to refer to anyone who questioned or rebelled against authority, including members of the Communist Party. Despite only being able to name two communists at the April 1931 demonstration mentioned above, Constable Bourke described it as follows: ‘There were about 200 unemployed and communists and also 3 women.’25 In July 1930 Detective Nalder attended a meeting of a hundred people where The Red Flag was sung and reported that “[t]he only persons that joined in the singing were members of the Communist Party.”26 Singing The Red Flag, for him, signified that the singer was a communist.

In another demonstration in April 1931, police officers used both tight and loose definitions of communists. After unemployed workers processioned to Parliament; they were refused entry and there was conflict with the police. Constable Fell, who arrested Roy Goode, stated: ‘Goode was in company with a number of communists who were trying to force their way past the Police into the grounds.’27 However, Detective Laugesen, the Wellington officer responsible for political surveillance, stated that J.J. Robinson was the only communist who took part in the disturbance, explicitly naming other communists who had nothing to do with it.28 The term communist, then, functioned differently in the two reports. Laugesen was talking specifically about members of the Communist Party, while Fell’s statement made sense according to the police worldview: trouble was the result of communist activity, and therefore troublemakers were communists.

Using the looser definition of communist in which anyone who dissented was deemed a communist, enabled policemen to explain dissent as inspired by the Communist Party. When miners in Huntly began to organise, the local police officer blamed communism: ‘The majority of the men here are a very quiet peaceable crowd, but now the Communist Party (of whom there are about a dozen) have got hold of the control of the Unemployed Union, there is only one result to be anticipated.’29 The Commissioner of Police described members of an
unemployed deputation that had come from outside of Wellington as ‘merely tools in the hands of the Communists.’ When relief workers went on strike in Wellington in 1931, Detective N.W. Baylis stated that the majority of them were deceived by communists into thinking the Labour Party supported their actions. Police reported frequently on the actions of those they saw as communists, tightly or loosely defined, because their model of the world put communists at the centre of their understanding of social discontent and political rebellion.

Flaws within the police model

As the effects of the Depression came to be felt more strongly, unemployed workers became much more organised, especially after the formation of the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement in 1931. Demonstrations by the unemployed increased and saw major riots in Auckland, Wellington and Dunedin. While Communist Party members took part in such actions, they formed only a small part of the movement, and policemen struggled to fit this into their worldview. When there was any suggestion that unemployed workers might take action, for example, the police response was to pay even more attention to identifying and surveilling communists. When in March 1931 the rates of relief were reduced, the Auckland detective in charge of political policing, P.J. Nalder, reported that communists were advocating strike action among the relief workers, although he did not know if they would do so. There are two further notes on the report from other police officers, one indicating that a strike did take place. The other from Auckland’s Superintendent S. Till, addressed to the Commissioner, stating that a ‘close watch is being kept on the communist leaders here.’ It seems that the only way even senior policemen could imagine that relief workers might go on strike is if they were influenced to by communists, who were thereby even more tightly monitored than previously.

Yet while the police emphasised communist influences they also downplayed their appeal to workers and the unemployed. This occurred in two ways. Firstly, policemen were inclined to believe that large protest gatherings of the unemployed or others were being stacked by communists. Thus a detective reported that communists were trying to dominate unemployed meetings, ‘and no doubt they are sometimes successful as they pack the meetings with seafaring men who are in sympathy with their cause.’ Secondly, policemen assumed that because they saw communist ideas as beyond the pale they assumed that these could not have any effect on public audiences who were not communists. When large numbers of people attended a meeting in Wellington in 1932, police reports thus downplayed the interest of those present: ‘These speakers were listened to by a crowd of some six or seven hundred but those interested would not be more than a hundred. When cheers were called for at the finish it was very noticeable that only a few answered.’ Another report of the same event suggested that those attending were ‘disinterested’.

Not only did police political analysis leave very little space for understanding why communist ideas might resonate with some members of the public, they also treated ‘Communist’ as a stable category. Yet in the early 1930s, as Kerry Taylor has demonstrated, there was huge turn-over in Communist Party membership which was related to internal disputation. During 1931 the Wellington membership peaked in May at a high of 80 but, by January 1932, this had fallen to 25. That year, indeed, the Party’s control commission expelled 21 members, a quarter of the Party’s membership. There was plenty of evidence before the police that ‘communist’ was an instable label. For example, after they had left the Communist Party, Petone’s Frederick Perrin and Joseph Turner were prosecuted for speaking without a permit because the Communist Party held the authorisation to speak. When John Sandford travelled the country in 1932, the Commissioner of Police described him as ‘a fairly good speaker, and [with] a good
deal of ability as an organiser’, but noted that he was ‘an ex-member of the Communist Party’, something remarked upon the previous year in a pencilled note (‘expelled’) on Detective F.N. Robinson’s report describing Sandford as a communist. In Christchurch, where there was conflict and turnover within the UWM committee, the police kept careful track of this, annotating the names of each new set of members with comments such as ‘Communist’, ‘Expelled Communist’ or ‘Unemployed’. While this article does not cover informants within the UWM (or the dissenting workers in 1951), the uniformed and plain-clothed policemen’s analyses were assisted by supplementary information by paid and unpaid informants and infiltrators within the ranks of the targeted movements. Such ‘insiders’ often gave full reports of the reasons for individuals being expelled from the party. Despite a great deal of information before them, however, the police continued to categorise communists as a unified category whose identification and monitoring would be the key to understanding and controlling dissent.

Yet they also knew that many radical actions were not inspired by communists in either the tight or loose definition of the word. Indeed, they were well aware that the Communist Party actively opposed some of the radical political action that took place in the 1930s – as with the Wellington relief workers’ strike in 1932: ‘Griffin, Galbraith and Robinson – leaders of the Communist Party – have expressed themselves as being opposed to a strike just now as the organisation is insufficient and it would probably fizzle out in a few days.’ An informant added evidence that the Communist Party was not involved in the ensuing strike, and gave information about some of those who had agitated for it: ‘Today F. Perrin went to Petone and J. Turner to Lower Hutt to endeavour to influence the Relief Workers in favour of a strike. These two men are leaders in the Unemployed Workers’ Movement, but not now connected with the Communist Party as members.’ Yet police analyses continued to see dissident activity as communist-inspired.

The 1951 Dispute

The 1951 waterfront dispute saw 16,000 workers either locked out or on strike in mining, waterfront, freezing works and other workplaces. Cabinet took control of the dispute early on, and declared emergency regulations that de-registered the watersiders’ union, directed armed services to work on the wharves and criminalised many activities involved in the strike. Prime Minister Sidney Holland and the popular press used Cold War rhetoric against the workers involved in the lockout and strikes. While a number of people prominently involved in the events of 1951 were members of the Communist Party the leaders of the New Zealand Union Waterfront Workers’ Union (NZWWU) were not. Neither were the vast majority of those who were locked out or went on strike.

Yet police reports about the waterside dispute focused on communists. When a group of Auckland trade unionists visited Wellington, Detective Sergeant Dave Paterson compiled extensive histories of all of them, including whether a subversive history sheet had been created for them and especially if they had been active in the Communist Party. When discussing the decision of the Seamen’s Union to go on strike, Paterson stated that the ‘action suggested is typical of that which would be taken at this time by militant trade unionists and Communists’, and specifically singled out Tommy Hepinstall, a communist. Senior Detective J.J. Halcrow of the Special Branch wrote a Communist Party-centred assessment of the executive of the Christchurch branch of the NZWWU even though, according to his information, just one member of it was in the Communist Party. All but that one were classified as ‘leftist’, some of these with alleged links to the Communist Party, or were noted as having ‘no adverse comment’
attached to them. The focus on communism came from the highest political as well as the lowest policing levels. The Commissioner of Police circulated a memorandum in March 1951 noting that ‘I am receiving many reports from the Ministers to the effect that meetings are being held and addressed by strike agitators and members of the Communist Party.’ Towards the end of the dispute, the police came into contact with Jessie Gardiner, who they had not previously been aware of. Detective Sergeant R.Q. Petherick reported that: ‘there was no doubt whatsoever that he was a rabid Communist, although to date he has not come under notice as having been connected with any particular Communist Party Branch in Wellington.’ He then provided details of Gardiner’s birth, parents, education, early work history, military service, current living situation, his mother’s living situation, and assessed his business, which was a milk bar. He reported that a subversive history sheet had been compiled for Gardiner. After the lockout was over in Lyttelton the police kept an eye on social events for watersiders and former watersiders: ‘[t]hese socials which are held fairly frequently, undoubtedly have the support of the Communist Party.’

The police worldview created problems in 1951 as it had in the 1930s. Their consistent belief was that events were being propelled by a few, mostly communist, agitators. This led them to assess that the vast majority of workers did not support the dispute, and would be willing to begin work again on the wharf on the Government’s terms if it were not for intimidation: ‘these men are frightened to start a new union owing to the remaining percentage being leftish in their views.’

The police worldview, and their focus on surveilling suspected communist agitators, made it difficult for police to understand what was happening. For example they found it hard to understand moderate unionists who supported the NZWWU. In early March, at the beginning the waterfront dispute, Inspector Johnston wrote a summary of a meeting in which he described the Secretary of the Nelson branch of the NZWWU, Alfred Jones, as follows: ‘He is held in high esteem by all classes of the community including his employers and is generally recognized as a man of good standing possessing most moderate views.’ He had engaged in extended conversation with Jones, who had indicated that he had no problem with the employers, and contrasted him with the branch president, Ernest Lock, whom he described as the leader of the agitators. Within the month, however, Johnston’s view had changed to fit Jones into the police anti-communist worldview.

While the emergency regulations empowered the police to ban union meetings, the Nelson police authorised a watersiders’ meeting, hoping that the workers would decide to go back to work. At the meeting, however, the union rejected the idea en masse and Lock led them out of the building. Jones had chaired the meeting and had supported the refusal to recommence work, causing Johnston to reassess his view of him. But the Inspector still believed that the dispute was being prolonged by radical leaders; it was just that he had transferred Jones to that category. He wrote: ‘I feel satisfied that a number of the watersiders are willing to work but they are under the influence of Lock and Jones and lack the strength and decision to form a new union of their own.’ The idea that radical individuals with ideological motives were behind the dispute made it difficult for the police to understand both moderate union leaders and the continued refusal of the bulk of the members to work.

More than any other officer, the Special Branch’s Detective Sergeant Dave Paterson took note of evidence that contradicted his worldview. Detective Sergeant Paterson took a prominent role in policing the fallout from the waterfront dispute while remaining a true believer in the communist menace. At a seminar to mark the 50th anniversary of the dispute, radio producer...
Jack Perkins mentioned that he had talked to Dave Paterson: ‘he still to this day believes that … everything he did was justified in terms of the communist threat.’ In his reports during the dispute he expressed himself in vivid language: ‘The watersiders’ sore is still discharging and also the freezing-workers, although the latter has healed in parts and the bandages have been removed from the ASRS [Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants].’

Very early in the 1951 dispute, Paterson reported in March that he had heard from Wellington watersiders that the dispute was not led by communists. He then canvassed political positions that he believed showed that the watersiders’ union was following the Communist Party line: their statement that armaments for the conflict in Malaya would not be loaded, for example, and that they were against the gaoling of American union leader Harry Bridges. To Paterson it was incomprehensible that any unionist could take these two positions except under the influence of communists, who he believed had inspired the dispute in the first place. While he knew that only a fraction of the participants in the dispute were communists, he believed that ‘the individual trade unionist is not fully alive to [communist designs] and that he is in many cases a dupe to the communists in the old trade union call of “solidarity”.’ In another report he stated that the ‘manner in which bona fide freezing workers have allowed themselves to be led along by the nose was amply illustrated at a mass meeting of former members of this union.’ His evidence for this was that the motion to continue the strike was put by Albert Birchfield, a communist who had joined the union just before the freezing workers went on strike.

Prominent leaders of the Wellington watersiders put some effort into trying to persuade Paterson that his understanding of the dispute was wrong but with little success. Toby Hill, the Secretary of the NZWWU, had a long conversation to try and convince him that he was not a communist, and that his union did not follow the Communist Party line. Hill explained that he was Catholic, and had been at times criticised in the union movement for his religious beliefs. On the issue of the NZWWU’s affiliation with the Soviet-orientated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which had been used by many public figures (including the cartoonist Gordon Minhinnick) to convince people that the watersiders were communist-influenced, Hill explained that this membership was a practical one – and indeed that the NZWWU had never paid its affiliation fees. He did acknowledge that there were individual communists involved in the union, but put considerable effort into trying to persuade Paterson that the union as a whole was not a communist front. While Paterson wrote down Hill’s views, they do not seem to have changed his analysis. Nor was Paterson moved by a conversation with an unnamed watersider who declared that communists had negligible influence within his union and, again, that affiliation fees to the WFTU had not been paid. Finally, Eddie Napier, a leader of the Wellington watersiders, who also rejected the idea that either he or his union were communist, and further argued that communists were not a significant force in the union. Paterson dismissed this position by noting that the secretary of the Hutt Valley Branch of the Communist Party had visited Napier at home and talked to him for half an hour in March, and ended his report by claiming that ‘there is no gainsaying that watersiders in Wellington are receiving moral and financial support from the Communist Party here.’

But the effect of Paterson’s inability to understand the origins and meaning of the events he was monitoring was that he consistently failed to predict what would happen next. When initially analysing the likely actions the Wellington drivers’ union would take during the dispute, he had focused on the politics of its leaders, emphasising that they had no known contact with the Communist Party and therefore predicting that they would not strike. However, the union did end up participating in the dispute and being deregistered accordingly.
Moreover, in mid-May 1951, Paterson asserted that the tide was turning inside the Wellington watersiders’ union and that a large number of its members were going to return to work soon, an assessment he repeated in early June. In the event, only 83 out of more than 2,000 members of the union returned to work on the Wellington waterfront before the lockout was over. That month he also reported that the ‘suggestion has been made that only the most militant section of the strikers here, possibly only the communist group, are likely to give Barnes [Jock Barnes, the President of the NZWWU] support in public demonstrations or acts of violence.’ But as it turned out, there were several large public demonstrations in Wellington between late May and the end of the dispute. Paterson, like other political policeman, had continued throughout the dispute to see radical action within the union movement only in terms of communists and their dupes, and they were surprised when large numbers of unionists engaged in such actions. Identifying communists, and using their influence as an explanation for any kind of rebellion against authority, was so central to the police worldview that even when the facts showed otherwise there was no fundamental re-evaluation.

Conclusion

Between the 1931 and 1951, despite momentous world events and ongoing political surveillance, there was very little change in the way police analysed dissent, and thus the limitations of an approach based on identifying communists remained in place. Political surveillance in New Zealand, then, remained shaped not by the conditions immediately after the First World War, when the police adapted their existing worldview and practices around crime to political surveillance – one that divided the world up into good citizens and a small number of individual criminals. This binary labelling, and the practices that went with it, was easily carried over to political policing, with the communists substituting for the criminals. Such practices did not end when police lost primary responsibility to the NZSS in 1956. Miriam Wharton has argued that identifying subversive people and organisations dominated the work of the early years of the NZSS, at least partly because it was much easier than other forms of security and intelligence work. In the decades that followed, the NZSIS would face ever greater challenges in understanding dissent against authority. When the New Zealand Communist Party was the only one in the world to follow China during the Sino-Soviet split, labelling and monitoring communists became an even more complex task. This was quickly followed by the social and political unrest of the later 1960s onwards, which could not be categorised in terms of communist influence – however much the political police might try.

From the 1920s until the 1950s, and beyond, the police had a shared worldview when it came to political policing, from the Commissioner down to constables: identifying communists was their key way of understanding the messy world of social and political protest and proactivity, something in which a constable (with his limited education) could be trained reasonably quickly. With the flawed knowledge of both dissent and communism which it provided, in some ways the labelling system failed them, limiting their ability to predict what might happen. But more broadly, the police and the Government did generally maintain the type of order and control that they wanted, and so labelling communists contributed to controlling dissent even if the system was not an appropriate model for understanding social and political unrest and dissent.

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34 ANZ, R24716780-ADMO-21007-W5985-3-268/90-1A, ‘Miscellaneous Organisations: Unemployed Workers’ Movement 1926-1931’, Report of Detective H. Nuttall relative to deputation from unemployed committee to wait on Cabinet Ministers on 14th inst, also parade of unemployed through city streets from Trades Hall to Parliament House, 13 July 1927, Wellington Detective Office.


38 Taylor, p.278.


41 ANZ, R24716781-ADMO-21007-W5985-3-268/90-2, ‘Miscellaneous Organisations: Unemployed Workers’ Movement 1931’, Report of Detective F. N. Robinson relative to meeting of the Unemployed Workers Movement held in Blair St. on evening of 7/10/13, 7 October 1931.


Wharton, p.110.