

Coercion, Carcerality and the Colonial Police Patrol

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'The frontiers are my prison': Leonard Cohen, *The Partisan*

Introduction

The organisers' invitation to reconsider the interface between the colonisers and the colonised order provides a welcome opportunity for reconceptualising colonial order. This paper will explore some comparisons and patterns that might provide insights into the ordering of colonies. Of course, taking different colonies, empires or hypotheses as a starting point may produce quite different conclusions. Thus, for example, an examination of colonies where little attention is paid to the 'rule of law' or the law is openly oppressive, might bring forth the metaphorical concept of colonisers as 'tree fellers in a forest of human beings'¹, whereas an examination of colonies in which the rule of law has been at least paid lip-service might lead an historian to the concept of a colonial police force that at least tries to serve in the interest of 'the people'.² This paper takes both prison colonies and prisons-within-colonies as a starting point for examining broader issues of colonial control. Any conclusions are not necessarily mutually exclusive of other interpretational possibilities, including those which see colonies as constituting a vast 'state of exception' under the 'rule of colonial difference'.³

Exploitation of 'the New World' brought opportunities for European nations to transfer heretics and criminals out of the homeland, but only a few colonial polities, with New South Wales and large parts of Siberia being among the most prominent examples, were established specifically as carceral receptacles.⁴ Most of the transported convict populations lived and worked outside prison walls, with colonial boundaries substituting for prison walls; within these boundaries, the transportees were simultaneously free and unfree, inmates of macro-prisons. In many instances, the indigenous peoples upon whom the prison colonies had been superimposed were more harshly treated than most of the transported convicts.⁵ While indigenes were themselves incarcerated within walls in penal colonies (including those transferred from other colonies), these numbers were relatively low, partly because their disciplining was often undertaken 'on the spot' by transported convicts.⁶

In non-prison colonies, however, gaols (which I will call micro-prisons) were crowded with indigenes, many of whom had engaged in acts of resistance. They could be kept under control only by intense scrutiny by their guards, for whom brutality was an endemic means of control along with other methods such as punishing labour requirements.⁷ In Foucauldian terms, the laceration of the body, phased out in European penalty in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries, lasted much longer in colonies. This might seem a far cry from the relative freedom of the convict-at-large on the penal colony, or more especially from experiences of masses of colonised indigenes. On the other hand, looking broadly across empires it might be argued that indigenes were subjected to such surveillance and violence that they too can be perceived as inmates of gigantic gaols of a different but analogous macro-prisons to those of the penal colonies. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that many of the colonised *saw themselves* as carceralised by the colonial authorities, especially by their coercive agents.

Their ‘crimes’ amounted to just being there, the possessors of the land and its resources which were needed for metropolitan and colonial purposes, resources from which they were to be displaced and/or upon which they were to be put to work. These processes were seen to be unproblematic given that indigenes were deemed to be members of ‘uncivilised races’ on the lower rungs of the stadial ladder of mankind. When they displayed any significant degree of resistance⁸ to encroachment on their lives and lands, imperial discipline intensified enormously, frequently involving severe handling of the colonial body and often resulting in injury, mutilation or death. This was generally at the hands of soldiers and (increasingly) police, the equivalents in the colony-wide macro-prison of the convict supervisors in the penal colony and the warders in the micro-prisons.

Convicts in the pre-modern metropolitan state and in colonies generally were at the mercy of their warders, supervisors and other judicial and administrative officials, all of whose methods were often savage in the extreme.⁹ Brutality within the micro-prisons was particularly extreme, and executions in colonial gaols were commonplace, serving as ‘a warning lesson to those who might question [colonial] rule.’ But the endemic violence against the micro-gaoled body was re-enacted endlessly outside penal walls as well as within them. Harsh discipline was prevalent in all subjugated colonial societies, to correct all manner of resistance, however mild – or none at all, in the frequent cases of randomised infliction of exemplary violence. Imminent and actual damage to the colonial body induced a climate of pervasive fear. Empire might be seen as running on endemic social fear of violence to the body. In French Indochina, for example, as elsewhere in empire, application of violence was ‘a deliberate and essential technique for maintaining the colonial order.’¹⁰

It was the colonial authorities’ own fear of the insurrectionary power of organised resistance to their conquest and occupation that led them to impose their reign of terror. This is essentially why the inmates of the colonial macro-prison were as potentially subject to extreme state violence – punitive, exemplary or pre-emptive – as the inmates of the metropolitan micro-prison were in the pre-correctional age, and as indigenous inmates in colonies continued to be. In fact, life within the colonial prison’s walls can be seen to distil the experience of being a colonised subject, rather than to represent a removal from colonial life. This paper attempts to examine this distillation, starting with the premise that both inside and outside colonial prison walls, watching and coercing are intimately intertwined in the processes of imposing order. The transported convict-at-large in the prison colony, sometimes behind bars but often not, can be seen as the conceptual linking device between colonial subjects in the micro-prison and the masses who were not. Both the coercion wielded on behalf of the state by constable or warder, and the surveillance on which it is based, were rooted in the exercise of patrolling – regular or irregular, solitary or (more frequently) collective. This paper will argue that the police patrol was a central factor in holding colonies, and equates its watchful scrutiny and its disciplinary capacity vis a vis the watched populations of macro-prisons to the experience of inmates of the walled prisons. The colonised indigene’s situation is seen as having resonance with that of the convict-at-large in the prison colony – both free and unfree at the same time.

Background

Long ago my research into policing colonial New Zealand led me to an increasing appreciation of the value of the police patrol to colonial control, to bringing indigenes (and unruly settlers) to order.¹¹ Much later I turned my mind to a global-historical project, as yet unfinished, comparing and contrasting the policing of colonised indigenes both within and between

empires. Key research questions included the extent to which imperial powers had common policing aims and methods, the relationship between metropolitan and colonial modes of policing, the role of culture and religion in control and resistance, and the degree to which policing modes differed between empire, region, period, gender, race and class. Of course this is a vast comparative subject and its execution challenged by many issues – by the fact, for example, that even within colonies frontiers are often ‘localised phenomena’. Nevertheless, information from many colonies and sub-colonies can be aggregated to analyse ‘the broader realities of the colonial experience’, including the coercion experienced at the hands of states ‘dispersed throughout social space’.¹²

The project’s conclusions can only be tentative, even in grand-comparative terms, because of the relative scarcity of international literature on the subject of policing and social control, more especially in colonies, certainly when seen against the very many outputs on military history. Today, among all the outpouring of First World War history, scarcely a thought is given to the police, who not only kept control in civil society at home and abroad but who also faced the enemy – as with the British and German forces in African theatres of war, who monitored and fought each other. Yet imperial ‘control’, to greater or lesser degrees, of vast areas of the earth, over people and peoples often resistant to external intervention, conquest and occupation, was generally conducted with few troops. Police forces, most of whose members were indigenous, were the major agents of control over much of the colonised world for much of the time.

Police surveillance over huge and un-‘ordered’ populations was a vital factor in maintaining that control. While surveillance can be both covert (from low-level detection of criminals through to counter-espionage) and overt, this paper focuses on the latter and the police operationalisation flowing from it. It should however be borne in mind, however, that covert surveillers frequently fed their information upwards to the same higher-level decision makers who examined and drew conclusions from the data collected from uniformed patrolling police. While my broad colonial policing project canvasses many official records to supplement the relatively small amount of secondary material, I seek to balance them with non-official sources. Accounts (published and unpublished) by colonial practitioners and observers of what they did and saw have provided a particularly valuable archive. Through these, generally silenced indigenous voices can sometimes be recovered, and in these the police often feature.¹³

Of course, whether in metropole or colony, police formed part of a larger machinery of social discipline, working in various combinations or alongside with other agencies. But their constant watching on a 24/7 basis, coupled with their legitimated capacity to intervene coercively in the lives of subjects, gives them a distinctive significance. As a general statement, policing agents were able routinely to direct, detain or discipline with few (or sometimes any) constraints. Subjects were seldom given access to (or knew about) the rights accorded them by formal law, which was often itself wanting on the question of civil liberties – certainly for indigenes. Taken together, from many studies in many and disparate colonies the police emerge, if not necessarily as supreme or monopolist discipliners for the state, certainly as highly important ones.

The police capacity to coerce backed up their significant role in apparently non-coercive arenas, including mediating *modi vivendi* between imperial regimes and their subjects – not just subjects *qua* subjects who might commit breaches of the rules set down by colonisers, but also as collectively-organised or imagined beings comprising (sub)cultures, religions, ethnicities, statelets, tribes, sub-tribal groupings, detribalised concentrations of workforces (in factories, mines, city slums and elsewhere), and so forth. In fact, when operationalising their coercive

capacity on the basis of surveillance-knowledge, colonial police forces worked within highly political contexts as all-purpose agents of the state.¹⁴ The responsibilities placed on them were huge, including important tasks associated with the imperial aim: to have subject peoples behaving (and, ultimately, thinking as they progress up the stadial ladder) along state-approved lines. In the event, this was at its most achievable in colonies where indigenes were swamped by settler immigration.¹⁵ Indeed, in 1886, colonial New Zealand could even disarm its police force, its indigenes having been coerced and cajoled into ‘correct behaviour’ along with unruly whites such as goldminers. Throughout empires, albeit with wildly variable rate of success, the police were among the state apparatuses which helped impose assimilative discipline and were sometimes central to this endeavour (as well as to policing ‘native areas’ in which customary law continued to have prominence).

Control

Control of the mind, however, needed to be preceded by control of the body. Given the major imperative of colonial conquest and occupation, the extraction of profit from indigenous land and labour, harsh control methods were clearly implicit.¹⁶ Colonisers themselves were at times open about their aims, while also in other contexts declaiming their civilising-mission and other noble sentiments.¹⁷ A French colonial governor noted in the mid-nineteenth century that the colonial aim in both Algeria and Senegal was ‘the same: to dominate the country at as low a cost as possible and through commerce to get the greatest advantage; the difficulties to be overcome are analogous – the means to reach them the same’.¹⁸ As leading British coloniser Lord Lugard noted in the 1920s: ‘The maintenance of law and order depends in every [colony] on the power of coercion by force’.¹⁹

The peoples subjected to such force, the unwilling inhabitants of the colonial macro-prison, were subject to the exemplary and dispossessory discipline of the policeman’s cudgel, chicotte or carbine, as were the micro-prison and prison-colony inmates to the similar weapon of their warders and supervisors. The Governor of Kenya, Sir Charles Eliot, shared with the Colonial Secretary in 1904 that while ‘on platforms and in reports we declare we have no intention to deprive the natives of their lands ... this has never prevented us taking whatever land we want ... There can be no doubt that the Masai and many other tribes must go under.’²⁰ Two years before, villagers who had killed a Kenyan policeman ‘as a protest against the white man’ had experienced the actuality of ‘going under’. They were descended upon by a police patrol, which:

‘killed about 17 niggers’ as the inhabitants fled. The report went on: ‘Then the fun began. We at once burned the village and captured the sheep and goats. After that we systematically cleared the valley in which the village was situated, burned all the huts, and killed a few more niggers ... We have told them that we are quite prepared to continue tomorrow what we began today, and I think they are impressed. Such nonsense as attacking the station is completely driven from their stupid heads. So order once more reigns’.²¹

Colonial policing necessarily means involves prolonged colonial assault on the indigenous body, often depicted as ‘taming of wild man’ or savage beast or disciplining the wild child.²² As a former senior policeman recalled, the colonial policeman’s job was to ‘tame the subject’ – to subjugate and control the behaviour of those whom he referred to as ‘the seething, half-clothed masses’.²³ The actual or potential deployment of violence was absolutely central to securing control. A policeman noted in 1913, with regard to the Natal Police, that ‘life is not

so sacred [here] as it is in Piccadilly'.²⁴ In French Indochina, state-imposed violence 'significantly affected daily life.'²⁵ And in the Danish West Indies, in 1903, a petition from leading citizens to the royal authorities included police brutality among its complaints for redress.²⁶

Naturally, indigenes of empire tended to resist occupation and exploitation with a greater or lesser degree of organisation and determination. As Lugard declared, the colonial order needed to be 'supported by force if collectively defied', and it was, very often.²⁷ Deployment of such force was often successful because, while armed defiance was certainly widespread,²⁸ it often reflected the localisation of the frontier: colonial regimes were often able to concentrate their firepower upon single tribes or villages. But, as in the micro-prison, resistance was often subtle and suffused, even ingrained. Indeed it is possible to argue that resistance happened most of the time – even if by daily, microscopic, even subliminal, acts of resistance, de Certeau's 'practices of everyday life' enacted in a carceralised environment.²⁹ In face of this, state discipline had to be relentless in both its actuality and potentiality. In the initial stages of colonies, this was generally imposed by the military and by police forces which were semi-military. The two institutions often worked in tandem, and police would be supplemented at need by reserve force – most obviously the military³⁰, but also by militia, volunteers, special constables, prison guards, missionary-led tribal war parties, and so forth, all of them engaged in the colonial project of subjecting the colonial body to discipline and (ultimately) the colonial mind to correction.

Once a reasonable degree of control over any given colony had been established, police forces took over the daily task of order control, but this did not necessarily imply any let-up in coercive discipline. Colonial police forces were not created primarily to fight crime, at least as it is conventionally defined, but to hold down the masses. Nor were those policemen intended to be impartial servants of the law, as some mythologies (especially in the 'British world') would have it. They were overtly political agents tasked with imposing the type of 'peace and good order' required by the ruling authorities.³¹ In colonies, the ultimate purpose of state policing power, to control people and peoples, was experienced in its most naked form, modifying the Foucauldian segue from harming to incarcerating the body: the two processes were complementary. The lacerations of the state continued to be inflicted upon bodies outside penitentiary walls as well as within, with the aim of procuring 'docile bodies' en masse.³²

The violence was generalised. With such overwhelming numbers to control, and with relatively little coercive might to do it with (modes of coercion were expensive), colonial regimes needed to instil fear into the population – if even 'the innocent' could suffer at the hands of the state, how much more severe would the punishment be for 'the guilty'? The bodies of the cooperative and non-cooperative alike would be disciplined by police and warders. Both walled inmates and those outside prison perimeters were potentially at the mercy of random and possibly terrible violence. There was no neat division in any case between prison warders and colonial police (and the supervisors of convicts in prison colonies). When police doubled as warders as they often did (running holding facilities, lockups and police-gaols, as opposed to formal prisons), macro and micro-carcerality were brought within a single frame, highlighting the elision between the few incarcerated within walls and the many effectively incarcerated within colonial boundaries.

Such whole-of-people control involved a continuum of interventions into the subjects' lives by the police and other coercive agents of state, from killing³³ through to apparently benign control by suasion, with a gradual move away from coercive extremes the quelling of opposition to the

colonial regime. Towards the coercive end of the continuum lay such interventions as conquest, quelling of disorder and rebellion, and punitive raids for group behaviour deemed inappropriate such as refusing taxes or labour.³⁴ In French African territories, for example, the police budget might contain funds to run hostage camps in which women and children were held until the men brought in the tax monies, and if a chief did not cooperate 'he will be smashed like glass'.³⁵ Less coercive measures included instilling productive rhythms of life into indigenous peoples, policemen acting as role models for how indigenes should behave under the 'civilising mission', and police involvement in rewarding, directly or indirectly, those who chose to assimilate. In the mountains of occupied Formosa, the police (Japanese officers and 'Formosans and savages hold[ing] junior posts') encouraged settled agriculture over the nomadic way of life from three-man posts every few miles.³⁶

Coercion and punishment was never far from the surface, not only when police and political analysis of the results of surveillance led to such a conclusion but also by the very nature of the tasks at hand. A typical colonial official might preside over forced labour systems, hold village elders hostage for ransom or other purposes, torture suspects or take punitive military action involving destruction of property and violence up to and including massacre.³⁷ Their interests extended to colonial children. Colonial Japanese police taught the children of the occupied people, and in the German Cameroons, a pupil's lack of progress in the compulsory 'patriotic' German curriculum would lead to flogging by the police.³⁸ Papua-New Guinean policemen 'captured small boys and brought them back to the station and indoctrinated them in the intentions of the government' when their elders declined to cooperate.³⁹

The successes involved in controlling the vast populations of empire were impressive, whatever one might think of the means. In the early twentieth century, Britain presided over territory 125 times its own size even though the vast populations of colonised indigenous peoples were generally trying to maintain control over their own affairs, if not to expel the intruders. In view of this, 'the degree of mass acquiescence' (and in some cases proactive co-operation) was (in Linda Colley's assessment) 'striking'.⁴⁰ There are many possible reasons for why colonies continued to be held, and they cannot be canvassed here: suffice it to reiterate the point that empire rested, in the final analysis, on imperial military might. As Hilaire Belloc put it in rhyme: 'Whatever happens, we have got/The Maxim gun and they have not.'⁴¹ But, on a day to day basis, policing regimes were central to controlling colonies. In David Arnold's words, police stood 'at the critical point of intersection between the state and the people'.⁴²

Police violence to the subject was not casual, but systemic, drummed into recruits and reflected in the brutalised living and working environment of the men. The constabularies in charge of order in the macro-prison were in effect themselves inmates of a total institution, subject to the tight discipline of what was generally at very least a 'a semi-military organisation' (and in fact it is hard to draw a line between police and military organisation and activity in many colonies). A police training depot typically involved intensive drilling which was designed to instil (as Nigeria's police orders for 1932 noted) 'obedience, discipline and self-control'.⁴³ As with conventional military training, the aim was to inculcate unquestioning obedience to orders, and punishment for transgression could be harsh for the most minor of infractions.⁴⁴ Patrolmen remained under such tight discipline that one might justly depict life in police barracks life as a mode of imprisonment in itself, even in relatively tranquil colonies – in 1940s Trinidad and Tobago, the constables were allowed out of their barracks only one night a fortnight, the same as in New Zealand a hundred years before.⁴⁵ The traveller Alec Waugh told of a prisoner in 1920s New Hebrides who became so used to life in gaol that on release he became a constable, as 'being a policeman was the nearest thing he could find to being a permanent prisoner'.⁴⁶

Patrol

Knowledge of the colonial population, so crucial to their policing, was collected in many and various ways, but the main police method was that of ‘frequent and vigilant patrolling’.⁴⁷ This took many forms, reflecting the conditions and requirements of both metropole and colony.⁴⁸ Systems of control by patrol were generally transferred from the metropole when each colony was occupied or conquered, reflecting both previous colonial experience and broader modes of imperial control: ‘imperial history is vitally about connexity, the identification and investigation of the manifold connections that existed over time between different sectors of the world and different peoples.’⁴⁹ In such interactions, local adjustments built quickly upon the basic structures of control. Thus, when ‘the British moved into India, they adopted – while also adapting – many of the [control] devices of the previous Mughal imperial system.’⁵⁰ Often the most successful imported systems were those which grafted significant autochthonous elements onto their operational systems. In so doing they were sometimes creating new policing knowledge, and sometimes in turn this was later transferred to the metropole and even retransferred around the globe.

Whatever the degree of adaptation, however, far from being rooted in the community, colonial policemen were essentially legitimated to exercise the occupation-imposed coercion upon which their function ultimately rested. Although the authorities often gave them much free agency, this was both within official parameters and depended for its success on possession of appropriate knowledge to decide whether and how to intervene. Armed patrolling policemen in the macro-sphere, like their warder colleagues in the micro-sphere and their soldier colleagues in the reserve in the forts, constituted, therefore, the ‘eyes and ears’ of the colonial state. In fact a colloquial Malay word for colonial police was *mata mata*, or eyes.

As Clive Emsley notes, policing models were never tightly defined, and colonial administrators and police officers ‘cherry-picked to suit their circumstances’.⁵¹ Historians of colonial policing in the British Empire would, however, generally agree that in the conflictual policing which dominated most British colonies, most of the time, the Irish Constabulary (from 1867, Royal Irish Constabulary/RIC) and its predecessor forces were the major conceptual ‘influence in shaping [colonial] forces’ in the nineteenth and twentieth century.⁵² The RIC was renowned for its overtly repressive approach to the population, a response to endemic resistance to occupation and the (related) high degree of ‘disorder’ in the Irish countryside. As Home Secretary Robert Peel put it, the force in its various iterations was created to effect ‘the reduction of Ireland to peaceful habits’, and that meant a significant and unapologetic use of coercion.⁵³

British colonial patrolmen were often instructed to behave as Irish constables. In troubled rural spaces they were ‘not to go out on stated nights or at particular hours, but shall do so at irregular periods, and are always to visit suspected places and observe suspicious house and persons. They will not confine their attention only to the main lines of roads, but will occasionally proceed through the bush, calling at the houses of the settlers to find out what is going on, and ascertain if their assistance is needed.’⁵⁴ They would ride together on their observations, and strike with collective force when necessary. Groups of Canadian North West Mounted Police patrolled vast spaces to observe and suppress First Nations and mixed-race resistance to the spread of white settlement. Similar types of suppressive constabularies existed around the colonial globe: as well as derivatives of the RIC, such as antipodean armed constabularies, the repressive soldier-police in the German and Belgian possessions in Africa, or the French

colonial soldiers who acted as police, all exercised similar functions, often in similar ways.⁵⁵ The situation which faced them demanded it.

Missionaries, traders and others had often paved the way for the first arrival of the police in a district, telling villagers of ‘the coercive powers of the government’ that would eventually reach them. The Gende people of Papua New Guinea were told that ‘a power much stronger than theirs would come’, and when it did in the form of a police patrol led by two European officers in 1936 the locals were both impressed and frightened. The police stamped their mark by force, caning and assaulting inhabitants to acquire their docility. ‘The rationalisations were that the newly contacted people only understood force; one sharp lesson was better than protracted skirmishes; and by demonstrating its power the government ultimately saved lives.’⁵⁶

Ongoing surveillance of that part of the colonial population within reach of the policeman’s panoptical gaze⁵⁷, even if intermittently, placed the inmates of the settler or plantation-colony on a similar plane as both convicts-at-large and indigenes in the prison-colony. There was, as well, much resonance with those deemed to be the most recalcitrant of colonial subjects, those incarcerated within walls and watched over and disciplined intensely by patrolling warders. Not long before World War Two, in Australian Melanesia villagers who resisted police demands would have to run around the perimeter walls with large boulders on their shoulders whilst policemen whipped them. As an ex-prisoner recalled, the prison he was in existed ‘to condition us to pay attention to what the policemen ... and the Government said.’ This was ‘the last time he entered a prison gate, or went anywhere near a policeman’: once forced into submission, he behaved as he was supposed to. It was the policeman who had taken him to the gaoler, turning him from a (technically) free subject to a definitely unfree one, and producing ‘a passive, undignified person ... reformed’.⁵⁸ He and other prisoners could see the continuity between the two and their political masters, often referring to police, judicial and other colonial authorities as ‘the Government’.

While both the macro and the micro-gaoled were subject to the panoptical gaze of the state surveiller, policeman or warder (and sometimes policeman/warder), surveillance was of little value beyond its preventive function unless analysed and, if necessary, acted upon. The ancient British policing term ‘watch and ward’ is a useful one, with its implication of a specialist body of surveillance agents whose job also involves any proactive coercive intervention seen to be necessary as a result of their watching. In the colony, then, as elsewhere, knowledge is not power per se – rather, it is a prerequisite for the successful exercise of power. On the basis of the observations of surveillant police patrols, police officers and political authorities could take any necessary preventive or reactive police (or military) measures – on the spot, or after deliberation, acting as the colonial state’s iron fist as well as its eyes and ears. The possession of knowledge about the society they were charged with controlling (especially about mass-targeted sections within it, such as resistant tribes, castes or classes), and the capacity to successfully wield state might if it were needed, then, were tightly interwoven, just as it was in the penitentiary. Both the intelligence gathering on which coercion was based, and the coercion itself, was generally conducted by mainstream police on patrol duty or prison guards on their routine observational rounds. In whole colonies, British and otherwise, the Swahili word *askari* meant, interchangeably, policeman, soldier, guard, warder.

The panoptical aspirations of the police patrol were more achievable in colonies (or parts thereof) directly administered by the colonising authorities, where patrolling tended to be more systematised than in colonies (or portions of them) run by indigenous authorities in various

types of indirect control arrangements; and the follow-through of colonial forces which met resistance was often swifter and harsher than in conditions of indirect rule. With the overarching awareness that colonial peoples were inherently threatening to colonisation, colonial police surveillers worked as hard as possible to monitor everything significant that happened within their borders, especially anything which might threaten the peace; and to take pre-emptive or suppressive action where necessary. They sought to spread the message among the indigenous population that, as a judge later noted in the context of armed police invasion of the last effectively autonomous indigenous area in New Zealand in 1916, ‘in every corner of the great Empire to which we belong the King’s law can reach anyone who offends against him.’⁵⁹ Under such ever-present potential scrutiny of authority, especially in circumstances of indigenous refusal to accept colonial directives of various types, the inmates of the macro-prison lived in a state of fear that the surveillers would unleash extreme violence, be it a pre-emptive, reactive or randomly exemplary exercise of coercion.

The phrase ‘anyone who offends’ needs interrogation, however. Despite the fine words of the various imperial civilizing missions, ‘the rule of law’ did not feature greatly in either the micro- or the macro-carcerality of the typical colony. Police actions often bore little resemblance to the formal rules or laws in place. It was the colonisers’ fear of the potential of colonised peoples which induced them to impose such terror-induced regimes, just as the brutalised askari serving in a colonial gaol feared, with good reason, those he was incarcerating if he dropped his guard. Even in settler-colonies feted for their ‘humanitarian’ policies towards indigenes, observers often noted that ‘[w]ith the law, the [police] have nothing to do; they are to preserve the peace’.⁶⁰ Two Canadian North-West Mounted Police officers were reported as saying, twenty years apart (1870s and 1890s), that ‘[w]e make up the law as we go along.’⁶¹ Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain declaimed, soon after taking office in 1895, that ‘you cannot have omelettes without breaking eggs, you cannot destroy the practices of barbarism, of slavery, of superstition which for centuries have desolated the interior of Africa without the use of force.’⁶²

‘Breaking eggs’ often involved disciplinary patrols deployed to inflict various levels of exemplary terror. In a typical incident in the British ‘sphere of influence’ in southern Africa in 1891 an ‘impertinent’ chief’s kraal was attacked with the loss of some two dozen indigenes. ‘Since these severe lessons’, the Chief Magistrate commented, ‘the natives willingly submit to the decision of an officer accompanied by a couple of policemen.’⁶³ The martial Tula of West Africa were regarded by the regional police official as ‘the most repulsive creatures I had seen and their habits must be stopped’. When they continued to rebuff British authority in the early twentieth century, their arrows and spears were no match for a patrol’s Maxim gun. After defeat, the survivors refused to hand over weapons and livestock, the patrol ‘fell upon’ them ‘tooth and nail ... and as a punishment we burnt the greater part of the town’. The police officer reported: ‘They now quite realised, they said, their error in not toeing the line before.’⁶⁴

Even non-destructive patrol visits to recalcitrant communities used methods which often involved violation of the formal rules or laws, such as the use of coercive bluff. A police officer in 1950s Sierra Leone described a typical such police operation in a village. All the villagers were lined up and questioned about their suspected possession of weapons. After a collective silence, the police dragged a randomly selected villager off into the jungle. A shot rang out, followed by a heart-rending scream. The NCO in charge emerged from the trees and proceeded to select another person for similar treatment. A village spokesperson then told the police where the arms cache was. The seized villager had been gagged, and a shot fired into the ground while a native constable screamed.⁶⁵

After World War One, air patrols often inflicted exemplary punishment that avoided huge casualties but devastated indigenous livelihoods. In 1937, for example, the Bin Yemani tribe of the Protectorate of Aden refused to pay fines levied upon them for tolling travellers. The ‘real difficulty’, the official in charge of the area noted, ‘was that of rubbing into people that when the British Government said a thing they meant it’. While ‘even the most pacifist of pacifists would not object to the police barging in and breaking a few heads’, however, he would display ‘remarkable leniency’ by ordering evacuation of villages and cultivations in advance of the bombing. In such cases, he opined, after some initial bombings villagers usually ‘get fed up before long’. In this case, there were only five dead in what was seen as a successful mission.⁶⁶

The skill inherent in all types of patrol policing was, at any given time, to get the balance right; too much coercion, applied too endemically, could be as counterproductive as intervening too late or with too little force. This was complicated by the messiness and liminality of frontier. As colonisation expanded out from the original carceral hub of New South Wales, for example, its control was uneven, producing a ‘strange phenomenon [of] peace and war simultaneously, in different places’; at any given time retributive action might be necessary only on ‘a handful of farms on a single river reach.’⁶⁷ If ‘friendly’ or neutral indigenes got caught up in the fighting or repression, police and military actions could lead to greater difficulties than existed in the first place. In 1912 a German colonial governor notified police and settlers alike to cease ‘brutal excesses’ against tribespeople lest this provoke ‘another rising’ and ‘consequently the economic ruin of the country’.⁶⁸

Often the appropriate balance was gained by a mixture of patrol methods which both complemented and counterbalanced each other. In the early twentieth-century South African countryside, ‘[p]atrols were out all day and every day’, a policeman-soldier recalled, but ‘[t]here were many kinds of patrols; there was the regular visiting patrol, when every farmer and trader in the patrol area was called upon. And there was the patrol sent out to investigate crime reports. There was also the night patrol between certain definite points to ensure that all was well with the inhabitants.’ These were supplemented by patrols to address specified targets, including the ‘most onerous and exacting’ duty by which two-man patrols would conceal themselves in the hope of catching miscreants who disturbed peace and good order, such as organised gangs of sheep stealers.⁶⁹

Just as the colonial carceral experience can be found in especially concentrated form in the micro-prison, so too can this be seen operating starkly in colonial cities, which were regarded as particularly troublesome for authority – full as they supposedly were with both more sophisticated people than in the countryside and newcomers from traditional social control institutions of the villages. In British colonies the urban police patrol was often modelled on the ‘new police’ established in London in 1829, which had the constable walking a specific assigned beat at a regular pace, reporting from time to time to NCOs. This served to impose a ubiquitous preventive and reactive police presence. In internationally controlled city-colonies, each occupying power kept watch, liaising with each other and often too with local police – as in pre-war occupied Shanghai, aptly labelled a ‘carceral city’.⁷⁰

Police patrols also often operated within systems of indirect control, especially where the regimes were superintended by officials from the imperial power.⁷¹ ‘The native chief is only an instrument’ of control, as the Governor General of French West Africa said in 1913.⁷² Sometimes this was overt, as with the warrant chiefs of West Africa. ‘[U]nder the British flag’,

wrote an observer in 1927, ‘when we find native chiefs unruly we depose them, and replace them by a near kinsman’.⁷³ The police and the warders of the indirect rule regimes were often as brutal and oppressive, if not more so, as those under direct colonial control. ‘Indigenous policing officials in Latin America were reported to ‘exhort the natives to labour, proclaim the occupations of the ensuing week, reprimand the idle, and severely cudgel the intractable [as] energetic measures are sometimes necessary to maintain tranquillity in this rising society.’⁷⁴

Patrol systems were often multi-layered, a combination of colonial regular policing, auxiliary support and policing by indirect control regimes.⁷⁵ In Dutch Berbice the authorities used ‘local Amerindians and enslaved creoles’ for surveillance duties and (because of their specialist jungle-fighting skills) for complementing regular police when suppressing rebels. Governor Wolfert van Hoogenheim characterised the aid of the Amerindians as ‘truly, the means of cleansing the land’.⁷⁶ Brutal coercion was often at its most extreme in territories subcontracted out to private control by concessionary companies (but where colonial police often had a general supervisory capacity). In 1925 André Gide found ‘appalling cases of murder and torture’ applied to the rubber collectors in the Congo, well after the Belgian rulers had professed to have reformed their control practices:

‘In the village of Bodembéré he gathered evidence of a reprisal that had been exacted by a Sergeant Yemba: men had been tied to a tree and shot, women had been killed by machete, and children were locked in a hut that was set on fire. All in all, thirty-five people were killed – as punishment for their refusal to abandon their plantations and move into a new settlement on the concessionary company’s orders.’⁷⁷

In such areas, and very many others in different colonies and empires, the indigenes had been reduced to ‘a condition that does not differ from slavery’.⁷⁸ Villagers testified to a contemporaneous American investigation into forced labour in Portuguese Mozambique and Angola that they had been better off before the abolition of slavery 14 years before. ‘Much of the brutality from which the natives suffer is inflicted by the native police (*cipaes*) who are given virtual *carte blanche* by their Portuguese superiors.’⁷⁹

Force

In the final analysis, the colonial authorities required from their police the capacity to wield force. This was often more effective if administered by men who were strangers to the policed community, with patrolmen were often taken from different tribes, areas, regions, villages, ethnicities, castes or colonies from those of the policed population. Peoples typologised as being of a martial disposition were often used as occupation police; Sikhs were selected, for example, to control Burma and Hong Kong.⁸⁰ German ‘police soldiers’ in late nineteenth-century New Guinea comprised ‘Malays and Buka men from the North Solomons’, while British New Guinea’s Armed Native Constabulary employed Fijian non-commissioned officers and Solomon Island constables.⁸¹ Macau was policed by men from Portuguese India. As a result of ‘stranger policing’, communications difficulties between police and policed were rife. In late nineteenth-century Puerto Rico, few of the police (from the ‘lower classes’ and of ‘negro blood’) spoke the American occupiers’ language, and the Chief of Police did not understand Spanish, the official language of the colony.⁸² None of this mattered much, given that the police role was not one requiring finesse. As all-purpose agents of the state, the patrolman knew in general terms what kind of social behaviour the colonial authorities would tolerate and that which they would not.

Insofar as there *were* rights accorded by formal metropolitan or colonial law, the generality of colonial subjects was seldom given access to (or knew about) them. In any case, given that colonial laws were generally designed to exploit rather than protect indigenous inhabitants, they were far more flexible than in the metropole. In the latter, for example, the policing official was in (at least) technical violation if he disciplined the detainee before handing him/her to judicial officials, but in colonies this was generally authorised for many circumstances. Even if it were not, if the police patrol felt the need to detain or punish its superiors would later work out a formal rationale back at the police station. There were countless laws available whose creative use amounted to, as one former senior policeman put it, ‘a splendid form of control’.⁸³

In fact, in most colonies, even in settler colonies, the police authorities could select from a number of differing legal and customary codes to suit their immediate purposes. In early twentieth-century Burma, for example, patrolmen could apply British laws operative in India; Indian government ordinances; Buddhist, Hindu or Islamic customary law; or unwritten tribal and village law and operating practices.⁸⁴ Many colonies, and some empires, had laws applicable only to their indigenous subjects. The nineteenth century French indigenous code in Algeria allowed police officials to incarcerate or flog indigenes for uttering anti-French sentiments, for disrespecting officials, for refusing to sell produce at fixed prices to the state, for travelling without a permit, and so on. When colonies changed hands, the laws of the previous regime often remained in force, including legally or informally sanctioned indigenous customs.⁸⁵

Given such a smorgasbord of law and custom, colonial patrolmen could generally detain or discipline any indigenes they wished with impunity. Where metropolises imposed rule-of-law limitations upon certain methods, some colonies would cope by formally condemning, while at the same time tolerating or informally condoning, condign discipline upon villagers by police or vigilantes. Thus in Melanesia, ‘massacres were frequently and carefully represented as being spatially and circumstantially beyond the sobering, civilizing and regulating reach of colonial law’, serving to legitimate the colonial violence that lay at the heart of empire.⁸⁶ More often, police did what they were tasked to do, with little recourse to legal niceties – as very numerous colonial massacres attest. Adverse consequences for the police perpetrators were few, except on the rare occasion that a colonial scandal reached the metropolitan media (and even then, only sometimes). As a colonial reform advocate noted of Portuguese colonial control, distant laws and royal decrees were as of nothing ‘compared with the proximity of a *chicotte*’.⁸⁷

The range of control devices available to any state, is best envisaged not as a set of sovereign legal devices but as continuum of state coercive deployment to render masses of people governable; from an overtly coercive pole, in which suppressive force, up to and including maiming and killing, is utilised, to a less coercive (and less expensive) pole. The latter is the ultimate aim, posited upon hegemonic control – the majority of the population have internalised most of the required modes of thought and behaviour and accepted the naturalness of the epistemological order declared by the colonial authorities.⁸⁸ As indigenes were gradually brought into apparent submission and self-policing in many colonies after the turn of the twentieth century, the police assault on the many bodies could belatedly shift towards the gaoling of the few – those recalcitrants who refused to adjust to colonisers’ notions of appropriate behaviour. In other words, aspects of the ‘civilising mission’, by which metropolises justified their imperialising,⁸⁹ gradually came to replace main force in some colonies as the key colonial control device, and one consequence was the lessening of bodily pain for the many.

Disciplining the body had been part of the journey towards disciplining the mind, a prerequisite for the desired outcome of society-wide self-policing.⁹⁰

But the colonial mind had only been partially disciplined to imperial notions of order – just as few prisoners fully acknowledged the validity of their imprisonment or obeyed the requirements of their warders. While many indigenous peoples came to accept western domination was not immediately going to go away, and had internalised certain behaviours required by the imposers of the civilising mission, ‘no one likes armed missionaries’ (as Maximilien Robespierre once said).⁹¹ When agitation for decolonisation greatly increased after World War Two, the police assault on the colonial body revived and in some places became as great as, if not greater, than previously.⁹² Once again the colonial macro-space became the site of both intensive police surveillance and the infliction of mass pain by the police patrol and other coercive forces.

Conclusion

As Michel Foucault stressed, surveillance and discipline are entwined. The modes of intertwining are complex, and this is particularly so for the policing and related methods which both subjugated peoples and induced them to believe – at least partially and/or for long periods – that the colonial order and the occupiers’ worldview was the ‘natural’ one. This was achieved partly by building upon indigenous customs and institutions which are imposed, adapted, tinkered with and negotiated, but generally in the context of the actual and potential police surveillance and violence – the equivalent of ‘watch and ward’ exercised over inmates of the colonial micro-prison and convicts-at-large in the prison-colony.

From the perspective of the indigenous masses, colonies amounted to carceral institutions. This was a logical consequence of the colonial imperative – the extraction of profit from indigenous land and labour which ipso facto produced, to a greater or lesser degree, indigenous resistance. While some colonial indigenes were immured under the scrutiny of armed and brutal warders, most were subjected to the attemptedly panoptical gaze of the patrolling policeman, the 24/7 state surveilling agent within the political economy. The knowledge gathered by the patrolman was the gateway to the successful wielding of colonial power. Indian police patrolmen ‘enabled the government to keep a finger on the pulse of the countryside’; as one testified, ‘I knew all the village headmen by name and sight.’⁹³ The convicts-at-large in the prison colonies knew how intense this surveillance could be, and its condign results upon their bodies if their actions did not conform and their minds did not reform. As convicts they were formally at the mercy of the state, like the inmates of the micro-prison; as the unfree free, they shared characteristics with colonised indigenes in general.

A typical colonial administrative centre had a dominating paramilitary police station that symbolised and embodied colonial authority and power. For example, the centre of Dodoma in post-World War One British Tanganyika was dominated by a ‘huge, fortress-like stone Boma, so built, as in other German cities, that the roads which radiate from it may be enfiladed by gunfire.’⁹⁴ In 1860s New Zealand, Armed Constabulary forts at regular intervals guarded against rebel incursions from the interior, and patrols went out daily from them, watching and acting upon what they observed.⁹⁵ Such police-soldiers were engaged in the same business as the part-time, routinely unweaponed rural patrolman in a quiescent backwater of the colony, monitoring the condition of order and using or calling upon main force if necessary – integral parts of the continuum of coercive control.

In view of the control devices deployed along this continuum, the colony can be envisaged as a gigantic version of the panoptical and punitive colonial prison, akin to the unfree freedom of the prison colony. As with the experience of colonial convicts within or outside prison walls, the general colonial move from taming the body to training the mind was at best only partial. The lacerating of the body continued even in colonies where the focus came to be the conquest of the mind, for the latter process proved to be both slow and flawed one, with limited and conditional uptake. It could scarcely have been otherwise given that the imperial civilising mission was essentially a falsehood, positing liberty and freedom of belief within the rule of law but offering up carcerality instead – the coercing of the body, the assault on the mind, the assimilationist attack on indigeneity.

Because the stakes were so high – the fortunes of the imperial and colonial political economies – failure was not an option in bringing colonial populations under at least sufficient control to exploit them and their resources. Thus carcerality and coercion dominated, certainly at first (and often continuingly), punishingly so for the colonial body. Armed policemen patrolled and watched over the inhabitants of the colonial macro-prison on a 24/7 basis, just as the warders of the micro-prison monitored those deemed so recalcitrant or contaminant that they had needed to be transferred from macro to micro-incarceration. The end which was sought was the same in the colonial periphery as in the metropolitan centre: the docile subject. The macro-prison aimed to ‘tranquillise’ indigenes just as the prison colony attempted to impose innate obedience upon its metropolitan convicts.

The journey towards the ideal of the self-policing society, while expected to be a much longer one than the conquest and taming of bodies, was seen as ultimately achievable. Many observers around the globe were noticing that the colonies were ‘settling down’ by the early twentieth century. New Zealand was perhaps the first to do so, and in fact had been able to disarm its patrol police as early 1886, once the last major Maori resistance movement had been crushed. Its carceral policies were increasingly ‘enlightened’, and soon after it ceased to be a colony in 1907 its prison policies moved increasingly to a focus on correcting the mind. But this was far from a universal phenomenon in colonies and ex-colonies. Three decades later, in another British Empire colony where the macro-police were also the micro-gaolers, ‘[t]he prisoners of that time slept in the holes in the ground’, an ex-policeman would recall. He continued: ‘The policemen’s houses were built on top of these holes. As we had no pit latrines away from where we lived, we relieved ourselves into the hole where the prisoners slept.’⁹⁶ Some of the very many villagers in the same colony who were routinely subjected to brutal treatment by the police patrol, those who had suffered loss of loved ones or livelihood or limbs when police descended upon their village, might have felt that such indignities were fairly light punishment in the colonial scheme of things. What they certainly knew was that the systematising and interrelating of vigilance and force in the colony was embodied both operationally and symbolically in the police patrol.

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- ¹ N.T. Nzula, I.I. Potekhin and A.Z. Zusmanovitch, *Forced Labour in Colonial Africa* (London: Zed Press, 1979), p.17.
- ² Robert Haldane, *The People's Force: A History of the Victoria Police* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1986).
- ³ Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
- ⁴ Andrea Button, 'Penal Colonies', in Melvin E. Page and Penny M. Sonnenburg, (eds), *Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural and Political Encyclopedia*, volume 2 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003), pp.460-462.
- ⁵ Henry Reynolds, *The Other Side of the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia* (Ringwood: Harmondsworth, 1982).
- ⁶ Kristyn Harmann, *Aboriginal Convicts: Australian, Khoisan and Maori Exiles* (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2012).
- ⁷ 'Comparative Analysis', Colonial Gaols Project, Treaty of Waitangi Research Unit, Wellington, New Zealand.
- ⁸ The definition of resistance I take is broad, and suffice to say that even the mildest of colonial resistance can lead to dire consequences. For some modes of resistance, see Jon Abbink, Mirjam de Bruijn and van Walraven, Klaus (eds), *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2003); Michael Adas, *Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the European Colonial Order* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); William Beinart and Colin Bundy, *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics & Popular Movements in the Transkei & Eastern Cape, 1890-1930* (London: J. Currey 1987). David McCreery points out that subjugated peoples 'have no obligation to act in ways academics find dramatic or exciting, but rather to survive and endure ... in the face of what threaten to be literally overwhelming pressures.' See McCreery, 'Hegemony and Repression in Rural Guatemala, 1871-1940', in Brij V. Lal, Doug Munro and Edward D. Beechert (eds), *Plantation Workers: Resistance and Accommodation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), p.235.
- ⁹ For some idea of conditions in colonial gaols even at the end of empire see Ian Brown, 'A Shooting Incident in Insein Prison, Burma, in 1947', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* (JICH), Vol.37, No.4 (2009), pp.517-535.
- ¹⁰ Michael G. Vann, 'Of Pirates, Postcards, and Public Beheadings': The Pedagogic Execution in French Colonial Indochina', *Historical Reflections*, Vol.36, No.2 (2010), especially p.40. See also August Kituai, 'Innovation and Intrusion: Villagers and Policemen in Papua New Guinea', *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol.23, No.2 (1988) and, for a broad perspective, Martin Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
- ¹¹ Richard S. Hill, *Policing the Colonial Frontier: The Theory and Practice of Coercive Social and Racial Control in New Zealand, 1767-1867* (2 vols.) (Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs, 1986); Hill, *The Colonial Frontier Tamed: New Zealand Policing in Transition, 1867-1886* (Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs, 1989); Hill, *The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove: The Modernisation of Policing in New Zealand 1886-1917* (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1995).
- ¹² Vincent O'Malley, *Beyond the Imperial Frontier: The Contest for Imperial New Zealand* (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2014), p.11; Maryse Tennant, 'Fields of Struggle: A Bourdieusian analysis of conflicts over criminal justice in England, c. 1820-50', *Social History*, Vol.39, No.1 (2014), p.39. Big picture history can provide valuable insights. See, for example, John Darwin, *Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012) and other of his works, and Julian Go's *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- ¹³ Such accounts are of course, themselves highly problematic, and standard historical ways of addressing this have been complemented by methods gained from collaborative work with social anthropologists and indigenous studies experts, as well as liaising with scholars in disciplines such as law, economics gender, politics, and literary studies.
- ¹⁴ This applies widely across empires, including non-western; for example, to ensure supply to Japan of specified agricultural produce, colonial police would enforce crop changes as well as impose tasks such as food rationing or labour 'volunteering'. Colonial officials described Formosa as a 'police state' in early twentieth-century, given the heavy involvement of police in administration: Ching-Chih Chen, 'Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire', in Myers, Ramon H. and Peattie, Mark R. (eds) *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.231.
- ¹⁵ James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
- ¹⁶ These might be crudely summed up in Cecil Rhodes' quip, 'I prefer land to niggers,' which Lorenzo Veracini notes could have been applied to any non-metropolitan inhabitants of empire: Lorenzo Veracini, *Israel and Settler Society* (London: Pluto Press, 2006), p.22.
- ¹⁷ D. A. Low, *Lion Rampant: Essays in the Study of British Imperialism* (London: Cass, 1973).
- ¹⁸ Cited in William B. Cohen, *Rulers of Empire: the French Colonial Service in Africa* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p.11.
- ¹⁹ Sir F.D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, 2nd ed (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1923), p.578.
- ²⁰ Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Africa and the West* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2000), p.86.
- ²¹ Colonel R. Meinertzhagen, *Kenya Diary, 1902-1906* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957), pp.39-40.
- ²² H. Lincoln Tangey, *In the Torrid Sudan* (Boston, MA: Richard G. Badger/The Gorham Press 1910), p.215. See also Jan Breman, *Taming the Coolie Beast: Planation Society and the Colonial Order in Southeast Asia* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), and the views of former armed constabulary officer Charles Bruce in *Twenty Years in Borneo* (London: Cassell and Company, 1924).
- ²³ Rene Onraet, *Singapore – A Police Background* (London: Dorothy Crisp and co, 1947), pp.72, 94.
- ²⁴ H.P. Holt, *The Mounted Police of Natal* (London: J. Murray, 1913), p.xiii.
- ²⁵ Vann, 'Of Pirates, Postcards, and Public Beheadings', p.41.

²⁶ Page, and Sonnenburg, p.709.

²⁷ Lugard, p.578.

²⁸ A universal maxim might be seen to apply when the exploiters are conquerors or invaders, along the lines of a customary Rumanian saying: 'There is no fruit more bitter than the rule of the foreigner in one's own land.' One scholar analysed 140 revolts in the Peruvian region between 1700 and 1783 to take an indicative example of armed resistance against colonial masters. See Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, *Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth Century Peru and Upper Peru* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1985).

²⁹ Michel De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

³⁰ Surveillance is integral to military success as well. For links between military knowledge and maintenance of empire, see James Hevia, *The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and Empire-Building in Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

³¹ Their intensely political role was often shared with the judiciary, which could show scant regard to legal norms. Between 1920 and 1924 in Nigeria, for example, 453 people who had been refused access to legal counsel were hanged after non-jury trials, declared guilty by magistrates with no legal training: 'Nigerian Police', Treaty of Waitangi Research Unit, Victoria University of Wellington.

³² Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labour Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.16.

³³ In the German attempt to pacify South West Africa, including by genocide of the Herero and Nama peoples, a third of the population perished between 1901 and 1906. For a flavour of German policies of that period see official documents in Page and Sonnenburg, pp.975-977. In the Italian colonial period, one estimate puts the number of dead in Libya at more than a quarter of the population. See Issandr El Amrani, 'Is there a Libya?', *London Review of Books*, Vol.33, No.9 (28 April 2011), pp.19-20. Likewise, from 1880 to 1920 the population of the Congo was cut by at least half, perhaps some 10 million deaths, many of these the result of policies of 'complete extermination' of resistant populations. See Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (London: Pan, 1999), pp.232-234.

³⁴ This itself was often exceedingly coercive. The police killing of at least 80 people in a single incident in German Melanesia in 1901, for example, was notable only by the higher casualty rates than usual: Peter Hempenstall, 'The Neglected Empire: The Superstructure of the Colonial State in German Melanesia', in Arthur J. Knoll, and Lewis H. Gunn, (eds), *Germans in the Tropics: Essays in German Colonial History* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), p.104.

³⁵ See, for example, Jean Suret-Canale, *Essays on African History: From the Slave Trade to Neocolonialism* (London: Africa World Pr, 1988), pp.131, 141.

³⁶ W.H. Murray Walton, *Scrambles in Japan and Formosa* (London: Edward Arnold & Co, 1934), pp.40-41.

³⁷ Many colonial officers' reminiscences indicate this candidly. For an outline of one official see Felix K. Ekechi, 'Portrait of a Colonizer: H. M. Douglas in Colonial Nigeria, 1897-1920', *African Studies Review*, Vol.26, No.1 (March 1983), pp.25-50.

³⁸ Such matters were a sign of despotism for English-speaking observers unaware that similar behaviour occurred in British colonies. For example see Albert F. Calvert, *The Cameroons* (London: T.W. Laurie, Ltd, 1917).

³⁹ Kituai, p.157.

⁴⁰ Linda Colley, 'What is Imperial History Now?', in David Cannadine (ed.), *What is History Now?* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp.136, 143.

⁴¹ H.B. and B.T.B., *The Modern Traveller* (London: Edward Arnold, 1898).

⁴² David Arnold, *Police Power and Colonial Rule: Madras, 1859-1947* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986), p.4.

⁴³ Philip Terdoo Ahire, *Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria, 1860-1960* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991), pp.57-58.

⁴⁴ Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1990); Timothy Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923-80* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2011).

⁴⁵ 'Policing the Colonial Caribbean', Stout Research Centre Police History Collection, Wellington, p.16.

⁴⁶ Alec Waugh, *The Coloured Countries* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1930).

⁴⁷ Holt, p.249.

⁴⁸ For an example of 1890s police manuals produced in the Siak and Riau-Lingga sultanates, showing how these were shaped by Dutch and British imperial concepts see Timothy P. Barnard, 'Rules for Rulers: Obscure Texts, Authority, and Policing in Two Malay States', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol.32, No.2 (2001), pp.221-225.

⁴⁹ Colley, p.138.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p.136.

⁵¹ Clive Emsley, *The Great British Bobby: A History of British Policing from the 18th Century to the Present* (London: Quercus, 2009), p.91.

⁵² Elizabeth Malcolm, *The Irish Policeman, 1822-1922: A Life* (Dublin: Four Courts, 2006). For the classic development of this perspective see Charles Joseph Jeffries, *The Colonial Police* (London: M. Parrish, 1952), pp.30-32 and *passim*.

⁵³ Galen Broecker, *Rural Disorder and Police Reform in Ireland, 1812-36* (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1970), p.188.

⁵⁴ *Manual of Police Regulations for the Guidance of the Canterbury Constabulary Force* (Christchurch: Printed by Ward and Reeves, 1862), p.81.

⁵⁵ For an example of an observer noting such things, see G. Ward Price, *In Morocco with the Legion*, 3rd ed. (London: Jarrolds, 1934).

⁵⁶ Kituai, p.158.

⁵⁷ For an elaboration of the concept see Arnold.

⁵⁸ Kituai, pp.160-163.

⁵⁹ Michael King, *The Penguin History of New Zealand* (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003), p.221.

⁶⁰ *Hawke's Bay Herald*, 13 May 1862, p.2.

- ⁶¹ NWMP folder, Stout Research Centre Police History Collection, Wellington.
- ⁶² Lugard, p.579.
- ⁶³ Philip Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma: The Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p.156.
- ⁶⁴ A.C.G. Hastings, *Nigerian Days* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1925), pp.71-77.
- ⁶⁵ 'West Africa' folder, Stout Research Centre Police History Collection, Wellington. For another example of such practice, some twenty years earlier in Palestine, see Geoffrey J. Morton, *Just the Job: Some Experiences of a Colonial Policeman* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1957), pp.104-105.
- ⁶⁶ Harold Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles* 2nd ed (London: Murray, 1952), pp.261f.
See too Epstein, C. Katherine, 'Imperial Airs: Leo Amery, Air Power and Empire, 1873-1945', *JICH*, Vol.38, No.4 (2010), pp.571-598.
- ⁶⁷ Grace Karskens, *The Colony: A History of Early Sydney* (Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 2009), p.455.
- ⁶⁸ L.S. Amery, *The German Colonial Claim* (London: W. & R. Chambers, 1939), pp.72-73.
- ⁶⁹ P.J. Young, *Boot and Saddle: A Narrative Record of the Cape Regiment, the British Cape Mounted Riflemen, the Frontier Armed Mounted Police, and the Colonial Cape Mounted Riflemen* (Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1955), p.130.
- ⁷⁰ Frederic Wakeman Jr, *Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
- ⁷¹ Kenneth Bradley, *The Diary of a District Officer* (London: Nelson, 1943).
- ⁷² For considerable detail see Cohen. For traditional chiefly authority in a French territory see Margaret Binns, *Guinea* (Oxford: ABC-Clio, 1996).
- ⁷³ Violet Clifton, *Islands of Queen Wilhelmina* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1927), p.218; A.E. Afigbo, *The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria 1891-1929* (London: Longman, 1972) and Kemi Rotimi, *The Police in a Federal State: The Nigerian Experience* (Ibadan: College Press Publ, 2002).
- ⁷⁴ See, for example, Lieutenant Boyd Alexander, *From the Niger to the Nile*, vol.1 (London: E Arnold, 1907); Elizabeth Isichei, *A History of Nigeria* (London: Longman, 1983), pp.380ff; Hill, 'Policing the Colonial Caribbean', Stout Research Centre Police History Collection, Wellington, p.29.
- ⁷⁵ Rupert Emerson, *Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (New York: Macmillan, 1937).
- ⁷⁶ Wayne E. Lee, (ed.), *Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion, and Warfare in the Early Modern World* (New York: New York University Press, 2011), pp.258, 268.
- ⁷⁷ Cassie Knight, *Brazzaville Charms: Magic and Rebellion in the Republic of Congo* (London: Frances Lincoln, 2007), p.68.
- ⁷⁸ Ibid.
- ⁷⁹ Edward Alsworth Ross, *Report on Employment of Native Labour in Portuguese Africa* (New York: Abbott Press, 1925), p.14, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, NBKR, 4/570.
- ⁸⁰ For the concept of martial race see D. Killingray and Omissi (eds), *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700-1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
- ⁸¹ Kituai, p.156.
- ⁸² A. Hyatt Verrill, *Porto Rico: Past and Present and San Domingo of To-Day* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1919), p.146.
- ⁸³ Onraet, p.86. See also Cohen.
- ⁸⁴ 'Colonial Burma: Laws' folder, Stout Research Centre Police History Collection, Wellington. Even in the early days of the Kenyan Mau Mau rebellion, a police inspector quit because different set of rules for whites and indigenes; for his account, see Peter Evans, *Law and Disorder, Or, Scenes of Life in Kenya* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1956).
- ⁸⁵ This could lead to such contentious issues as British colonies taking over torture from the Spanish: see, for example, James Epstein, *Scandal of Colonial Rule: Power and Subversion in the British Atlantic during the Age of Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
- ⁸⁶ Tracey Banivanua-Mar, "'A thousand miles of cannibal lands": imagining away genocide in the re-colonization of West Papua', *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol.10, No.4 (2008), p.595.
- ⁸⁷ William A. Cadbury, *Labour in Portuguese West Africa* (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1910), p.112.
- ⁸⁸ Dane Kennedy, 'Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory', *JICH*, Vol.24, No.3 (1996), p.356.
- ⁸⁹ Low; T.J. Alldridge, *A Transformed Colony: Sierra Leone, as It Was, and as It Is: Its Progress, People, Native Customs and Undeveloped Wealth* (London: Seely and Co., 1910).
- ⁹⁰ Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965).
- ⁹¹ Dennis Phillips, 'No one likes armed missionaries', *Australian Review of Public Affairs* (October, 2009).
- ⁹² For example, Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2006).
- ⁹³ Roland Hunt and John Harrison, *The District Officer in India, 1930-1947* (London: Scholar Press, 1982), pp.88, 90.
- ⁹⁴ Gilchrist Alexander, *Tanganyika Memories: A Judge in the Red Kanzu* (London: Blackie & Son, 1936), pp.47-48.
- ⁹⁵ Hill, *Colonial Frontier Tamed*, pp.55ff.
- ⁹⁶ Kituai, p.164.